Ever since philosophy became conscious of itself, there has been a problem of the relations between the real world which philosophy sought to understand and explain, and the thought by which it sought to explain it. It was found that thought had certain requirements and conditions of its own. If the real world was to be understood through thought, there was a question whether thought and the real correspond ed in all respects, and therefore whether they had the same conditions and laws, or whether some of these were peculiar to thought alone. For the solution of this problem it was necessary to study thought and the process of knowing and the conditions which the manner of know ing placed upon our interpretation of the real. With a consciousness of the peculiarities of thought and of its laws, philosophers could then more surely make use of it to arrive at the knowledge of the real world which they were seeking, without danger of reading into the real what is peculiar to thought. This necessity gave rise to the science of logic, a science which is still necessary, and for the same reasons. It has an importance in philosophy which it is disastrous to overlook.
Ever since philosophy became conscious of itself, there has been a problem of the relations between the real world which philosophy sought to understand and explain, and the thought by which it sought to explain it. It was found that thought had certain requirements and conditions of its own. If the real world was to be understood through thought, there was a question whether thought and the real correspond ed in all respects, and therefore whether they had the same conditions and laws, or whether some of these were peculiar to thought alone. For the solution of this problem it was necessary to study thought and the process of knowing and the conditions which the manner of know ing placed upon our interpretation of the real. With a consciousness of the peculiarities of thought and of its laws, philosophers could then more surely make use of it to arrive at the knowledge of the real world which they were seeking, without danger of reading into the real what is peculiar to thought. This necessity gave rise to the science of logic, a science which is still necessary, and for the same reasons. It has an importance in philosophy which it is disastrous to overlook.
This study forms part of a research programme aiming to interpret and evaluate the theology of Thomas Aquinas and the later reception of his theology. In particular, it deals with the reception of Aquinas' thinking about the eternity of the world by theologians at the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century. De Grijs defends the thesis that Aquinas' main interest in De Aeternitate Mundi is not philosophical but theological; while Aertsen opposes this thesis and tries to demonstrate Aquinas' philosophical purposes by comparing his De Aeternitate Mundi with his De Potentia and by study of his concept of creation. Van Veldhuijsen sketches the difference between Aquinas and Bonaventure in this respect. M. Hoenen concentrates on the importance of William de la Mare's Correctorium fratris Thomae and of the Correctoria Corruptorii for our understanding of the history of the reception of the views of Aquinas. F. Thijssen discusses the criticism of the Oxford theologian Henry of Harclay (died 1317) of Aquinas' views on two central issues that are involved in an eternal world: the traversal of an infinity and the existence of unequal infinities. Van Veldhuijsen, finally investigates Aquinas' reception by Richard of Middleton.
“More than any other living scholar of medieval philosophy, Gyula Klima has influenced the way we read and understand philosophical texts by showing how the questions they ask can be placed in a modern context without loss or distortion. The key to his approach is a respect for medieval authors coupled with a commitment to regarding their texts as a genuine source of insight on questions in metaphysics, theology, psychology, logic, and the philosophy of language—as opposed to assimilating what they say to modern doctrines, or using medieval discussions as a foil for ‘new and improved’ conceptual schemes.” Jack Zupko, University of Alberta “Gyula Klima is widely recognized as one of the world’s leading experts on thirteenth and fourteenth-century Latin philosophy, with his own, distinctive analytic approach, which brings out both the similarities and differences between medieval and contemporary logic and semantics.” John Marenbon, Trinity College, University of Cambridge “Gyula Klima has been a towering figure in the field of medieval philosophy for decades. His influence comprises not only the scholarly results of his work, but also intense and generous mentorship of students and junior colleagues. This volume is a perfect reflection of the esteem that he enjoys around the world, collecting excellent pieces by established as well as up-and-coming scholars of medieval philosophy.” Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam “For four decades now, Gyula Klima has been setting the standard among medievalists for philosophical sophistication and historical rigor. This collection of wide-ranging studies from leading scholars in the field offers a worthy tribute to that legacy.” Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado Boulder Gyula Klima is Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, and Senior Research Fellow, Consultant, and the Director of Institute for the History of Ideas of the Hungarian Research Institute in Budapest. In 2022, the President of Hungary awarded him the Knight’s Cross of the Hungarian Order of Merit, “in recognition of his outstanding academic career, significant research work and exemplary leadership.” In this volume, colleagues, collaborators, and students celebrate Klima’s project with new essays on Plotinus, Anselm, Aquinas, Buridan, Ockham and others, exploring specific questions in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and logic. No contemporary surpasses Kripke and Klima in semantics and metaphysics, but only Gyula Klima’s thought ranges flawlessly over classical philosophy as well. The volume is a fitting tribute to the master. David Twetten, Marquette University
In the Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God, prepared just before his death, Hegel states that the question of proving God can receive its “scientific” treatment in the (Science of) Logic and nowhere else. He also states that Logic, at least his logical system, is the same as that of metaphysics. Here, everything finds its place in relation to everything else. This book presents a total system in the light of which everything, from physics to theology, finds its place and true presentation. It chiefly follows, in textual citation, the later, more concise version (as Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences) of Hegel’s two presentations of this science. The stress has been on showing God’s own thought, or that of the cosmos, with which all mind is as such in unity. Logic and its forms, Hegel claims, is and are “the form of the world”. This ultimate objectivity, therefore, is at once utter subjectivity. The opposition collapses. The method here has been simply to follow the logic’s own development of thought (a development from within which Hegel himself calls its only method), to allow it once more to run its course rather than to merely “comment” on it, as if from a superior standpoint. In this work on Logic specifically, therefore, the intention is not to substitute one religion for another, as so many scholars, such as Charles Taylor, interpret Hegel as doing. Rather, it stakes out the path for specifically theological development as its ecumenical absorption into sophia, into the Idea as “all in all”, into the pure theology or wisdom of the ecumenical “Church”. One stakes this out, not in a “reduction” to philosophy, but in the re-establishment of metaphysics as itself the true theologia, the mind of heaven. What else could philosophy meaningfully be, unless “understanding spiritual things spiritually”, the being led into all truth, perched on the shoulders of those going before?
This book sheds new light on the history of the philosophically crucial notion of intentionality, which accounts for one of the most distinctive aspects of our mental life: the fact that our thoughts are about objects. Intentionality is often described as a certain kind of relation. Focusing on Franz Brentano, who introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy, and on the Aristotelian tradition, which was Brentano’s main source of inspiration, the book reveals a rich history of debate on precisely the relational nature of intentionality. It shows that Brentano and the Aristotelian authors from which he drew not only addressed the question whether intentionality is a relation, but also devoted extensive discussions to what kind of relation it is, if any. The book aims to show that Brentano distinguishes the intentional relation from two other relations with which it might be confused, namely, causality and reference, which also hold between thoughts and their objects. Intentionality accounts for the aboutness of a thought; causality, by contrast, explains how the thought is generated, and reference, understood as a sort of similarity, occurs when the object towards which the thought is directed exists. Brentano claims to find some anticipation of his views in Aristotle. This book argues that, whether or not Brentano’s interpretation of Aristotle is correct, his claim is true of the Aristotelian tradition as a whole, since followers of Aristotle more or less explicitly made some or all of Brentano’s distinctions. This is demonstrated through examination of some major figures of the Aristotelian tradition (broadly understood), including Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Neoplatonic commentators, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Francisco Suárez. This book combines a longue durée approach – focusing on the long-term evolution of philosophical concepts rather than restricting itself to a specific author or period – with systematic analysis in the history of philosophy. By studying Brentano and the Aristotelian authors with theoretical sensitivity, it also aims to contribute to our understanding of intentionality and cognate features of the mind.
The Order of Things: The Realism of the Principle of Finality is an exploration of the metaphysical principle, “Every agent acts for an end.” In the first part, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange sets forth the basics of the Aristotelian metaphysics of teleology, defending its place as a central point of metaphysics. After defending its per se nota character, he summarizes a number of main corollaries to the principle, primarily within the perspective established by traditional Thomistic accounts of metaphysics, doing so in a way that is pedagogically sensitive yet speculatively profound. In the second half of The Order of Things, Garrigou-Lagrange gathers together a number of articles which he had written, each having some connection with themes concerning teleology. Thematically, the texts consider the finality and teleology of the human intellect and will, along with the way that the principle of finality sheds light on certain problems associated with the distinction between faith and reason. Finally, the text ends with an important essay on the principle of the mutual interdependence of causes, causae ad invicem sunt causae, sed in diverso genere.
