First published in 1984. This monograph is the third in a series that examines the nature of a midlevel visual process relatively uncontaminated by either peripheral receptor or central cognitive processing. The paradigm utilized in this study selectively assays what seems to be a relatively fixed algorithmic mechanism involved in the extraction of dotted stimulus-forms from masks consisting of random dots.
Originally published in 1988, this is the final volume in the set. The original intent of the tetralogy was to review neural explanations of high level perceptual and cognitive processes. However, at this point, it became clear that there were few neural explanations of perceptual topics – a situation that still persists today. This book, therefore, used a different framework examining the role of detection, discrimination, and recognition at the behavioral level.
These four volumes, originally published between 1973 and 1988, were intended to provide a broad survey of cognitive neuroscience, a field known variously as physiological psychology or psychobiology in the 1970s and 1980s when the books were written. The general goal was to summarize what was known about the relation between brain and mind at that time, with an emphasis on sensory and perceptual topics. Out of print for many years, the Tetralogy is now available again, as a set for the first time (which is as the author envisaged it), or as individual volumes.
The crux of the debate between proponents of behavioral psychology and cognitive psychology focuses on the issue of accessibility. Cognitivists believe that mental mechanisms and processes are accessible, and that their inner workings can be inferred from experimental observations of behavior. Behaviorists, on the contrary, believe that mental processes and mechanisms are inaccessible, and that nothing important about them can be inferred from even the most cleverly designed empirical studies. One argument that is repeatedly raised by cognitivists is that even though mental processes are not directly accessible, this should not be a barrier to unravelling the nature of the inner mental processes and mechanisms. Inference works for other sciences, such as physics, so why not psychology? If physics can work so successfully with their kind of inaccessibility to make enormous theoretical progress, then why not psychology? As with most previous psychological debates, there is no "killer argument" that can provide an unambiguous resolution. In its absence, author William Uttal explores the differing properties of physical and psychological time, space, and mathematics before coming to the conclusion that there are major discrepancies between the properties of the respective subject matters that make the analogy of comparable inaccessibilities a false one. This title was first published in 2008.
This research monograph describes a large programming project in which an underwater organism, capable of perceiving, learning, deciding, and navigating, is computationally simulated. The developed computational model serves as a contemporary theory of perceptual-motor performance, embodying much of what is known about human vision and some of what is known about other cognitive processes. This artificial intelligence project has substantial contributions to make to the development of autonomous underwater vehicles. It also makes a specific theoretical statement about the organization and nature of organic perceptual motor systems that may be useful to psychologists, neuroscientists, and theoreticians in a number of other fields.
Within the last three decades, interest in the psychological experience of human faces has drawn together cognitive science researchers from diverse backgrounds. Computer scientists talk to neural scientists who draw on the work of mathematicians who explicitly influence those conducting behavioral experiments. The chapters in this volume illustrate the breadth of the research on facial perception and memory, with the emphasis being on mathematical and computational approaches. In pulling together these chapters, the editors sought to do much more than illustrate breadth. They endeavored as well to illustrate the synergies and tensions that inevitably result from adopting a broad view, one consistent with the emerging discipline of cognitive science.
In this book, William R. Uttal continues his analysis and critique of theories of mind. This book considers theories that are based on macroneural responses (such as those obtained from fMRI) that represent the averaged or cumulative responses of many neurons. The analysis is carried out with special emphasis on the logical and conceptual difficulties in developing a theory but with special attention to some of the current attempts to go from these cumulative responses to explanations of the grand question of how the mind is generated by the brain. While acknowledging the importance of these macroneural techniques in the study of the anatomy and physiology of the brain, Uttal concludes that this macroneural approach is not likely to produce a valid neural theory of cognition because the critical information—the states of the individual neurons—involved in brain activity becoming mental activity is actually lost in the process of summation. Controversial topics are considered in detail including discussions of empirical, logical, and technological barriers to theory building in cognitive neuroscience.
The search for mind-brain relationships, with a particular emphasis on distinguishing hyperbole from solid empirical results in brain imaging studies. Cognitive neuroscience explores the relationship between our minds and our brains, most recently by drawing on brain imaging techniques to align neural mechanisms with psychological processes. In Mind and Brain, William Uttal offers a critical review of cognitive neuroscience, examining both its history and modern developments in the field. He pays particular attention to the role of brain imaging—especially functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)—in studying the mind-brain relationship. He argues that, despite the explosive growth of this new mode of research, there has been more hyperbole than critical analysis of what experimental outcomes really mean. With Mind and Brain, Uttal attempts a synoptic synthesis of this substantial body of scientific literature. Uttal considers psychological and behavioral concerns that can help guide the neuroscientific discussion; work done before the advent of imaging systems; and what brain imaging has brought to recent research. Cognitive neuroscience, Uttal argues, is truly both cognitive and neuroscientific. Both approaches are necessary and neither is sufficient to make sense of the greatest scientific issue of all: how the brain makes the mind.
