How National Contradictions Rival Political Ambitions, And Conflicting National Interests Have Affected Indo-China From 1945 To 1985 Is The Theme Of The Book.
For most Americans, the "exit" from Indochina occurred in 1973, with the withdrawal of the U.S. military from South Vietnam. In fact, the final exit did not occur until two decades later, after the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975, the Cambodian revolution, and a decade of Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Only in the early 1990s were the major powers able to negotiate a settlement of the Cambodia conflict and withdraw from the region. This book recounts the diplomacy that brought an end to great power involvement in Indochina, including the negotiations for a UN peace process in Cambodia and construction of a "road map" for normalizing U.S.-Vietnam relations. In so doing, this volume also highlights the changing character of diplomacy at the beginning of the 1990s, when, at least temporarily, an era of military confrontation among the major world powers gave way to political management of international conflicts.
Gareth Porter presents a new interpretation of how and why the US went to war in Vietnam. He provides a challenge to the prevailing explanation that US officials adhered blindly to a Cold War doctrine that loss of Vietnam would cause a 'domino effect' leading to communist dominance of the area.
Bringing together a team of cutting-edge researchers based in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Indo-Pacific countries, this book focuses on the tug of war between China’s influence and forces of resistance in Hong Kong, Taiwan and selected countries in its surrounding jurisdictions. China’s influence has met growing defiance from citizens in Hong Kong and Taiwan who fear the extinction of their valued local identities. However, the book shows that resistance to China’s influence is a global phenomenon, varying in motivation and intensity from region to region and country to country depending on the forms of China’s influence and the balances of forces in each society. The book also advances a concentric center-periphery framework for comparing different forms of extra-jurisdictional Chinese influence mechanisms, ranging from economic, military and diplomatic influences to united front operations. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of comparative politics, international relations, geopolitics, Chinese politics, Hong Kong-China relations, Taiwan and Asian politics.
The first documented, systematic study of a truly revolutionary subject, this 1937 text remains the definitive guide to guerrilla warfare. It concisely explains unorthodox strategies that transform disadvantages into benefits.
A history of the Chinese experience in WWII, named a Book of the Year by both the Economist and the Financial Times: “Superb” (The New York Times Book Review). In 1937, two years before Hitler invaded Poland, Chinese troops clashed with Japanese occupiers in the first battle of World War II. Joining with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, China became the fourth great ally in a devastating struggle for its very survival. In this book, prize-winning historian Rana Mitter unfurls China’s drama of invasion, resistance, slaughter, and political intrigue as never before. Based on groundbreaking research, this gripping narrative focuses on a handful of unforgettable characters, including Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, and Chiang’s American chief of staff, “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell—and also recounts the sacrifice and resilience of everyday Chinese people through the horrors of bombings, famines, and the infamous Rape of Nanking. More than any other twentieth-century event, World War II was crucial in shaping China’s worldview, making Forgotten Ally both a definitive work of history and an indispensable guide to today’s China and its relationship with the West.
Going beyond the dominant orthodox narrative to incorporate insight from revisionist scholarship on the Vietnam War, Michael G. Kort presents the case that the United States should have been able to win the war, and at a much lower cost than it suffered in defeat. Presenting a study that is both historiographic and a narrative history, Kort analyzes important factors such as the strong nationalist credentials and leadership qualities of South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem; the flawed military strategy of 'graduated response' developed by Robert McNamara; and the real reasons South Vietnam collapsed in the face of a massive North Vietnamese invasion in 1975. Kort shows how the US commitment to defend South Vietnam was not a strategic error but a policy consistent with US security interests during the Cold War, and that there were potentially viable strategic approaches to the war that might have saved South Vietnam.
‘Churchill, Eden and Indo-China, 1951-1955’ offers a systematic approach to pertinent international politics, providing a historiography and assessing the impact of events such as the Cold War and the Second World War within the context of the governments of Churchill and Eden. Revisiting Churchill's wartime helmsmanship in order to shed further light on his post-war administration, Nông Dân provides a greater historical awareness of the broad international context of decolonized Indo-China and South East Asia.
When the Vietnam War ended with the North Vietnamese capture of Saigon on April 30, 1975--27 months after a cease-fire had been signed in Paris--the differences between the United States and Vietnam were far from being resolved. Mutual bitterness regarding the war remained. Newly unified Vietnam wanted normalization of relations and the subsequent economic reconstruction aid promised in the Paris Peace Accords. Understandably wary of such diplomatic relations, the United States requested information regarding soldiers listed as missing in action and assistance with the repatriation of military remains. A series of misconceptions and misunderstandings as well as changes from a regional to a global U.S. foreign policy left both countries bereft of an easy solution. This book describes the negotiations during the late Ford and early Carter administrations (1975-1979) and discusses the repercussions the diplomatic stalemate had on the domestic and international politics of the United States and Vietnam, emphasizing the conflicting priorities and political goals of both countries, at home and abroad. This previously neglected period in United States-Vietnam relations deals with issues such as Hanoi's constant exultation over the victory, American denial of responsibility, the division between the presidents' public declarations and congressional policies, and both sides' use of the MIA issue. Based primarily on recently declassified documents and former U.S. official Douglas Pike's uncensored collection, the work also makes use of media press sources from America, Vietnam, Britain, France and China. Interviews with Vietnamese immigrants and former U.S. politicians provide insight unavailable in written histories. Appendices contain the February 1973 correspondence between President Nixon and the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, six diplomatic notes from 1976, and a January 30, 1979, letter from President Carter to Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping.