Maastricht will induce changes to the EC budget the various dimensions of which are explored in this volume. Based on the theory of fiscal federalism the author discusses important aspects of multilayer government finance for existing federations - Australia, Germany, Switzerland and the USA. He sketches the effects of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) onto the Community budget, and concludes with a systematic treatment of revenue instruments for its future financing
Although the need for fiscal coordination and for controlling national spending in particular have been widely justified, relatively little attention has been paid to identifying and analyzing concrete measures to make this feasible. Most studies on these aspects of the Economic and Monetary Union have been concerned with questions as to why the need exists for fiscal convergence and to what degree is it desirable. Attention has only recently been focused on examining what budgetary measures (rules, procedures, structures) can be taken by the Commission or finance ministries for European convergence. The objective of this book is to discuss and suggest alternative policy-option initiatives at EC and national levels encouraging convergent financial management behaviour. Analyses are focused on the following important questions: `What is the current capacity of EC and national governments to manage public spending? '; `What budgetary strategies are available to reduce deficits? '; `What should the role of the Commission be under these circumstances? '; `What is the Member States' responsibility for managing national budgets? '; `What budgetary norms and rules should be proposed and negotiated to guarantee convergence of integration? '; `What strategic and structural arrangements could facilitate integration? ', etc.
Sir Alan Walters ex-chief economic advisor to PM Margaret Thatcher Whether it succeeds or fails, Europe is everyone's concern. The idea of a united Europe has been entertained, even partially at least, achieved, inter alia, CharlemagI!e, Napoleon, Hitler, and in our da)' by Spaak, Monet and Chancellor Kohl: the first three by military conquest, the last three by "negotiation" and the creation of integrating institutional arrangements. The motives varied from the twisted paranoia of the Nazis to the idealism of SpaaklMonet/Kohl in avoiding conflicts and wars. Under the protection of NATO the European Coal and Steel Community soon was transformed into the EEC by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The massive reduction of trade barriers, particularly between France and Germany, was rewarded by vigorous growth over the next 15 years. Even as late as 1972, when Britain acceeded to the Treaty of Rome, the EEC was thought to be lar~ely a customs union: in de Gaulle eyes the EEC was simply a collection of sovereISJ:l states who cooperated primarily on trade. Each state however enjoyed a veto; deCIsions had to be unanimous.
In its pursuit of economic integration, economic and monetary union (EMU) had become a primary commitment for the European Community. Originally published in 1974, this study sets out to examine the meaning of economic union and its relationship with monetary union. The contributors look at the problems and costs for attaining economic union for the member states of the EEC at the time. Steven Robson writes on economic management. Paul Woolley examines the integration of capital markets. Santosh Mukherjee looks at the implications of labour market policy. Geoffrey Denton and Adam Ridley consider the impact of economic and monetary union on regional problems. Alan Prest is concerned with tax harmonisation specifically Value Added Tax and Corporation Tax and Douglas Dosser discusses the development of a European Community budget. Though the long-term benefits of EMU were clear, in the short term it would impose strains and pressures on national economies and particular sectors within them. This study goes a long way to clarifying where these difficulties would arise and suggests some ways of coping with them.
The Heads of State and Government at the European Council meeting in Maastricht definitely decided to embark upon the creation of Economic and Monetary Union by, at the latest, the beginning of 1999, and in doing so opted for a relatively short but difficult journey that should bring the European Community all the benefits one could expect from such an undertaking. However, the question still remains of how Economic and Monetary Union will really affect the day-to-day policymaking of the national civil servants involved, particularly in the areas of monetary and fiscal policies. Can national policymakers adopt a `sit-and-wait' policy or does Economic and Monetary Union really entail a dangerous voyage between Scylla and Charybdis? Will Economic and Monetary Union undermine the sovereignty of national governments because the Maastricht Treaty will give the EC the competence to dictate its own will? Are the benefits of Economic and Monetary Union for the Member States really as great as expected? These and other issues are assessed in this book which, after an assessment of the achievements of the Maastricht European Council, will cover the main implications of a European monetary policy and closer economic cooperation for the relevant policies of the Member States, the division of the competences between Community and member countries and the forthcoming prospects for new EC policies (e.g. regional policy, the EC budget, fiscal union, etc.)
The European Community is negotiating a new treaty to establish the constitutional foundations of an economic and monetary union in the course of the 1990s. This study provides the only comprehensive guide to the economic implications of economic and monetary union. The work of an economist inside the Commission of the European Community, it reflects the considerations influencing the design of the union. The study creates a unique bridge between the insights of modern economic analysis and the work of the policy makers preparing for economic and monetary union.
In the wake of the Greek crisis, the future of the EU is the subject of a great deal of debate. This book critically evaluates the current new monetarist model of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, presenting an alternative post-Keynesian (progressive) model, aimed at addressing the current problems of trade imbalance and asymmetric macroeconomic policy infrastructure that are augmenting tensions within the Eurozone. The book’s approach is based upon the development of a common, rather than a single, currency approach, and utilises post-Keynesian policy solutions in order to create a form of EMU which will promote full employment rather than austerity.
Now published with a new preface explaining why The Great Deception is of the utmost importance today as it was when it was first published and to coincide with Great Britain's EU referendum in 2016, this book suggests that the United States of Europe and its edict of 'ever closer union' have been based on a colossal confidence trick. The Great Deception tells for the first time the inside story of the most audacious political project of modern times: the plan to unite Europe under a single 'supranational' government. From the 1920s, when the blueprint for the European Union was first conceived by a British civil servant, this meticulously documented account takes the story right up to the moves to give Europe a political constitution, already planned 60 years ago to be the 'crowning dream' of the whole project. The book shows how the gradual assembling of a European government has amounted to a 'slow motion coup d'etat', based on a strategy of deliberate deception, into which Britain's leaders, Macmillan and Heath, were consciously drawn. Drawing on a wealth of new evidence, scarcely an episode of the story does not emerge in startling new light, from the real reasons why de Gaulle kept Britain out in the 1960s to the fall of Mrs Thatcher. The book chillingly shows how Britain's politicians, not least Tony Blair, were consistently outplayed in a game the rules of which they never understood. But it ends by asking whether, from the euro to enlargement, the 'project' has now overreached itself, as a gamble doomed to fail. Since their collaboration began in 1992, Christopher Booker, a Sunday Telegraph columnist, and Richard North, who worked for four years in Brussels and Strasbourg as a senior researcher, have won a unique reputation for their expertise on Britain's relationship to the European Union. Their previous publications included The Mad Officials (1994) and The Castle of Lies (1996). But they regard The Great Deception as the book they had been waiting to write for ten years. Christopher Booker's preface now adds up-to-date detail for the current era as Britain heads inexorably towards a possible 'Brexit'.
