The first of its kind, this book is entirely dedicated to the implementation of monetary policy. Monetary policy implementation has gone through tremendous changes over the last twenty years, which have witnessed the quiet end of 'reserve position doctrine' and the return of an explicit focus on short-term interest rates. Enthusiastically supported by Keynes and later by the monetarist school, reserve position doctrine was developed mainly by US central bankers and academics during the early 1920s, and at least in the US became the unchallenged dogma of monetary policy implementation for sixty years. The return of interest rate targeting also corresponds largely to the restoration of central banking principles established in the late 19th century. Providing a simple theory of monetary policy implementation, Bindseil goes on to explain the role of the three main instruments (open market operations, standing facilities, and reserve requirements) and reviews their use in the twentieth century. In closing, he summarizes current views on efficient monetary policy implementation.
An argument that contagion is the most significant risk facing the financial system and that Dodd¬Frank has reduced the government's ability to respond effectively. The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 was intended to reform financial policies in order to prevent another massive crisis such as the financial meltdown of 2008. Dodd–Frank is largely premised on the diagnosis that connectedness was the major problem in that crisis—that is, that financial institutions were overexposed to one another, resulting in a possible chain reaction of failures. In this book, Hal Scott argues that it is not connectedness but contagion that is the most significant element of systemic risk facing the financial system. Contagion is an indiscriminate run by short-term creditors of financial institutions that can render otherwise solvent institutions insolvent. It poses a serious risk because, as Scott explains, our financial system still depends on approximately $7.4 to $8.2 trillion of runnable and uninsured short-term liabilities, 60 percent of which are held by nonbanks. Scott argues that efforts by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Treasury to stop the contagion that exploded after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers lessened the economic damage. And yet Congress, spurred by the public's aversion to bailouts, has dramatically weakened the power of the government to respond to contagion, including limitations on the Fed's powers as a lender of last resort. Offering uniquely detailed forensic analyses of the Lehman Brothers and AIG failures, and suggesting alternative regulatory approaches, Scott makes the case that we need to restore and strengthen our weapons for fighting contagion.
The global financial crisis (GFC) has renewed interest in emergency liquidity support (sometimes referred to as “Lender of Last Resort”) provided by central banks to financial institutions and challenged the traditional way of conducting these operations. Despite a vast literature on the topic, central bank approaches and practices vary considerably. In this paper we focus on, for the most part, the provision of idiosyncratic support, approaching it from an operational perspective; highlighting different approaches adopted by central banks; and also identifying some of the issues that arose during the GFC.
An introduction to the way that central banks implement monetary policy through market operations. It explains monetary policy operations in normal times, reviews the basic mechanics of financial crises, and explains what central banks need to do to fulfil their monetary policy and financial stability mandates when markets and banks are impaired.
This paper considers the central bank mandate with respect to financial stability and identifies the links to the functioning of securities markets. It argues that while emergency support to securities markets is an important part of the crisis management response, a high bar should be set for its use. Importantly, it should be used only as part of a comprehensive policy package. The paper considers what types of securities markets may be important for financial stability, what market conditions could trigger emergency support measures, and how programs can be designed to restore market functioning while minimizing moral hazard.
The flexibility shown by the ECB/Eurosystem in adapting its framework, as required by circumstances, has helped improve funding and liquidity conditions. Compared to the situation pre-crisis, the ECB/Eurosystem has provided liquidity against a broader range of collateral and for as long as four years in terms of maturity; extended liquidity in foreign currency; conducted outright purchases of public and private sector assets (now tapering off); and reduced interest rates into negative territory. In these arrangements, policy is directed from the center, but is implemented mostly by the National Central Banks (NCBs); risks are largely shared. Market participants are complimentary about the role the ECB/Eurosystem has played in backstopping the financial system and its forward guidance on monetary policy.
Most central banks oblige depository institutions to hold minimum reserves against their liabilities, predominantly in the form of balances at the central bank. The role of these reserve requirements has evolved significantly over time. The overlay of changing purposes and practices has the result that it is not always fully clear what the current purpose of reserve requirements is, and this necessarily complicates thinking about how a reserve regime should be structured. This paper describes three main purposes for reserve requirements - prudential, monetary control and liquidity management - and suggests best practice for the structure of a reserves regime. Finally, the paper illustrates current practices using a 2010 IMF survey of 121 central banks.
Most short-term interest rates in the Euro area are below the European Central Bank deposit facility rate, the rate at which the central bank remunerates banks’ excess reserves. This unexpected development coincided with the start of the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP). In this paper, we explore empirically the interactions between the PSPP and repo rates. We document different channels through which asset purchases may affect them. Using proprietary data from PSPP purchases and repo transactions for specific (“special") securities, we assess the scarcity channel of PSPP and its impact on repo rates. We estimate that purchasing 1 percent of a bond outstanding is associated with a decline of its repo rate of 0.78 bps. Using an instrumental variable, we find that the full effect may be up to six times higher.
This edited volume offers a study of national banking systems and explains how banking developed in the years preceding the international financial crisis that erupted in 2007. Its analysis of market-based banking shows the impact of the financial crisis in eleven developed economies, including all of the G7 economies.