The customary law of belligerent occupation goes back to the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Recent instances of such occupation include Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, the Congo and Eritrea. But the paradigmatic illustration is the Israeli occupation, lasting for over 40 years. There is now case law of the International Court of Justice and other judicial bodies, both international and domestic. There are Security Council resolutions and a vast literature. Still, numerous controversial points remain. How is belligerent occupation defined? How is it started and when is it terminated? What is the interaction with human rights law? Who is protected under belligerent occupation, and what is the scope of the protection? Conversely, what measures can an occupying power lawfully resort to when encountering forcible resistance from inhabitants of the occupied territory? This book examines the legislative, judicial and executive rights of the occupying power and its obligations to the civilian population.
Since the mid-19th century military powers and various writers have tried to define the notion of belligerent occupation and, in particular, the beginning thereof. There are many situations in which a state of occupation is controversial or even denied. When is control so effective that an invasion turns into a state of belligerent occupation? What is the minimum area of a territory that can be occupied; a town, a hamlet, a house or what about a hill taken by the armed forces? This paper examines what seems to be an important gap of the Fourth Geneva Convention: contrary to the Hague Regulations of 1907 it does not provide a definition of belligerent occupation. It is argued that the Fourth Geneva Convention follows its own rules of applicability and that therefore the provisions relative to occupied territories apply in accordance with the “functional beginning” of belligerent occupation approach from the moment that a protected person finds him or herself in the hands of the enemy. Henry Dunant Prize 2010 from the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (ADH Geneva)
The law of occupation imposes two types of obligations on an army that seizes control of enemy land during armed conflict: obligations to respect and protect the inhabitants and their rights, and an obligation to respect the sovereign rights of the ousted government. In theory, the occupant is expected to establish an effective and impartial administration, to carefully balance its own interests against those of the inhabitants and their government, and to negotiate the occupation's early termination in a peace treaty. Although these expectations have been proven to be too high for most occupants, they nevertheless serve as yardsticks that measure the level of compliance of the occupants with international law. This thoroughly revised edition of the 1993 book traces the evolution of the law of occupation from its inception during the 18th century until today. It offers an assessment of the law by focusing on state practice of the various occupants and reactions thereto, and on the governing legal texts and judicial decisions. The underlying thought that informs and structures the book suggests that this body of laws has been shaped by changing conceptions about war and sovereignty, by the growing attention to human rights and the right to self-determination, as well as by changes in the balance of power among states. Because the law of occupation indirectly protects the sovereign, occupation law can be seen as the mirror-image of the law on sovereignty. Shifting perceptions on sovereign authority are therefore bound to be reflected also in the law of occupation, and vice-versa.
This book provides the first comprehensive analysis of factors that transform a prima facie non-international armed conflict (NIAC) into an international armed conflict (IAC) and the consequences that follow from this process of internationalization. It examines in detail the historical development as well as the current state of the relevant rules of international humanitarian law. The discussion is grounded in general international law, complemented with abundant references to case law, and illustrated by examples from twentieth and twenty-first century armed conflicts. In Part I, the book puts forward a thorough catalogue of modalities of conflict internationalization that includes outside intervention, State dissolution, and recognition of belligerency. It then specifically considers the legal qualification of complex situations that feature more than two conflict parties and contrasts the mechanism of internationalization of armed conflicts with the reverse process of de-internationalization. Part II of the book challenges the conventional wisdom that members of non-State armed groups do not normally benefit from combatant status. It argues that the majority of fighters belonging to non-State armed groups in most types of internationalized armed conflicts are in fact eligible for combatant status. Finally, Part III turns to belligerent occupation, traditionally understood as a leading example of a notion that cannot be transposed to armed conflicts occurring in the territory of a single State. By contrast, the book argues in favour of the applicability of the law of belligerent occupation to internationalized armed conflicts.
This monograph analyses the historical evolution of the laws of occupation as a special branch of international humanitarian law (IHL), focusing on the extent to which this body of law has been transformed by its interaction with the development of international human rights law. It argues that a large part of the laws of occupation has proved to be malleable while being able to accommodate changing demands of civilians and any other persons affected by occupation in modern context. Its examinations have drawn much on archival research into the drafting documents of the instruments of IHL, including the aborted Brussels Declaration 1874, the 1899/1907 Hague Regulations, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol I. After assessing the complementary relationship between international human rights law and the laws of occupation, the book examines how to provide a coherent explanation for an emerging framework on the rights of individual persons affected by occupation. It engages in a theoretical appraisal of the role of customary IHL and the Martens clause in building up such a normative framework.
"This book is an updated and expanded study of the manner in which the Supreme Court of Israel has related to petitions challenging actions of the Israeli authorities in the territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 War. The first edition of the study was published two decades ago by one of the present authors, David Kretzmer. The original work was completed just before the second intifida began in September 2000. It covered decisions of the Supreme Court both during the formative years of the Court's jurisprudence on the occupation, and during the first intifada that broke out in December 1987. As stated in the preface to the first edition, the beginning of the second intifada proved that the hopes that the historic Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO (1993-1995) would lead to peace between Israel and the Palestinians and to the end of the occupation were premature. At the present time (2020) an end to direct Israeli control over the West Bank and restrictions on life in Gaza does not seem to be in sight. The so-called peace plan published by the Trump Administration in February 2020, as we were completing the manuscript, does not alter that picture, although it may contribute to changes in the regime in the West Bank. Much that has happened since the first edition was published has affected the type of cases that reach the Supreme Court, and consequently the topics covered in this study. After a wave of suicide bombings in Israel in 2001 and 2002 the IDF embarked on a military operation in the West Bank. This operation and subsequent hostilities between the IDF and armed Palestinian groups yielded a host of petitions relating to means and methods of warfare and to judicial review during active hostilities. In 2002 the Israeli government began the construction of a separation barrier in the West Bank, the declared purpose of which was to make it more difficult for potential Palestinian terrorists to enter Israel itself. The barrier's route not only spurred close to two hundred petitions to the Supreme Court; it was also the subject of an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice. In August 2005 Israel withdrew its armed forces and civilian settlements from the Gaza Strip under the Disengagement Plan, and the government announced that Israel no longer had responsibility for Gaza. Controversy arose whether Gaza remained occupied territory. In 2006 the Hamas movement gained control over Gaza and the Government of Israel declared Gaza to be 'hostile territory.' The relations between Israel and Gaza have been tense ever since, with firing of rockets and bombs on Israeli towns and villages, severe restrictions on supply of goods to Gaza and movement of people between Gaza and the West Bank, and periods of active hostilities between Israel and Gaza. Since the first edition of this study was completed there has been a dramatic expansion in the number of Israeli settlements and settlers in the West Bank. This expansion has had various legal and practical consequences, including the emergence of two different legal regimes applicable to Israelis and to Palestinians resident in the West Bank"--
Belligerent Reprisals examines the historical developments in the law and practice relating to recourse to belligerent reprisals, as a (primitive) means of law enforcement in the hands of a party to an armed conflict, victim of a violation of the law of war at the hands of its enemy. As a legal concept, the notion means that the victim in turn violates a rule of the same body of the law of war, with the purpose of thus inducing the enemy to terminate its unlawful conduct. However, the enemy may in its turn denounce the so-called reprisal as an unlawful act of war and retaliate against it, thus setting in motion the ill-famed spiral of negative reciprocity. While early lawmakers refrained from taking up the issue, prohibitions of reprisals could be achieved in conventions adopted in 1929 and 1949 on the protection of the power of the enemy. In contrast, reprisals (or retaliatory conduct announced under that title without meeting the requisite conditions) were common practice in the conduct of hostilities, with civilians in non-occupied territory as the main victims. With major governments disinclined to give up this tool, the ban on reprisals against civilian populations ultimately accepted in the Protocols of 1977 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 could only be hard-fought, and it remains contested to this day. First published in 1971, Belligerent Reprisals has become a classic work on this complex topic. The analysis of lawmaking and state practice it contains is as valid today as it was in the late 1970’s, and elucidates the dilemmas inherent in the notion of belligerent reprisal, as a means of law enforcement that can go terribly wrong.
