"[This] book examines how trhe German army developed field fortifications to hold what can loosely be described as the Ypres Friont. With the decision by Falkenhayn in 1915 to concentrate Germany's offensive effoets largely in the east, the German defenders around Ypres set to developing their lines for semi-permanent occupation. The subsoil around the Salient generally made it difficult to construct and maintain mined (i.e. deep) dugouts - unlike, for example on the Somme, with easily worked chalk not far below the surface. The only practicable alternative was to use reinforced concrete. The authors... have used [a] ... range of primary sources to provide a narrative of what the Germans built, how they built it (the logistical challenge was enormous) and how the designs and requirements of types of bunkers, such as forward medical bunkers, artillery shelters, machine gun and observation bunkers, changed as the war progressed and as the military situation on the front dictated. "--Back cover.
The WWI military expert presents his authoritative study of the German Army’s operations during the First Battle of Ypres. Soon after the First World War broke out in 1914, Allied and German forces attempted to outflank each other in a series of battles along the Western Front. Some of the most intense fighting came in Flanders, Belgium, at the First Battle of Ypres. It was during this battle that generals on both sides confronted the end of maneuvering as they became locked into positional warfare. Historian Jack Sheldon is a renowned expert on the German Army during WWI. In this groundbreaking study of the First Battle of Ypres, he presents a tactical narrative of German operation at the regimental and battalion level. Focusing on the battles around Ypres against the British Expeditionary Force, Sheldon also analyses the fighting against the French and Belgian armies. This book also features the first complete account of German army operations in the battles north of Lille in the late autumn of 1914. Drawing on extensive research into German sources, Sheldon presents the testimony of German participants, shedding light on the experiences of the fighting troops at regimental level and below. He supports this material with historical context and commentary, as well as evidence from senior commanders.
Describing the radical transformation in German Infantry tactics that took place during World War I, this book presents the first detailed account of the evolution of stormtroop tactics available in English. It covers areas previously left unexplored: the German Infantry's tactical heritage, the squad's evolution as a tactical unit, the use of new weapons for close combat, the role of the elite assault units in the development of new tactics, and detailed descriptions of offensive battles that provided the inspiration and testing ground for this new way of fighting. Both a historical investigation and a standard of excellence in infantry tactics, Stormtroop Tactics is required reading for professional military officers and historians as well as enthusiasts. Contrary to previous studies, Stormtroop Tactics proposes that the German Infantry adaption to modern warfare was not a straightforward process resulting from the top down intervention of reformers but instead a bottom up phenomenon. It was an accumulation of improvisations and ways of dealing with pressing situations that were later sewn together to form what we now call Blitzkrieg. Focusing on action at the company, platoon, and squad level, Stormtroop Tactics provides a detailed description of the evolution of German defensive tactics during World War I—tactics that were the direct forbears of those used in World War II.
The combined British Expeditionary Force and American II Corps successfully pierced the Hindenburg Line during the Hundred Days Campaign of World War I, an offensive that hastened the war’s end. Yet despite the importance of this effort, the training and operation of II Corps has received scant attention from historians. Mitchell A. Yockelson delivers a comprehensive study of the first time American and British soldiers fought together as a coalition force—more than twenty years before D-Day. He follows the two divisions that constituted II Corps, the 27th and 30th, from the training camps of South Carolina to the bloody battlefields of Europe. Despite cultural differences, General Pershing’s misgivings, and the contrast between American eagerness and British exhaustion, the untested Yanks benefited from the experience of battle-toughened Tommies. Their combined forces contributed much to the Allied victory. Yockelson plumbs new archival sources, including letters and diaries of American, Australian, and British soldiers to examine how two forces of differing organization and attitude merged command relationships and operations. Emphasizing tactical cooperation and training, he details II Corps’ performance in Flanders during the Ypres-Lys offensive, the assault on the Hindenburg Line, and the decisive battle of the Selle. Featuring thirty-nine evocative photographs and nine maps, this account shows how the British and American military relationship evolved both strategically and politically. A case study of coalition warfare, Borrowed Soldiers adds significantly to our understanding of the Great War.
This third volume of a mini-series covering the German forces in World War I examines the troops that fought during the climax of the war on all fronts: the last great battles of attrition in the West (Arras, Messines, 3rd Ypres Passchendaele/Langemarck and Cambrai, 1917) and the collapse of Russia in the East. The 'Kaiserschlacht' campaign is covered, as are the German operations in Italy, the Balkans, and in support of Turkey in the Middle East. Uniform changes during this period reflected the introduction of new tactics and weapons and new types of troops, such as tanks and assault battalions.
The sector north of Ypres is best known for the inundation of much of the ground to the east of the Yser that acted as a block to the German advance in the autumn of 1914. From that time on military activities were extremely limited. Much of this line was manned by Belgian troops, with some assistance from the French army at its southern end and of the British army on the Channel coast. The role of the Belgian army in the Great War is little known, apart from the opening months, when 'brave little Belgium' held on to its important fortified cities, notably Liege and Antwerp, for longer than German planning had anticipated. It was not until mid October 1914 that the Belgian army was forced back to the area of the Yser, when its defences were bolstered by French troops whilst Haig's I Corps came up on its southern flank. At this crucial phase of the campaign, the harsh decision was taken to open the dykes at the end of October 1914 and thereby flooding much of the low lying ground east of the Yser and so effectively halting major German offensive operations. For almost four years the Belgian army rested reasonably secure behind this sodden landscape, although certain key points were the scene of frequent, if limited, tussles. 'Free' Belgium was reduced to two significant towns that could be regarded as secure and out of the range of most German artillery - the coastal resort of La Panne (De Panne) and the much bigger settlement of Furnes (Veurne), Over these years the Belgian army was rebuilt under the dynamic leadership of the king, Albert I, and by the time of the general allied advance in September 1918, the Belgian army was able to take its place in the Advance to Victory, in an allied Army that was commanded by King Albert. Although this phase of the war is outside the scope of the book, it is important to realise that the Belgian army was a very active player in these last few months. Amongst the achievements of Belgian troops at this stage of the war was the final capture of Passchendaele. This book concerns itself with the years of defence and the reconstruction of the army behind the Yser. Relatively little of Belgium's efforts in the Great War remained, but recent years have seen action to preserve what does. Most significant of these, perhaps, is the so called Trench of Death near Diksmuide. Although always preserved, it has recently been very successfully refurbished and is now most effectively and informatively presented. Other remains from the war have also been developed so as to be more informative and the result is that touring this area provides a fascinating insight into one of the most unusual sectors of the Western Front and which is conveniently close to the much visited Ypres Salient. In this book Chris Baker brings his extensive knowledge of the Belgian army (helped by his ability to read French and Dutch) and of the Flanders region to produce a much needed insight into Belgium's army role for most of the war as the protector of the northern flank of the whole of the Allied line.
Alongside maps and carefully-chosen archive photography, David Lomas explores The British Expeditionary Force's presence during the battle of Mons and thereafter. When the First World War broke out in August 1914 the Imperial German Army mistakenly assumed that the BEF – 'that contemptible little army' – would be easily defeated. They were stopped in their tracks by the numerically inferior British force, whose excellent marksmanship cost the closed packed German ranks dear. Eventually forced to fall back by overwhelming German numbers, the British carried out a masterful fighting retreat across Belgium and northern France. At Mons, nine and a half British battalions held four German divisions at bay for an entire day. This book examines not just the battle of Mons itself but also the ensuing British retreat including the actions at Le Cateau and Villers-Cotterêts.
Convinced that both God and the Kaiser were on their side, the officers and men of the German Army went to war in 1914, confident that they were destined for a swift and crushing victory in the West. The vaunted Schlieffen Plan on which the anticipated German victory was based expected triumph in the West to be followed by an equally decisive success on the Eastern Front. It was not to be. From the winter of 1914 until the early months of 1918, the struggle on the Western Front was characterised by trench warfare. But our perception of the conflict takes little or no account of the realities of life 'across the wire' in the German trenches. This book redresses that imbalance and reminds us how similar these young German men were to our own Tommies. Drawing from diaries and letters, Ian Passingham charts the hopes and despair of the German soldiers, filling an important gap in the history of the Western Front.
In August 1914 the mobilization of Imperial Germany's 800,000-strong army ushered in the first great war of the modern age a war which still stands as the greatest slaughter of soldiers in history. That German Army is also the best example of a particular period of military thought, when virtually the whole manpower of the European nations was integrated into mass conscript armies, supported by several age categories of reservists and by dedicated industrial and transport systems. In this first of three volumes the author offers an extraordinary mass of information, in text and tables, illustrated by photographs and colour plates.
This book is an innovative comparative history of how German and British soldiers endured the horror of the First World War. Unlike existing literature, which emphasises the strength of societies or military institutions, this study argues that at the heart of armies' robustness lay natural human resilience. Drawing widely on contemporary letters and diaries of British and German soldiers, psychiatric reports and official documentation, and interpreting these sources with modern psychological research, this unique account provides fresh insights into the soldiers' fears, motivations and coping mechanisms. It explains why the British outlasted their opponents by examining and comparing the motives for fighting, the effectiveness with which armies and societies supported men and the combatants' morale throughout the conflict on both sides. Finally it challenges the consensus on the war's end, arguing that not a 'covert strike' but rather an 'ordered surrender' led by junior officers brought about Germany's defeat in 1918.
