Unconventional monetary policy is often assumed to benefit banks. However, we find little supporting evidence. Rather, we find some evidence for heightened medium-term risks. First, in an event study using a novel instrument for monetary policy surprises, we do not detect clear effects of monetary easing on bank stock valuation but find a deterioration of medium-term bank credit risk in the United States, the euro area, and the United Kingdom. Second, in panel regressions using U.S. banks’ balance sheet information, we show that bank profitability and risk taking are ambiguously affected, while balance sheet repair is delayed.
Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.
The Global Financial Stability Report examines current risks facing the global financial system and policy actions that may mitigate these. It analyzes the key challenges facing financial and nonfinancial firms as they continue to repair their balance sheets. Chapter 2 takes a closer look at whether sovereign credit default swaps markets are good indicators of sovereign credit risk. Chapter 3 examines unconventional monetary policy in some depth, including the policies pursued by the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, and the U.S. Federal Reserve.
This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.
We explore empirically how the time-varying allocation of credit across firms with heterogeneous credit quality matters for financial stability outcomes. Using firm-level data for 55 countries over 1991-2016, we show that the riskiness of credit allocation, captured by Greenwood and Hanson (2013)’s ISS indicator, helps predict downside risks to GDP growth and systemic banking crises, two to three years ahead. Our analysis indicates that the riskiness of credit allocation is both a measure of corporate vulnerability and of investor sentiment. Economic forecasters wrongly predict a positive association between the riskiness of credit allocation and future growth, suggesting a flawed expectations process.
We present evidence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on the internal ratings of U.S. banks on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve’s survey of terms of business lending. We find that ex-ante risk taking by banks (as measured by the risk rating of the bank’s loan portfolio) is negatively associated with increases in short-term policy interest rates. This relationship is less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods when banks’ capital erodes, such as episodes of financial and economic distress. These results contribute to the ongoing debate on the role of monetary policy in financial stability and suggest that monetary policy has a bearing on the riskiness of banks and financial stability more generally.
The European experience suggests that the efforts made to achieve an efficient trade-off between monetary policy and prudential supervision ultimately failed. The severity of the global crisis have pushed central banks to explore innovative tools—within or beyond their statutory constraints—capable of restoring the smooth functioning of the financial cycle, including setting macroprudential policy instruments in the regulatory toolkit. But macroprudential and monetary policies, by sharing multiple transmission channels, may interact—and conflict—with each other. Such conflicts may represent not only an economic challenge in the pursuit of price and financial stability, but also a legal uncertainty characterizing the regulatory developments of the EU macroprudential and monetary frameworks. In analyzing the “legal interaction” between the two frameworks in the EU, this book seeks to provide evidence of the inconsistencies associated with the structural separation of macroprudential and monetary frameworks, shedding light upon the legal instruments that could reconcile any potential policy inconsistency.
The recent financial crisis has generated many structural changes within the economy. Many issues are ongoing, and the question of how to recover from the crisis, and how to avoid another one, are continually addressed by scholars and practitioners everywhere. Where there is much discussion within academic and practitioner circles, there is not always adequate interaction between these schools of research. This book provides a thorough overview of the recent financial crisis from the perspective of both industry practitioners and academics specialising in the area. The first part provides practitioner insight on the crisis, and explores the causes and effects and of the recession, European public financing, ECB monetary policy and the Euro, the repression of financial markets, and financial stability. Part two focuses on the case of Greece, as a country still heavily impacted by the crisis, which has undergone various unorthodox policies imposed by the IMF, the ECB the EU. The third part provides insight from researchers and academics, covering an array of Economic theories and revealing new economics architectures available for the future. With informed views from both financial industry practitioners and academics, this book discusses current issues and implementable solutions for a faster post-crisis recovery.
Bolder economic policy could have addressed the persistent bouts of deflation in post-bubble Japan, write Gene Park, Saori N. Katada, Giacomo Chiozza, and Yoshiko Kojo in Taming Japan's Deflation. Despite warnings from economists, intense political pressure, and well-articulated unconventional policy options to address this problem, Japan's central bank, the Bank of Japan (BOJ), resisted taking the bold actions that the authors believe would have significantly helped. With Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's return to power, Japan finally shifted course at the start of 2013 with the launch of Abenomics—an economic agenda to reflate the economy—and Abe's appointment of new leadership at the BOJ. As Taming Japan's Deflation shows, the BOJ's resistance to experimenting with bolder policy stemmed from entrenched policy ideas that were hostile to activist monetary policy. The authors explain how these policy ideas evolved over the course of the BOJ's long history and gained dominance because of the closed nature of the broader policy network. The explanatory power of policy ideas and networks suggests a basic inadequacy in the dominant framework for analysis of the politics of monetary policy derived from the literature on central bank independence. This approach privileges the interaction between political principals and their supposed agents, central bankers; but Taming Japan's Deflation shows clearly that central bankers' views, shaped by ideas and institutions, can be decisive in determining monetary policy. Through a combination of institutional analysis, quantitative empirical tests, in-depth case studies, and structured comparison of Japan with other countries, the authors show that, ultimately, the decision to adopt aggressive monetary policy depends largely on the bankers' established policy ideas and policy network.
