The Economics of Contracts

The Economics of Contracts

Author: Eric Brousseau

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2002-10-17

Total Pages: 604

ISBN-13: 9780521893138

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A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.


Contracting in the New Economy

Contracting in the New Economy

Author: David Frydlinger

Publisher: Springer Nature

Published: 2021-05-24

Total Pages: 327

ISBN-13: 3030650995

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Today’s business environment is constantly evolving, filled with volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity and driven by digital transformation, globalization, and the need to creating value through innovation. These shifts demand that organizations view contracting through a different lens. Since it is impossible to predict every what-if scenario in a transactional contract, organizations in strategic and complex partnerships must shift to a mindset of shared goals and objectives built upon a strong foundation of transparency and trust, working together to mitigate risk much better than merely shifting risk to the weaker party. Contracting in the New Economy helps you to not only develop this mindset – but also offers the practical tools needed to embrace the social side of contracting, enabling your organization to harness the value creating potential of formal relational contracts. Briefly sharing the theoretical foundations that prove relational contracting works, it goes well beyond theory by providing powerful examples of relational contracting principles in practice. In addition, the authors provide a practical and proven approach for helping you to put relational contracting theory into practice for your own relationships. First by providing a framework for approaching any contracting situation and helping organizations finding the best contract model for each situation. And then by sharing five proven steps you can take to create an effective relational contract for you own strategic and complex business relationships. For anyone involved in developing contracts —lawyers, in-house counsels, contract managers, C-level managers, procurement officers, and so on — this book will empower you to create powerful cooperative alliances that will help you reach —and surpass — your business goals in today’s dynamic new environment.


Contract Theory

Contract Theory

Author: Patrick Bolton

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2004-12-10

Total Pages: 746

ISBN-13: 9780262025768

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A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.


Advanced Microeconomics for Contract, Institutional, and Organizational Economics

Advanced Microeconomics for Contract, Institutional, and Organizational Economics

Author: W. Bentley MacLeod

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2022-04-05

Total Pages: 417

ISBN-13: 0262046873

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A graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.


Seduction by Contract

Seduction by Contract

Author: Oren Bar-Gill

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2012-08-23

Total Pages: 297

ISBN-13: 019966336X

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Seduction by Contract explains how consumer contracts emerge from market forces and consumer psychology. Consumers' predictable mistakes - they are short-sighted, optimistic, and imperfectly rational - compel sellers to compete by hiding the true costs of products in complex, misleading contracts. Only better law can overcome the market's failure.


New Ideas in Contracting and Organizational Economics Research

New Ideas in Contracting and Organizational Economics Research

Author: Harvey S. James

Publisher:

Published: 2005

Total Pages: 222

ISBN-13:

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Research on contracting and organisational economics is progressing at a rapid pace. Nevertheless, what new ideas are needed in order to advance the frontiers of contracting and organisations research in ways that prove beneficial to society? This new book brings together scholars from around the world who have new ideas on the economics of contracts and organisations, otherwise known as transaction cost economics. The book is divided into three main sections. The first section presents ideas for improving the theoretical and empirical research in transaction cost economics. The second section shows how transaction cost economics informs on two important business issues -- corporate contracting and information technology (IT) operations. The third section presents alternative frameworks for examining contracting, organisational, and regulatory problems.


Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure

Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure

Author: Oliver Hart

Publisher: Clarendon Press

Published: 1995-10-05

Total Pages: 244

ISBN-13: 0191521728

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This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.


Advances in Economic Theory

Advances in Economic Theory

Author: Truman Fassett Bewley

Publisher: CUP Archive

Published: 1989-07-28

Total Pages: 452

ISBN-13: 9780521389259

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These articles should be helpful to anyone with training in economics.


What We Owe Each Other

What We Owe Each Other

Author: Minouche Shafik

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2022-08-23

Total Pages: 256

ISBN-13: 069120764X

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From one of the leading policy experts of our time, an urgent rethinking of how we can better support each other to thrive Whether we realize it or not, all of us participate in the social contract every day through mutual obligations among our family, community, place of work, and fellow citizens. Caring for others, paying taxes, and benefiting from public services define the social contract that supports and binds us together as a society. Today, however, our social contract has been broken by changing gender roles, technology, new models of work, aging, and the perils of climate change. Minouche Shafik takes us through stages of life we all experience—raising children, getting educated, falling ill, working, growing old—and shows how a reordering of our societies is possible. Drawing on evidence and examples from around the world, she shows how every country can provide citizens with the basics to have a decent life and be able to contribute to society. But we owe each other more than this. A more generous and inclusive society would also share more risks collectively and ask everyone to contribute for as long as they can so that everyone can fulfill their potential. What We Owe Each Other identifies the key elements of a better social contract that recognizes our interdependencies, supports and invests more in each other, and expects more of individuals in return. Powerful, hopeful, and thought-provoking, What We Owe Each Other provides practical solutions to current challenges and demonstrates how we can build a better society—together.


Economics of Contract Law

Economics of Contract Law

Author: Douglas G. Baird

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

Published: 2007

Total Pages: 686

ISBN-13:

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This important volume presents a rich collection of ideas on and insights into the law and economics of contracts. It includes material relevant to a large number of legal fields. Many of the articles are classics that have, over the years, become focal points for continuing debate; others provide an easily accessible account of particular areas. The editor's comprehensive introduction provides an overview of law and economics scholarship in contracts over the past few decades and a portal into an evolving field. Topics include: the economics of contracting; efficient breach and renegotiation; expectation damages and its alternatives; default rules and mass markets.