Conventional Arms Control provides an analysis of the political and operational problems of verification of conventional arms control in Europe. It examines aspects of the verification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and includes assessments of the different negotiating positions and concepts involved. Based on this analysis it looks towards the future - exploring issues associated with continuing conventional arms control discussions and possibilities. The experience gained in the Persian Gulf War is discussed in terms of its relevance for monitoring conventional deployments. The analysis covers aspects of verification and transparency associated with `Open Skies' and CSBM regimes, and indicates trends and prospects for the future of related activities.
In this new Brookings Marshall Paper, Michael O'Hanlon argues that now is the time for Western nations to negotiate a new security architecture for neutral countries in eastern Europe to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. He believes NATO expansion has gone far enough. The core concept of this new security architecture would be one of permanent neutrality. The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc, from Europe's far north to its south: Finland and Sweden; Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. Discussion on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. The new security architecture would require that Russia, like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from those countries in a verifiable manner; after that, corresponding sanctions on Russia would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain their rights to participate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, including even those operations that might be led by NATO. They could think of and describe themselves as Western states (or anything else, for that matter). If the European Union and they so wished in the future, they could join the EU. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination in every sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them into the alliance as members. Ideally, these nations would endorse and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way to ensure their security than the current situation or any other plausible alternative.
For many people who live in Europe, the presence of substantial US military forces is a matter of concern and debate, which has tended so far to centre around a few highly-visible bases, such as the cruise missile locations. Apart from these few bases, relatively little is known about the size and extent of the US military presence in Europe. This book aims to fill that gap by providing the raw data on what is where. The study also highlights the historical details behind the acquisition of bases in individual countries, and summarizes and analyses all of the basing agreements between the US and its host nations which are available to the public. The book a timely contribution to the debate: as discussions begin for possible post-INF cuts in superpower force levels in Europe, there is an urgent need for accurate and unbiased information on US forces in Western Europe and on the massive infrastructure that supports those forces.
"This book examines the CFE Treaty both in terms of the Treaty commitments, and in terms of the debate over the Treaty and its ratification in order to deepen understanding of the different national attitudes to security at the end of the Cold War." "It is a piece of contemporary history as well as a book which sets out the legal obligations over the size of the armed forces of most of the countries of Europe in perpetuity. It includes an analysis not only of the Treaty of November 1990, but also the revised version of 1992 (which set out the limits for all the ex-Soviet states), and the CFE 1A agreement, in which states declared maximum levels for their military personnel."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved
The definitive guide to the history of nuclear arms control by a wise eavesdropper and masterful storyteller, Michael Krepon. The greatest unacknowledged diplomatic achievement of the Cold War was the absence of mushroom clouds. Deterrence alone was too dangerous to succeed; it needed arms control to prevent nuclear warfare. So, U.S. and Soviet leaders ventured into the unknown to devise guardrails for nuclear arms control and to treat the Bomb differently than other weapons. Against the odds, they succeeded. Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare for three quarters of a century. This book is the first in-depth history of how the nuclear peace was won by complementing deterrence with reassurance, and then jeopardized by discarding arms control after the Cold War ended. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace tells a remarkable story of high-wire acts of diplomacy, close calls, dogged persistence, and extraordinary success. Michael Krepon brings to life the pitched battles between arms controllers and advocates of nuclear deterrence, the ironic twists and unexpected outcomes from Truman to Trump. What began with a ban on atmospheric testing and a nonproliferation treaty reached its apogee with treaties that mandated deep cuts and corralled "loose nukes" after the Soviet Union imploded. After the Cold War ended, much of this diplomatic accomplishment was cast aside in favor of freedom of action. The nuclear peace is now imperiled by no less than four nuclear-armed rivalries. Arms control needs to be revived and reimagined for Russia and China to prevent nuclear warfare. New guardrails have to be erected. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace is an engaging account of how the practice of arms control was built from scratch, how it was torn down, and how it can be rebuilt.
The emergence of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the last two-thirds of the 1990s and continuing into the new century, has been a complex process intertwining politics, economics, national cultures, and numerous institutions. This book provides an essential background for understanding how security issues as between NATO and the European Union are being posed for the early part of the 21st century, including the new circumstances following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. This study should be of interest to those interested in the evolution of U.S.-European relations, especially in, but not limited to, the security field; the development of institutional relationships; and key choices that lie ahead in regard to these critical arrangements.
The multilateral Open Skies Treaty was signed in 1992 (although it did not enter into force until 2002) and covers all NATO and former Warsaw Treaty members, including the main successor states to the former Soviet Union. The treaty enables states to overfly and observe the territory of one another, as part of the process of verifying and monitoring arms control agreements. As the imagery taken during observation flights is accessible to all parties, the treaty places all members on an equal footing and requires crews of the inspecting and inspected states to work closely together. This publication, based on research carried out during 1995-2000, examines the concept of the Open Skies regime and prospects for its future adaptation, taking into account current international security needs and technological possibilities.
" ... Paper provides an authoritative analysis of national security thinking in Moscow, as well as some pointed suggestions on how to improve relations between Russia and the West. To assist readers who may want more details from official documents, as opposed to the opinions of an individual scholar and parliamentarian, we have also included extracts from the current Russian Military Doctrine and National Security Concept."--Forward.
