The United States has a large and complex interagency process to deal with national security on a global basis. It is imperative that civilian and military professionals understand that process. The chapters in this volume deal with various dimensions and institutions, from the National Security Council, the Department of State, and other agencies. It also contains case studies of interagency coordination and integration.
The Interagency Process (IAP), formally established in 1947, is in need of major over-haul. The present process for directing national strategic policy is open for interpretation by the executive branch, which has led to ineffective interagency proceedings, redundancy, and at times conflicting policy. As the nation prepares for the future, it is imperative that the IAP be better codified and formalized to enhance national strength and security. Over the past century and through many conflicts, the role of the U.S. military has changed from being a self-defense force to being a global force focused on a commitment to world peace and democracy. The evolution of the Services into a joint, unified fighting machine is a fascinating study of overcoming personalities, almost fanatical parochialism, and much debate on what is best for the nation. The evolution of democratic principals and a global military presence makes it essential that the leaders of organizations involved in political and military intercourse fully recognize and understand the role of all departments and agencies of the U.S. Government as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational organizations. The IAP applied during military contingency operations has been a topic of discussion and debate since its inception. Many studies have discussed the shortfalls of the IAP, and each administration has struggled to recognize and make use of lessons from previous conflicts.
The United States has a large and complex interagency process to deal with national security on a global basis. It is imperative that civilian and military professionals understand that process. The chapters in this volume deal with various dimensions and institutions, from the National Security Council, the Department of State, and other agencies. It also contains case studies of interagency coordination and integration.
What government insiders call the interagency process- or, even worse, "the interagency" has generally developed without consistent central control or direction. Given the American government's structure, intended from its founding to favor checks and balances over efficiency, this lack of interagency coherence is not surprising. One institution, however, stands as a model of interagency cooperation and coordination at its most effective: the civilian political advisor, or POLAD, assigned to advise the most senior officers of the U.S. military.
Inhibitions about using force can distance the military from participation in interagency decision making. As a result other instruments of national power may be exhausted before serious attention is given to the unique capabilities of the Armed Forces, and then only with a deep sense of having failed in employing other means. The interagency process, especially when military planners are involved throughout, can represent a significant force multiplier, but it suffers from deficiencies in methods, actors, and structure. Military officers, accustomed to a settled and demanding system of staff work, may be frustrated by governmental mechanisms which are known for elasticity and ambivalence. But the military should remain engaged in the interagency process both to make it more effective and to ensure that the military voice is heard at the table. Officers can educate the interagency community about military capabilities and, more importantly, about the limitations of force.
The level of interagency cooperation in the conduct of US foreign policy has varied widely in the past. The Executive Branch has made progress in improving cooperation at the national level since Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY, the invasion and subsequent restoration of civil government in Panama. While the National Security Council serves as the strategic-level interagency coordination body, mechanisms for such coordination become less structured and more ad hoc as we move down the spectrum through the theater strategic, operational and tactical levels of the application of national power. In a time of increased and varied global tensions, asymmetric threats and over-taxed resources, the synergy gained by effective interagency cooperation at all levels of endeavor is essential. This paper will look at some of the common problems involved in intra-governmental cooperation, and drawing on the author's recent experience in Afghanistan, identify some lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom that may be applicable in other locations and future operations.
This symposium was held 16-18 Sept. 2008 at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The theme, ¿The U.S. Army and the Interagency Process: Historical Perspectives,¿ was designed to explore the partnership between the U.S. Army and government agencies in attaining national goals and objectives in peace and war within a historical context. The symposium also examined current issues, dilemmas, problems, trends, and practices associated with U.S. Army operations requiring interagency cooperation. In the midst of two wars and Army engagement in numerous other parts of a troubled world, this topic is of tremendous importance to the U.S. Army and the Nation. Charts and tables.
