The paper reports to the Executive Board on its decision of April 29, 2019, to prepare an IMF Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT), which is linked to the 2017 Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative (RSCI), for a revision and update of the 1999 Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code (MFPT). Directors asked that the CBT should remove the overlap on financial policies covered by other international standards, expand the transparency standards to broader set of activities undertaken by many central banks since the 2008 financial crisis, and reorient the transparency standards to facilitate risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks.
This paper reports to the Executive Board on the outcomes of the Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT) pilot reviews. The pilot CBT reviews helped central banks evaluate their transparency practices and strengthen dialogue with external stakeholders. The CBT pilots provided valuable information on the resources required for the reviews going forward. Staff will continue to offer CBT reviews to the rest of the membership. The staff will report back to the Board in FY2026 on the progress of the CBT reviews and an update to the Code following five years of implementation.
This document provides guidance and practical suggestions for conducting reviews of the Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT) to IMF staff and experts conducting reviews, as well as to the central banks participating or intending to participate in the CBT review.
This paper develops a new central bank transparency index for inflation-targeting central banks (CBT-IT index). It applies the CBT-IT index to the Czech National Bank (CNB), one of the most transparent inflation-targeting central banks. The CNB has invested heavily in developing a Forecasting and Policy Analysis System (FPAS) to implement a full-fledged inflation-forecast-targeting (IFT) regime. The components of CBT-IT index include measures of transparency about monetary policy objectives, the FPAS designed to support IFT, and the monetary policymaking process. For the CNB, all three components have shown substantial improvements over time but a few gaps remain. The CNB is currently working on eliminating some of these gaps.
The Central Bank of Chile (CBC) has implemented broadly advanced transparency practices. This reflects the CBC’s strong public commitment to transparency, which is anchored in the law and has been designated by the CBC as a strategic objective to fulfill its mandate. This policy has earned the CBC the broad trust of its stakeholders and has paid significant dividends for the CBC in terms of safeguarding its autonomy and ensuring its policy effectiveness.
The National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia (NBRNM) is implementing advanced transparency practices. The long-standing commitment to transparency noted by a number of stakeholders and forcefully re-affirmed in the recent period is well anchored in the law, and it has been designated by the NBRNM as a strategic objective to fulfill its mandate. This policy has earned the NBRNM noteworthy trust from stakeholders met by the mission, and it has paid significant dividends in terms of anchoring its autonomy and ensuring policy effectiveness.
A leading economist and former central banker discusses the evolution of central bank communication from secretiveness to transparency and accountability. Central bank communication has evolved from secretiveness to transparency and accountability—from a reluctance to give out any information at all to the belief in communication as a panacea for effective policy. In this book, Otmar Issing, himself a former central banker, discusses the journey toward transparency in central bank communication. Issing traces the development of transparency, examining the Bank of England as an example of extreme reticence and European Central Bank's President Mario Draghi as a practitioner of effective communication. He argues that the ultimate goal of central bank communication is to make monetary policy more effective, and describes the practice and theory of communication as an evolutionary process. For a long time, the Federal Reserve never made its monetary policy decisions public; the European Central Bank, on the other hand, had to adopt a modern communication strategy from the outset. Issing discusses the importance of guiding expectations in central bank communication, and points to financial markets as the most important recipients of this communication. He discusses the obligations of accountability and transparency, although he notes that total transparency is a “mirage.” Issing argues that the central message to the public must always be that the stability of a nation's currency is the bank's priority.
The paper responds to a request made by the Executive Board at the time of the 2017 Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative (RSCI) for a revision and update of the 1999 Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code (MFPT). Directors asked staff that the new code remove the overlap on financial policies covered by other standards, expand the transparency standards to broader set of activities undertaken by many central banks since the Global Financial Crisis, and reorient the transparency standards to facilitate risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks.
Not long ago, secrecy was the byword in central banking circles, but now the unmistakable trend is towards greater openness and transparency. This, the third Geneva Report on the World Economy, describes and evaluates some of the changes in how central banks talk to the markets, to the press, and to the public. The report first assesses the case for transparency ? defined as providing sufficient information for the public to understand the policy regime ? and concludes that it is very strong, based on both policy effectiveness and democratic accountability. It then examines what should be the content of communication and argues that central banks ought to spell out their long-run objectives and methods. It then investigates the link between the decision-making process and central bank communication, drawing a distinction between individualistic and collegial committees. The report concludes with a review of the communications strategies of some of the main central banks.
The economic influence of central banks has received ever more attention given their centrality during the financial crises that led to the Great Recession, strains in the European Union, and the challenges to the Euro. The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking reflects the state of the art in the theory and practice and covers a wide range of topics that will provide insight to students, scholars, and practitioners. As an up to date reference of the current and potential challenges faced by central banks in the conduct of monetary policy and in the search for the maintenance of financial system stability, this Oxford Handbook covers a wide range of essential issues. The first section provides insights into central bank governance, the differing degrees of central bank independence, and the internal dynamics of their decision making. The next section focuses on questions of whether central banks can ameliorate fiscal burdens, various strategies to affect monetary policy, and how the global financial crisis affected the relationship between the traditional focus on inflation targeting and unconventional policy instruments such as quantitative easing (QE), foreign exchange market interventions, negative interest rates, and forward guidance. The next two sections turn to central bank communications and management of expectations and then mechanisms of policy transmission. The fifth part explores the challenges of recent developments in the economy and debates about the roles central banks should play, focusing on micro- and macro-prudential arguments. The implications of recent developments for policy modeling are covered in the last section. The breadth and depth enhances understanding of the challenges and opportunities facing central banks.
