'Desert Storm' reveals the whole war fought between Iraq and an international coalition, from the start of this campaign to its very end. This book offers a refreshing insight into this unique conflict.
Keen to learn but short on time? Get to grips with the events of Operation Desert Storm in next to no time with this concise guide. 50Minutes.com provides a clear and engaging analysis of Operation Desert Storm. Iraq’s decision to invade Kuwait, home to one of the largest oil fields in the world, in 1990 caused panic in the international community. Consequently, in early 1991 a coalition of international forces, the largest military alliance since the Second World War, intervened to drive the Iraqi army out of Kuwait, inflicting huge losses on Saddam Hussein’s forces in the process. In just 50 minutes you will: • Understand the international political and social context preceding the operation • Identify the main leaders of the Iraqi forces and the opposing Allied troops • Analyse the outcome of the battle and its impact on future of the Middle East ABOUT 50MINUTES.COM | History & Culture 50MINUTES.COM will enable you to quickly understand the main events, people, conflicts and discoveries from world history that have shaped the world we live in today. Our publications present the key information on a wide variety of topics in a quick and accessible way that is guaranteed to save you time on your journey of discovery.
This book describes the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, with a pretense of a new government in Kuwait, and less than a week later Saddam Hussein announces that Kuwait is annexed to Iraq.
From a Western perspective, the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 largely fulfilled the first President Bush's objective: "In, out, do it, do it right, get gone. That's the message." But in the Arab world, the causes and consequences of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and his subsequent defeat by a U.S.-led coalition were never so clear-cut. The potent blend of Islam and Arab nationalism that Saddam forged to justify the unjustifiable—his invasion of a Muslim state—gained remarkable support among both Muslims and Arabs and continued to resonate in the Middle East long after the fighting ended. Indeed, as this study argues in passing, it became a significant strand in the tangled web of ideologies and actions that led to the attacks of 9/11. This landmark book offers the first in-depth investigation of how Saddam Hussein used Islam and Arab nationalism to legitimate his invasion of Kuwait in the eyes of fellow Muslims and Arabs, while delegitimating the actions of the U.S.-led coalition and its Arab members. Jerry M. Long addresses three fundamental issues: how extensively and in what specific ways Iraq appealed to Islam during the Kuwait crisis; how elites, Islamists, and the elusive Arab "street," both in and out of the coalition, responded to that appeal and why they responded as they did; and the longer-term effects that resulted from Saddam's strategy.
Provides an account, from the point of view of the U.S. Army forces employed, of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of coalition forces from southeastern Iraq. It focuses on the Army's part in this war, particularly the activities of the Headquarters, Third Army, and the Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT). It looks especially at the activities of the VII Corps, which executed ARCENT's main effort in the theater ground force schwerpunkt -- General Schwarzkopf's "Great Wheel." This is not an official history; the author speaks in his own voice and makes his own judgments. Maps.
"Freedman has collected an array of first-rate political analysts with differing perspectives and areas of expertise. . . . The result is a work of uniformly high quality . . . readable and up to date."--Jerrold D. Green, University of Arizona Center for Middle East Studies We may not live to see the end of the ripple effect of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the ensuing Gulf War. Meanwhile, this collection is one of the first systematic attempts to investigate the implications of that invasion for the significant political actors, in the Middle East and beyond. From varied perspectives and fields of interest, well-respected political scientists focus on the military dynamics of the war and its political effects on the Persian Gulf, on the Arab-Israeli zone of conflict, and on the superpowers. Of particular interest to many readers will be the analysis of both U.S. military and diplomatic strategy during the war and U.S. efforts to convene the Arab-Israeli peace talks after the war; Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts to follow a "minimax" strategy under which he sought a minimum level of cooperation with the United States while retaining maximum influence in Iraq; the debate in Japan about whether to get involved in the Allied war effort; and the reasons for Palestinian support of Iraq during the war. Other subjects analyzed in the book include Saddam Hussein's postwar strategy for staying in power; Jordan's effort to walk a narrow tightrope between the Allies and Iraq; Syrian, Iranian, and Egyptian exploitation of the war to improve their regional positions; and the changes in Israel and Saudi Arabia precipitated by the war. Robert O. Freedman is Peggy Meyerhoff Pearlstone Professor of Political Science and dean of the School of Graduate Studies at Baltimore Hebrew University. He is the editor of Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World, and the Superpowers (UPF, 1991) and a prolific author and frequent lecturer on the Middle East. Contents Preface Introduction Part I: The Military and Political Dynamics of the Gulf War The Persian Gulf War: A Political-Military Assessment, by Bard E. O'Neill and Ilana Kass Part II: The Policy of External Powers U.S. Policy toward the Middle East after Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, by Robert E. Hunter Moscow and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, by Robert O. Freedman Fire on the Other Side of the River: Japan and the Persian Gulf War, by Eugene Brown Part III: The Gulf Region Iraq after the Invasion of Kuwait, by Laurie Mylroie Iran from the August 1988 Cease-fire to the April 1992 Majlis Elections, by Shireen T. Hunter Saudi Arabia: Desert Storm and After, by F. Gregory Gause, III Part IV: The Eastern Mediterranean Israel, the Gulf War, and Its Aftermath, by Marvin Feuerwerger The Palestinians and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, by Helena Cobban Syria since 1988: From Crisis to Opportunity, by Alasdair Drysdale Jordanian Policy from the Intifada to the Madrid Peace Conference, by Adam Garfinkle Unipolarity and Egyptian Hegemony in the Middle East, by Louis Cantori
Evaluates three factors which may explain the causes of the Gulf War. First, the author compares Saddam Hussein's personality to other war-like dictators, analyzes the internal weaknesses of the Iraqi state, and then assesses the formal anarchy of the post