This two-volume set examines the origins and growth of judicial review in the key G-20 constitutional democracies, which include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, India, Canada, Australia, South Korea, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, and the European Union, as well as Israel. The volumes consider five different theories, which help to explain the origins of judicial review, and identify which theories apply best in the various countries discussed. They consider not only what gives rise to judicial review originally, but also what causes of judicial review lead it to become more powerful and prominent over time. Volume Two discusses the G-20 civil law countries.
This major history of judicial review, revised to include the Rehnquist court, shows how modern courts have used their power to create new "rights with fateful political consequences." Originally published by Basic Books.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.
This two-volume set examines the origins and growth of judicial review in the key G-20 constitutional democracies, which include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, India, Canada, Australia, South Korea, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, and the European Union, as well as Israel. The volumes consider five different theories, which help to explain the origins of judicial review, and identify which theories apply best in the various countries discussed. They consider not only what gives rise to judicial review originally, but also what causes of judicial review lead it to become more powerful and prominent over time. Volume One discusses the G-20 common law countries and Israel.
"This book examines the origins and growth of judicial review in the key G-20 constitutional democracies, which include: the United States; the United Kingdom; France; Germany; Japan; Italy; India; Canada; Australia; South Korea; Brazil; South Africa; Indonesia; Mexico; and the European Union. The book considers five different theories, which help to explain the origins of judicial review, and it identifies which theories apply best in the various countries discussed. It considers not on what gives rise to judicial review originally, but also what causes of judicial review lead it to become more powerful and prominent over times. The positive account of what causes the origins and growth of judicial review in so many very different countries over such a long period of time has normative implications"--
In countries and supranational entities around the globe, constitutional reform has transferred an unprecedented amount of power from representative institutions to judiciaries. The constitutionalization of rights and the establishment of judicial review are widely believed to have benevolent and progressive origins, and significant redistributive, power-diffusing consequences. Ran Hirschl challenges this conventional wisdom. Drawing upon a comprehensive comparative inquiry into the political origins and legal consequences of the recent constitutional revolutions in Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and South Africa, Hirschl shows that the trend toward constitutionalization is hardly driven by politicians' genuine commitment to democracy, social justice, or universal rights. Rather, it is best understood as the product of a strategic interplay among hegemonic yet threatened political elites, influential economic stakeholders, and judicial leaders. This self-interested coalition of legal innovators determines the timing, extent, and nature of constitutional reforms. Hirschl demonstrates that whereas judicial empowerment through constitutionalization has a limited impact on advancing progressive notions of distributive justice, it has a transformative effect on political discourse. The global trend toward juristocracy, Hirschl argues, is part of a broader process whereby political and economic elites, while they profess support for democracy and sustained development, attempt to insulate policymaking from the vicissitudes of democratic politics.
In this book, the author presents a new interpretation of the origin of judicial review. She traces the development of judicial review from American independence through the tenure of John Marshall as Chief Justice, showing that Marshall's role was far more innovative and decisive than has yet been recognized. According to the author all support for judicial review before Marshall contemplated a fundamentally different practice from that which we know today. Marshall did not simply reinforce or extend ideas already accepted but, in superficially minor and disguised ways, effected a radical transformation in the nature of the constitution and the judicial relationship to it.
When the Supreme Court strikes down favored legislation, politicians cry judicial activism. When the law is one politicians oppose, the court is heroically righting a wrong. In our polarized moment of partisan fervor, the Supreme Court’s routine work of judicial review is increasingly viewed through a political lens, decried by one side or the other as judicial overreach, or “legislating from the bench.” But is this really the case? Keith E. Whittington asks in Repugnant Laws, a first-of-its-kind history of judicial review. A thorough examination of the record of judicial review requires first a comprehensive inventory of relevant cases. To this end, Whittington revises the extant catalog of cases in which the court has struck down a federal statute and adds to this, for the first time, a complete catalog of cases upholding laws of Congress against constitutional challenges. With reference to this inventory, Whittington is then able to offer a reassessment of the prevalence of judicial review, an account of how the power of judicial review has evolved over time, and a persuasive challenge to the idea of an antidemocratic, heroic court. In this analysis, it becomes apparent that that the court is political and often partisan, operating as a political ally to dominant political coalitions; vulnerable and largely unable to sustain consistent opposition to the policy priorities of empowered political majorities; and quasi-independent, actively exercising the power of judicial review to pursue the justices’ own priorities within bounds of what is politically tolerable. The court, Repugnant Laws suggests, is a political institution operating in a political environment to advance controversial principles, often with the aid of political leaders who sometimes encourage and generally tolerate the judicial nullification of federal laws because it serves their own interests to do so. In the midst of heated battles over partisan and activist Supreme Court justices, Keith Whittington’s work reminds us that, for better or for worse, the court reflects the politics of its time.
