Ireland and the War at Sea, 1641-1653

Ireland and the War at Sea, 1641-1653

Author: Elaine Murphy

Publisher: Boydell & Brewer Ltd

Published: 2012

Total Pages: 270

ISBN-13: 0861933184

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

An examination of the mid-seventeenth century maritime battles between Ireland, England, and Scotland, showing them to have had a dramatic impact on the overall conflict. The conflict on the Irish seaboard between the years 1641 and 1653 was not some peripheral theatre in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. As this first full-length study of the war at sea on the Irish coast from the outbreak of the Ulster rising in 1641 to the surrender of Inishbofin Island, the last major royalist maritime outpost, in April 1653, shows, it was instead the epicentre of naval conflict with important consequences for the nature and outcome of the land conflicts in Ireland and elsewhere. The book provides a clear and comprehensive narrative account of the war at sea, accompanied by careful contextualisation and a full analysis of its Irish, British and European dimensions. This includes the strategic importance of Irish ports, conflict between organised navies and formidable bands of privateers and pirates, the adoption of new naval technologies and tactics and the relationship between conflict onland and sea. Moving beyond traditional accounts of naval campaigns, it integrates warfare at sea into the wider dimension of political and economic developments in Ireland, England and Scotland. Extensive use is made of a wide range of archival material, in particular the High Court of Admiralty papers held in the National Archives at Kew. Dr Elaine Murphy is Lecturer in Maritime/Naval History, Plymouth University.


The 1641 Depositions and the Irish Rebellion

The 1641 Depositions and the Irish Rebellion

Author: Annaleigh Margey

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2015-10-06

Total Pages: 281

ISBN-13: 1317322053

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

The 1641 Depositions are among the most important documents relating to early modern Irish history. This essay collection is part of a major project run by Trinity College, Dublin, using the depositions to investigate the life and culture of seventeenth-century Ireland.


The Irish and British Wars, 1637–1654

The Irish and British Wars, 1637–1654

Author: James Scott Wheeler

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2003-10-03

Total Pages: 285

ISBN-13: 1134598335

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Connecting the strategic and tactical levels of war with political actions and reactions,this is an accessible and well-documented study of the wars of Britain and Ireland in the mid 17th century.


The Oxford Handbook of Modern Irish History

The Oxford Handbook of Modern Irish History

Author: Alvin Jackson

Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA

Published: 2014-03

Total Pages: 801

ISBN-13: 0199549346

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Draws from a wide range of disciplines to bring together 36 leading scholars writing about 400 years of modern Irish history


Confederate Catholics at War, 1641-49

Confederate Catholics at War, 1641-49

Author: Pádraig Lenihan

Publisher: Stylus Publishing, LLC.

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 328

ISBN-13: 9781859182444

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This book evaluates the Confederate Catholic war effort from the preceeding phase of localized insurgency, through the formation of a national self-government in 1642, until the Confederate Catholic regime was finally subsumed in a broad pan-Royalist alliance in 1649. While this alliance held out the prospect of significant religious and constitutional concessons this achievement was nullified by the subsequent Cromwellian catastrophe: the Confederate regime failed. In attributing this failure to political factionalism, historians have neglected the potential and limitations of the Confederate war effort. This study does not substitute crude military determinism but acknowledges that political indecision and strategic incoherence inhibited the war effort at critical junctures. From the conflicting political priorities of Confederates two partially exclusive military strategies, insular, and expeditionary, can be identified. Both strategies were proactive and so demanded standing armies rather than local militia units. This book emphasizes the crucial importance of the tax gathering apparatus in fueling the incremental growth of standing armies. In the absence of large scale foreign patronage, exacting money from an agrarian economy, rather than the shortages of material, or still less, manpower representing the crucial extrinsic limit to Confederate military potential. Given these limits, it was a considerable achievement to contain two British interventions (in 1642 and 1646/7 respectively). The influence of the contemporaneous "military revolution" on the European mainland was mediated by the cadre of returned mercenary officers. Consequently, the Confederates developed a qualitative edge in fortification and siegecraft. The application of the continental model and the shift from putatively "celtic" or irregular tactics of raiding and running battles would be more problematic. This and other explanations for the poor battlefield performance of the Confederate armies are discussed.


Raw Generals and Green Soldiers

Raw Generals and Green Soldiers

Author: Pádraig Lenihan

Publisher: Helion and Company

Published: 2023-08-21

Total Pages: 188

ISBN-13: 1804516465

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

The eleven years of conflict that engulfed Ireland (1641-53) can be seen as a drama in three acts, each of which drew Ireland into progressively closer alignment with the Civil Wars (1642-52) in the other two Stuart kingdoms, Scotland and England. The first act in the Wars of Religion in Ireland (1641-53) began in October 1641 with a rising in Ulster and shuddered to a halt in September 1643 when the insurgents, now embodied as the Confederate Catholics, agreed a ceasefire with Charles I’s representative in Ireland. This study is confined to Act One to manage its sheer scope and scale. Not a single county in Ireland was unscathed by war and in summer 1642 there were more men under arms than there ever had been or would be again. Moreover, Act One was singularly nasty. Insurgent slaughter of Protestant settlers in the winter of 1641-42 quickly gained canonical status. English and Scots armies routinely massacred natives in the spring and summer that followed. After their uprising failed, the Irish in 1642 were attacked by English and Scottish armies that were bigger, in aggregate, than any before or since. And that includes the armies of Elizabeth I, Oliver Cromwell and William of Orange. Lacking munitions, forced to disperse their strength, and usually outfought in open battle, the Confederate Catholics pushed back in war-as-process and food-fights in which castles dominating a chequerboard of hinterlands jostled with hostile neighbors. The Catholics were winning this small war when the music stopped in 1643. This is a study of the Catholic armies in Act One through a succinct narrative which reveals underlying pattern and purpose in what would otherwise be one apparently random battle, siege, skirmish, massacre, and cattle raid after another, devoid of form or meaning. The narrative focuses in and out, from the strategic through the operational down to the tactical and what happened in a particular place on a given day. The narrative also shifts from the southern or Leinster/Munster theater to the northern or Connacht/Ulster theater. Meaning is disclosed through narrative in which the strengths and shortcomings of the Irish armies become clearer. The quotation in the title sets up two such shortcomings, of leaders and led. One reason why the Catholics lost so many battles may be that their generals fought battles when they needn’t have, showed a fatal preference for the all-out attack, and did not always deploy in a manner that let their army’s components, pike, shot and horse act in mutual support. Another reason may be that the rankers were less invested in the Catholic cause than their officers. But the establishing quotation is followed by a question mark. Perhaps the real question to be asked is how the Catholic armies achieved so much rather than why they failed.