The Existence of a Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium
Author: Sang-Seung Yi
Publisher:
Published: 1995
Total Pages: 28
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKRead and Download eBook Full
Author: Sang-Seung Yi
Publisher:
Published: 1995
Total Pages: 28
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Guilherme Carmona
Publisher: World Scientific
Published: 2013
Total Pages: 153
ISBN-13: 9814390658
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe book aims at describing the recent developments in the existence and stability of Nash equilibrium. The two topics are central to game theory and economics and have been extensively researched. Recent results on existence and stability of Nash equilibrium are scattered and the relationship between them has not been explained clearly. The book will make these results easily accessible and understandable to researchers in the field. Book jacket.
Author: Hans Keiding
Publisher:
Published: 1999
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Hans Keiding
Publisher:
Published: 1999
Total Pages: 24
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: B. Douglas Bernheim
Publisher:
Published: 1984
Total Pages: 39
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Chenghong Luo
Publisher:
Published: 2020
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Peter Borm
Publisher:
Published: 1991
Total Pages: 5
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Debraj Ray
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2007-11
Total Pages: 336
ISBN-13: 019920795X
DOWNLOAD EBOOKDrawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
Author: Michael R. Baye
Publisher:
Published: 1990
Total Pages: 62
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Ryusuke Shinohara
Publisher:
Published: 2019
Total Pages: 8
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKI introduce an undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibrium that is unique and is able to select undominated Nash equilibria in a quasi-supermodular game with a strict single-crossing property and monotonic externalities.