Fifty years on from its original publication, HLA Hart's The Concept of Law is widely recognized as the most important work of legal philosophy published in the twentieth century, and remains the starting point for most students coming to the subject for the first time. In this third edition, Leslie Green provides a new introduction that sets the book in the context of subsequent developments in social and political philosophy, clarifying misunderstandings of Hart's project and highlighting central tensions and problems in the work.
More than 50 years after it was first published, The Concept of Law remains the most important work of legal philosophy in the English-speaking world. In this volume, written for both students and specialists, 13 leading scholars look afresh at Hart's great book. Unique in format, the volume proceeds sequentially through all the main ideas in The Concept of Law: each contributor addresses a single chapter of Hart's book, critically discussing its arguments in light of subsequent developments in the field. Four concluding essays assess the continued relevance for jurisprudence of the 'persistent questions' identified by Hart at the beginning of The Concept of Law. The collection also includes Hart's 'Answers to Eight Questions', written in 1988 and never before published in English. Contributors include Timothy Endicott, Richard HS Tur, Pavlos Eleftheriadis, John Gardner, Grant Lamond, Nicos Stavropoulos, Leslie Green, John Tasioulas, Jeremy Waldron, John Finnis, Frederick Schauer, Pierluigi Chiassoni and Nicola Lacey.
This book brings together the fruits of different traditions in legal philosophy and draws on them to develop a systematic thesis on the concept of law. The work uses a legal model to explore the underlying question of how the current phenomena of transnational law are best understood, in combination with an examination of the traditions of Jürgen Habermas's critical theory and H.L.A. Hart's analytic jurisprudence. This leads the author to conclude that the key to a fruitful dialogue and comprehensive understanding is to appreciate that the concept of law is not state-cantered and must reflect relationships to other legal systems.
During the last decades, legal theory has focused almost completely on norms, rules and arguments as the constitutive elements of law. Concepts were mostly neglected. The contributions to this volume try to remedy this neglect by elucidating the role concepts play in law from different perspectives. A main aim of this volume is to initiate a debate about concepts in law. Åke Frändberg gives an overview of the many different uses of concepts in law and shows amongst others that concepts in the law should not be confused with the role of concepts in descriptions of the law. Dietmar von der Pfordten criticizes the restriction to norms as parts of the law in contemporary legal theory by questioning what concepts are and what their function is, both in general and in legal conceptual schemes. Giovanni Sartor assumes the inferential analysis of meaning proposed by Alf Ross in his ground breaking paper Tû-tû and addresses the question how possession of a concept, including the rules defining it, is possible without endorsing these rules. Jaap Hage argues that 1. legal status words such as 'owner' have a meaning because they denote things or relations in institutional reality, 2. the meaning of these words consists in this denotation relation, 3. knowledge of this meaning presupposes knowledge of the rules governing these words. Torben Spaak contributes to this volume with an exemplary analysis of one of the most central concepts of the law, namely that of a legal power. Lorenz Kähler discusses the role of concepts in determining the scope of application of legal rules and raises from this perspective the question to what extent legal concept formation can be arbitrary. Ralf Poscher argues that as soon as a concept is used in stating the law, the precise scope of application of this concept has become a legal matter. This means that the use of ‘moral’ concepts in the law does not automatically lead to a moral import into the law. Dennis Patterson holds that Hart’s concept of law can be understood as a so-called ‘practice theory’ and provides an overview of such a theory.
HLA Hart's The Concept of Law is one of the most influential works of philosophy of the twentieth century, redefining the field of legal philosophy and introducing generations of students to philosophical reflection on the nature of law. Since its publication in 1961 an industry of academic research and debate has grown up around the book, disputing, refining, and developing Hart's work. Under the sheer volume of competing interpretations of the book the original contexts - cultural and intellectual - that shaped Hart's project can be obscured. In this book, renowned legal historian AWB Simpson attempts to sweep aside the volumes of academic criticism and return to 'Troy I', revealing the world of post-war Oxford that produced Hart and his famous book. Drawing on his personal experience of studying and teaching in Oxford at the time Hart developed The Concept of Law, Simpson recreates with characteristic wit the social and intellectual culture of Oxford philosophy and the law faculty in the 1950s. He traces Hart's early work and influences, within and outside Oxford, showing how Hart developed his picture of philosophy and its potential for enriching the understanding of law. He also lays bare the painful shortcomings of post-war Oxford academia, depicting a world of eccentric dons and intellectual Cyclopses - isolated and closed to broad, interdisciplinary exchange - arguing that Hart did not escape from the limitations of his intellectual world. Simpson's entertaining, and controversial, account of the world that produced The Concept of Law will be essential reading for all those engaged in interpreting and teaching the seminal book, and an engaging read for anyone interested in the history of Oxford philosophy and legal education.
Reprint of the second revised and enlarged edition, a complete revision of the first edition published in 1934. A landmark in the development of modern jurisprudence, the pure theory of law defines law as a system of coercive norms created by the state that rests on the validity of a generally accepted Grundnorm, or basic norm, such as the supremacy of the Constitution. Entirely self-supporting, it rejects any concept derived from metaphysics, politics, ethics, sociology, or the natural sciences. Beginning with the medieval reception of Roman law, traditional jurisprudence has maintained a dual system of "subjective" law (the rights of a person) and "objective" law (the system of norms). Throughout history this dualism has been a useful tool for putting the law in the service of politics, especially by rulers or dominant political parties. The pure theory of law destroys this dualism by replacing it with a unitary system of objective positive law that is insulated from political manipulation. Possibly the most influential jurisprudent of the twentieth century, Hans Kelsen [1881-1973] was legal adviser to Austria's last emperor and its first republican government, the founder and permanent advisor of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Austria, and the author of Austria's Constitution, which was enacted in 1920, abolished during the Anschluss, and restored in 1945. The author of more than forty books on law and legal philosophy, he is best known for this work and General Theory of Law and State. Also active as a teacher in Europe and the United States, he was Dean of the Law Faculty of the University of Vienna and taught at the universities of Cologne and Prague, the Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Harvard, Wellesley, the University of California at Berkeley, and the Naval War College. Also available in cloth.
Raymond Wacks reveals the intriguing and challenging nature of legal philosophy, exploring the notion of law and its role in our lives. He refers to key thinkers from Aristotle to Rawls, from Bentham to Derrida and looks at the central questions behind legal theory, and law's relation to justice, morality, and democracy.
Published posthumously, the second edition of The Concept of Law contains one important addition to the first edition, a substantial Postscript, in which Hart reflects upon some of the central concerns that have been expressed about the book since its publication in 1961. The Postscript is especially noteworthy because it contains Hart's only sustained response to the objections pressed by his foremost critic, Ronald Dworkin, who succeeded him to the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford. The Postscript focuses on a range of issues covering both Hart's substantive view and his methodological commitments. In particular, Hart endorses Inclusive Legal Positivism, asserts that his is a methodology of descriptive jurisprudence which he contrasts with Dworkin's normative jurisprudence or interpretivism, while denying that his theory of law has a semantic underpinning. The essays in this collection address each of these issues in a sustained way. The book contains discussions of Hart's semantic commitments, his rejection of a normative jurisprudence as well as the extent to which he can embrace Inclusive Legal Positivism in a way that is consistent with his other stated positions. The book's contributors include the leading advocates of alternative schools of Positivist jurisprudence, important contributors to the methodogical disputes in jurisprudence and noted experts on the relationship of philosophy of language to jurisprudence. Among the contributors of note are: Joseph Raz, Jules L. Coleman, Stephen Perry , Brian Leiter, Scott Shapiro and Andrei Marmor.
