Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology
In November 1999, GSA and the U.S. Department of State convened a symposium to discuss the apparently conflicting objectives of security from terrorist attack and the design of public buildings in an open society. The symposium sponsors rejected the notion of rigid, prescriptive design approaches. The symposium concluded with a challenge to the design and security professions to craft aesthetically appealing architectural solutions that achieve balanced, performance-based approaches to both openness and security. In response to a request from the Office of the Chief Architect of the Public Buildings Service, the National Research Council (NRC) assembled a panel of independent experts, the Committee to Review the Security Design Criteria of the Interagency Security Committee. This committee was tasked to evaluate the ISC Security Design Criteria to determine whether particular provisions might be too prescriptive to allow a design professional "reasonable flexibility" in achieving desired security and physical protection objectives.
One of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) priorities is the protection of Federal employees and private citizens who work within and visit U.S. Government-owned or leased facilities. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC), chaired by DHS, consists of 53 Federal departments and agencies, has as its mission the development of security standards and best practices for nonmilitary Federal facilities in the United States. As Chair of the ISC, I am pleased to introduce the new ISC document titled The Risk Management Process: An Interagency Security Committee Standard (Standard). This ISC Standard defines the criteria and processes that those responsible for the security of a facility should use to determine its facility security level and provides an integrated, single source of physical security countermeasures for all nonmilitary Federal facilities. The Standard also provides guidance for customization of the countermeasures for Federal facilities.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management