This volume provides highly illuminating, analytic perspectives on key facets of the East Asian economies. It discusses weaknesses in the financial sector, corporate governance, exchange rate and trade policies, regulatory capability, and proposes remedies. Rethinking the East Asian Miracle is an indispensable book for all those with an interest in East Asia's prospects in the early decades of the new century.
To What Extent Does The East Asian Experience Provide Us With A Viable Model Of Economic Development? This Tract Seeks To Answer This Through A Careful Analysis Of The Long-Term Development Of The East Asian Economies And Their Recent Crisis. The Tract Shows The Contradictory Implications Of The Process Of Industrialisation And The Problems Of Unregulated Finance Which Makes Liberalised Economies Extra Sensitive To The Slightest Ripple In Investor Sentiments. To Understand The Specificities Of The East Asian Experience, The Tract Looks Carefully At The Histories Of Crises In Other Parts Of The World, And Provides A Powerful Critique Of The Imf Response To Them.
This paper reviews macroeconomic developments during the first year of the crisis in east Asia and draws some preliminary policy lessons. The crisis is rooted in the interaction of large capital inflows and weak private and public sector governance. At the same time, macroeconomic adjustment in these countries has resulted in some surprising outcomes, including severe economic contractions, low inflation, and rapid external adjustment. The lessons for crisis resolution include the importance of tight monetary policy early on for exchange rate stabilization, flexible fiscal policy, and comprehensive structural reform. Crises are avoided by prudent macroeconomic policies, diligent bank supervision, transparent data dissemination, strong governance, and forward-looking policymaking, even in good times.
The current economic crisis in East Asia is unprecedented in world economic history. It seemed the economic strength of the region, until very recently, would just keep growing. Now, the macroeconomic achievements of Asia are under threat and the economies of North America and Europe are feeling the results. This book brings together the thoughts of leading experts on the Asian economy and provides a broad and thorough analysis of the situation. It provides case studies from fourteen countries in the region, how the crisis developed and affected them, and the response from governments. There are other non-country specific chapters with a strong theoretical content which address issues such as causation, how such a crisis should be handled, how it might be avoided in the future, and the likely implications for on-going deregulatory and other economic reforms. This is an important authoritative account of one of the most extraordinary economic events and provides a broad synthesis of case studies and theoretical approaches from a variety of researchers with an intimate knowledge of the region.
Two Crises, Different Outcomes examines East Asian policy reactions to the two major crises of the last fifteen years: the global financial crisis of 2008–9 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. The calamity of the late 1990s saw a massive meltdown concentrated in East Asia. In stark contrast, East Asia avoided the worst effects of the Lehman Brothers collapse, incurring relatively little damage when compared to the financial devastation unleashed on North America and Europe. Much had changed across the intervening decade, not least that China rather than Japan had become the locomotive of regional growth, and that the East Asian economies had taken numerous steps to buffer their financial structures and regulatory regimes. This time Asia avoided disaster; it bounced back quickly after the initial hit and has been growing in a resilient fashion ever since. The authors of this book explain how the earlier financial crisis affected Asian economies, why government reactions differed so widely during that crisis, and how Asian economies weathered the Great Recession. Drawing on a mixture of single-country expertise and comparative analysis, they conclude by assessing the long-term prospects that Asian countries will continue their recent success.
No sooner had the Asian crisis broken out in 1997 than the witch-hunt started. With great indignation every Asian economy pointed fingers. They were innocent bystanders. The fundamental reason for the crisis was this or that - most prominently contagion - but also the decline in exports of the new commodities (high-tech goods), the steep rise of the dollar, speculators, etc. The prominent question, of course, is whether contagion could really have been the key factor and, if so, what are the channels and mechanisms through which it operated in such a powerful manner. The question is obvious because until 1997, Asia's economies were generally believed to be immensely successful, stable and well managed. This question is of great importance not only in understanding just what happened, but also in shaping policies. In a world of pure contagion, i.e. when innocent bystanders are caught up and trampled by events not of their making and when consequences go far beyond ordinary international shocks, countries will need to look for better protective policies in the future. In such a world, the international financial system will need to change in order to offer better preventive and reactive policy measures to help avoid, or at least contain, financial crises.
The turmoil that has rocked Asian markets since the middle of 1997, and that is now having such deep effects on the economies in the region, is the third major currency crisis of the 1990s. This study explains how the Asian crisis arose and spread. It then outlines the corrective policy measures that could help end the crisis, and the shortcomings that have been revealed in the international financial system that require reform to reduce the chances of a recurrence.
The Asian crisis has sparked a thoroughgoing reappraisal of current international financial norms, the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, and the adequacy of the existing financial architecture. To draw proper policy conclusions from the crisis, it is necessary to understand exactly what happened and why from both a political and an economic perspective. In this study, renowned political scientist Stephan Haggard examines the political aspects of the crisis in the countries most affected—Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Haggard focuses on the political economy of the crisis, emphasizing the longer-run problems of moral hazard and corruption, as well as the politics of crisis management and the political fallout that ensued. He looks at the degree to which each government has rewoven the social safety net and discusses corporate and financial restructuring and greater transparency in business-government relations. Professor Haggard provides a counterpoint to the analysis by examining why Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines escaped financial calamity.
