This report examines West European opposition to the modernization of NATO intermediate range nuclear forces (i.e., the deployment of Pershing-Z ballistic missiles and ground launches cruise missiles). Notable differences between U.S. and European perceptions of the peace movement are discussed. Keywords: Peace movements; Force moderation; Tactical nuclear forces; Theater operation; Western Europe; Foreign policy; Public opinion.
The United States currently is wrestling with the negative implications of lean defense budgets in the face of vigorous and expanding Soviet efforts. It is unclear whether vital programs of other sorts have been or can be funded at levels adequate to ensure effective U.S. and NATO competition with aggressive Soviet efforts in many arenas. That being the case, a decision to commit vital funds to new weapons of less obvious military worth should only be entertained if there simply is no political alternative than to proceed with this plan, and if the political importance of one particular approach rules out alternatives. Political leaders must, in short, base their decisions on the foreknowledge that long range theater nuclear force modernization would trade off with more adequate funding for central strategic forces and theater non-nuclear forces.
Meeting in December 1979, the NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers decided to modernize NATO's long-range theater nuclear force (LRTNF) by deploying, in Europe, 108 Pershing II medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) launchers and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns announced that these systems would be based in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Italy, and the United Kingdom, and possibly Belgium and the Netherlands. Attaching 'great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of detente, ' the Ministers emphasized that, in parallel with the deployment decision, they wished to continue arms control efforts designed to achieve 'a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons, ' to involve theater as well as strategic nuclear forces. A Special Consultative Group was created to continue work on the arms control aspects of the LRTNF issue. With this decision NATO's member states sought to resolve an issue that had been raised nearly three years before, and that had commanded increasing amounts of attention ever since.
The author takes issue with the complacent belief that a happy mixture of deterrence, arms control and luck will enable humanity to cope adequately with weapons of mass destruction, arguing that the risks are ever more serious.
