Focusing on the rivalries among the Great Powers in the search for markets during the world depression of the 1930s, the author surveys the five Major Powers and all the Eastern European countries from the Baltic to Turkey. But he primarily canvases the economic situations in locations like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia.
The region between the Baltic and the Black Sea was marked by a set of crises and conflicts in the 1920s and 1930s, demonstrating the diplomatic, military, economic or cultural engagement of France, Germany, Russia, Britain, Italy and Japan in this highly volatile region, and critically damaging the fragile post-Versailles political arrangement. The editors, in naming this region as "Middle Europe" seek to revive the symbolic geography of the time and accentuate its position, situated between Big Powers and two World Wars. The ten case studies in this book combine traditional diplomatic history with a broader emphasis on the geopolitical aspects of Big-Power rivalry to understand the interwar period. The essays claim that the European Big Powers played a key role in regional affairs by keeping the local conflicts and national movements under control and by exploiting the region's natural resources and military dependencies, while at the same time strengthening their prestige through cultural penetration and the cultivation of client networks. The authors, however, want to avoid the simplistic view that the Big Powers fully dominated the lesser players on the European stage. The relationship was indeed hierarchical, but the essays also reveal how the "small states" manipulated Big-Power disagreements, highlighting the limits of the latters' leverage throughout the 1920s and the 1930s.
This book illuminates, in the form of a clear, well-paced and student-friendly analytical narrative, the functioning of the European states system in its heyday, the crucial century between the defeat of Napoleon in 1814 and the outbreak of the First World War just one hundred years later. In this substantially revised and expanded version of the text, the author has included the results of the latest research, a body of additional information and a number of carefully designed maps that will make the subject even more accessible to readers.
The heyday of the European states system was in the century before the First World War. How the system of five great powers in conscious equilibrium came into being is the central theme of this book.
The history of oil is a chapter in the story of Europe's geopolitical decline in the twentieth century. During the era of the two world wars, a lack of oil constrained Britain and Germany from exerting their considerable economic and military power independently. Both nations' efforts to restore the independence they had enjoyed during the Age of Coal backfired by inducing strategic over-extension, which served only to hasten their demise as great powers. Having fought World War I with oil imported from the United States, Britain was determined to avoid relying upon another great power for its energy needs ever again. Even before the Great War had ended, Whitehall implemented a strategy of developing alternative sources of oil under British control. Britain's key supplier would be the Middle East - already a region of vital importance to the British Empire - whose oil potential was still unproven. As it turned out, there was plenty of oil in the Middle East, but Italian hostility after 1935 threatened transit through the Mediterranean. A shortage of tankers ruled out re-routing shipments around Africa, forcing Britain to import oil from US-controlled sources in the Western Hemisphere and depleting its foreign exchange reserves. Even as war loomed in 1939, therefore, Britain's quest for independence from the United States had failed. Germany was in an even worse position than Britain. It could not import oil from overseas in wartime due to the threat of blockade, while accumulating large stockpiles was impossible because of the economic and financial costs. The Third Reich went to war dependent on petroleum synthesized from coal, domestic crude oil, and overland imports, primarily from Romania. German leaders were confident, however, that they had enough oil to fight a series of short campaigns that would deliver to them the mastery of Europe. This plan derailed following the victory over France, when Britain continued to fight. This left Germany responsible for Europe's oil requirements while cut off from world markets. A looming energy crisis in Axis Europe, the absence of strategic alternatives, and ideological imperatives all compelled Germany in June 1941 to invade the Soviet Union and fulfill the Third Reich's ultimate ambition of becoming a world power - a decision that ultimately sealed its fate.
This new political history of the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire explains why Orthodoxy became the subject of acute political competition between the Great Powers during the mid 19th century. It also explores how such rivalries led, paradoxically, both to secularizing reforms and to Europe's last great war of religion - the Crimean War.
In 1840, conflict within the Ottoman Empire gave rise to a serious all-European crisis which led to a diplomatic rupture between France and other Great Powers. The crisis was given the name of the natural frontier which divided France from the rest of Europe: the Rhine. Although the Rhine Crisis did not lead to armed conflict, many states were deeply worried by the unfolding events and by the failure of the peace so carefully negotiated at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Combined with accumulated political, social, national and economic problems, there were fears of general social upheaval and perhaps even revolution. This book uses the Rhine Crisis to evaluate the stability of the European States System and the functionality of the Concert of Europe in this period. In doing so, Miroslav edivy offers an original and deeply-researched insight into the history of international relations in the pivotal years between 1815 and 1848."