This is the most comprehensive and up-to-date investigation of moral and conceptual questions about lying and deception. Carson argues that there is a moral presumption against lying and deception that causes harm, he examines case-studies from business, politics, and history, and he offers a qualified defence of the view that honesty is a virtue.
This title gathers together essays on deception, self-deception, and the intersections of the two phenomena, from the leading thinkers on the subject. It will be of interest to philosophers across the spectrum including those interested in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and metaphysics.
This book systematically explores the moral issues surrounding self-deception. While many articles and books have been written on the concept of self-deception in recent years, Martin's gives much greater emphasis to self-deception as a significant topic for both ethical theory and applied ethics. "Self-deception is . . . perplexing from a moral point of view. It seems tailor-made to camouflage and foster immorality. . . . Does all self-deception involve some guilt, and is it among the most abhorrent evils. as some moralists and theologians have charged? Or is it only wrong sometimes, such as when it has bad consequences? Could it on occasion be permissible or even desirable to deceive ourselves, just as we are sometimes justified in deceiving other people? Are self-deceivers perhaps more like innocent victims than perpetrators of deceit, and as such deserving of compassion and help? Or, paradoxically, are they best viewed with ambivalence: culpable as deceivers and simultaneously innocent as victims of deception?" (from the introduction) Martin develops a conception of self-deception as the purposeful evasion of acknowledging to oneself truths or one's view of truth. He details a systematic framework for understanding the main moral perspectives and traditions concerning self-deception that have emerged in western philosophy. In so doing, he clarifies related concepts like sincerity, authenticity, honesty, hypocrisy, weakness of will, and self-understanding. Ranging across traditions both philosophical (Kant, Kierkegaard, and Sartre) and non-philosophical (Freud, Eugene O'Neill, and Henrik Ibsen), Martin shows why self-deception is as morally complex as any other major form of behavior. The appeal of this book is broad. The volume will challenge professional philosophers and psychologists, yet it is organized and written to be accessible to students in courses on ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of literature. Martin's numerous literary examples should also interest literary critics.
In what appears to be a paradox, journalists lie or deceive to get at the truth. Truthtelling, a universal value and a core journalistic value, is a theme underlying many ethical issues in journalism. Borrowing from Elliot and Culver's (1992) definition of journalistic deception that covers not only newsgathering but also the omission-commission distinction, this dissertation explores how American journalists assess various forms of deception such as impersonation, non-identification, hidden cameras, fabrication, photo manipulation, quote tampering, staging, withholding information, and lying to newsmakers. Of interest are journalists' ethical assessment of deception, factors influencing their judgment, the motives, and justifications. Theoretically, this study is grounded in normative theories of media performance--codes of conduct, professional values, and social responsibility theory, theories of moral development, the ethical theories of Kant and Mill, and gatekeeping. In a Web survey with 740 members of Investigative Reporters and Editors (IRE) and depth interviews with 20 journalists, journalistic deception is found to be a continuum, consistent with utilitarian reasoning. Some acts, for example non-identification and hidden cameras, are more acceptable than fabrication and impersonation. Deception is evaluated in a moral-pragmatic framework based on harm-benefit, the altruism of the act, and the instrumental utility of deception including issues of convenience, the bottom line, and personal safety. The journalists carefully distinguish between deceptive acts aimed at news audiences and those targeting news sources, considering the latter to be less deserving of the truth. There is greater tolerance of deception aimed at wrongdoers, supporting Bok's (1978, 1989) notion of lying to liars. Deception by commission is also considered to be more egregious than deception by omission. A regression analysis reveals the newsroom, rather than personal-level variables, is the most important force shaping evaluation of deception. The salience of competition and medium demonstrates ethical decision-making is a function of occupational pressures as journalists negotiate the tensions between morality and professional demands. With its distinctive set of tacit rules and subtleties, journalistic deception is an occupational construct. It is contextually forged by a complex interplay of values and norms central to journalism as well as organizational pressures and the contours of a broader moral framework.
This textbook looks at the main ethical questions that confront the criminal justice system - legislature, law enforcement, courts, and corrections - and those who work within that system, especially police officers, prosecutors, defence lawyers, judges, juries, and prison officers. John Kleinig sets the issues in the context of a liberal democratic society and its ethical and legislative underpinnings, and illustrates them with a wide and international range of real-life case studies. Topics covered include discretion, capital punishment, terrorism, restorative justice, and re-entry. Kleinig's discussion is both philosophically acute and grounded in institutional realities, and will enable students to engage productively with the ethical questions which they encounter both now and in the future - whether as criminal justice professionals or as reflective citizens.
The concept of mimesis has dominated reflection on the nature and role, in Greek literature, of representation. Jonas Grethlein, in his ambitious new book, takes this reflection a step further. He argues that, beyond mimesis, there was an important but unacknowledged strand of reflection focused instead on the nuanced idea of apatē (often translated into English as 'deceit'), oscillating between notions of 'deception' and 'aesthetic illusion'. Many authors from Gorgias and Plato to Philo, Plutarch and Clement of Alexandria used this key concept to entwine aesthetics with ethics. In creatively exploring the various reconfigurations of apatē, and placing these in their socio-historical contexts, the book offers a bold new history of ancient aesthetics. It also explores the present significance of the aesthetics of deception, unlocking the potential of ancient reflection for current debates on the ethical dimension of representation. It will appeal to scholars in classics and literary theory alike.
Jennifer Saul presents a close analysis of the distinction between lying to others and misleading them, which sheds light on key debates in philosophy of language and tackles the widespread moral preference for misleading over lying. She establishes a new view on the moral significance of the distinction, and explores a range of historical cases.
