Bureaucratic Justice

Bureaucratic Justice

Author: Jerry L. Mashaw

Publisher: Yale University Press

Published: 1983-01-01

Total Pages: 260

ISBN-13: 9780300034035

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Anyone interested in 'good government' should read Jerry Mashaw's new book on how the social Security Administration implements congressionally mandated policy for controlled consistent distribution of disability benefits. . . . He offers an important perspective on bureaucracy that must be considered when devising procedures for not only disability determinations but also other forms of administrative adjudication.--Linda A. O'Hare, American Bar Association Journal A major contribution to the ongoing debate about administrative law and mass justice.--Lance Liebman and Richard B. Stewart, Harvard Law Review Profound implications for the future of democratic government. . . . Practical, analytical policymaking for a complex decision system of great significance to many Americans.--Paul R. Verkuil, Yale Law Journal An exceptionally valuable book for anyone who is concerned about the role of law in the administrative state. Mashaw manages to range broadly without becoming superficial, and to present a coherent and challenging theory in lively, readable prose. Bureaucratic Justice seems certain to become a standard reference work for administrative lawyers, and for anyone else who seeks the elusive goal of developing more humane and more effective public bureaucracies.--Barry Boyer, Michigan Law Review Strongly recommended for use in graduate seminars in public policy or law. . . . If we are to develop a positive model of bureaucratic competence, we must answer the insightful questions rased in this cogent book.--David L. Martin, American Political Science Review Mashaw provides an excellent analysis of middle range processes of decision making.--Gerald Turkel, Qualitative Sociology Stimulating and provocative and . . . makes a contribution to the ongoing dialogue about due process in public administration.... It is tightly organized, cogently argued, and full of pithy historical illustrations. . . . One of the best such works in many years. --Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science A thoughtful, challenging, and very useful book.--Choice Inspires a new direction in administrative law scholarship.--A.I. Ogus, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies


Administrative Law

Administrative Law

Author: Christopher F. Edley

Publisher: Yale University Press

Published: 1992-07-29

Total Pages: 288

ISBN-13: 9780300052534

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This seminal book presents a fundamental reconsideration of modern American administrative law. According to Christopher Edley, the guiding principle in this field is that courts should apply legal doctrines to control the discretion of unelected bureaucrats. In practice, however, these doctrines simply give unelected judges largely unconstrained--and inescapable--discretion. Assessed on its own terms, says Edley, administrative law is largely a failure. He discussed why and how this is so and argues that law should abandon its obsession with bureaucratic discretion and pursue instead the direct promotion of sound governance. Edley demonstrates that legal analyses of separation of powers and of judicial oversight of agencies implicitly use three decision-making paradigms: politics, scientific expertise, and adjudicatory fairness. Conventional wisdom maintains, for example, that judges should hesitate to question the political choices of legislators and the expertise of administrators, but need not be so deferential in addressing questions of law. Such judicial efforts to police governance have largely failed because, as Edley shows in several contexts, they attempt to appraise decision-making paradigms as though they were separable when in fact the important decisions of both judges and political officials combine elements of politics, science, and fairness. According to Edley, unsustainable boundaries among these paradigms cannot be a satisfactory basis for deciding when a court should interfere. Law must stop focusing on separation of powers and instead direct attention to such issues as bureaucratic incompetence, systemic agency delay, and political bias.


Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact

Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact

Author: M. L. M. Hertogh

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2004-08-19

Total Pages: 334

ISBN-13: 9780521547864

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A collection of essays which focus on the relationship between judicial review and bureaucratic behaviour.


The Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy

The Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy

Author: Robert F. Durant

Publisher: OUP Oxford

Published: 2012-08-02

Total Pages: 888

ISBN-13: 0191628336

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One of the major dilemmas facing the administrative state in the United States today is discerning how best to harness for public purposes the dynamism of markets, the passion and commitment of nonprofit and volunteer organizations, and the public-interest-oriented expertise of the career civil service. Researchers across a variety of disciplines, fields, and subfields have independently investigated aspects of the formidable challenges, choices, and opportunities this dilemma poses for governance, democratic constitutionalism, and theory building. This literature is vast, affords multiple and conflicting perspectives, is methodologically diverse, and is fragmented. The Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy affords readers an uncommon overview and integration of this eclectic body of knowledge as adduced by many of its most respected researchers. Each of the chapters identifies major issues and trends, critically takes stock of the state of knowledge, and ponders where future research is most promising. Unprecedented in scope, methodological diversity, scholarly viewpoint, and substantive integration, this volume is invaluable for assessing where the study of American bureaucracy stands at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, and where leading scholars think it should go in the future. The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics are a set of reference books offering authoritative and engaging critical overviews of the state of scholarship on American politics. Each volume focuses on a particular aspect of the field. The project is under the General Editorship of George C. Edwards III, and distinguished specialists in their respective fields edit each volume. The Handbooks aim not just to report on the discipline, but also to shape it as scholars critically assess the scholarship on a topic and propose directions in which it needs to move. The series is an indispensable reference for anyone working in American politics. General Editor for The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics: George C. Edwards III


American Bureaucracy

American Bureaucracy

Author: Glen O. Robinson

Publisher: University of Michigan Press

Published: 1991

Total Pages: 264

ISBN-13: 9780472102433

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A critical synthesis of social theory about government, bureaucracy, and law


The Bureaucracy in Court

The Bureaucracy in Court

Author: Richard C. Cortner

Publisher: Kennikat Press

Published: 1982

Total Pages: 248

ISBN-13:

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This book provides a comprehensive analysis of administrative law. Topics include judicial review of administrative determinations, rule making and adjudicatory powers, and the investigatory power.


Exploring the U.S. Bureaucracy and Judiciary with Networks, Text, and Votes

Exploring the U.S. Bureaucracy and Judiciary with Networks, Text, and Votes

Author: Matthew Sweeten

Publisher:

Published: 2018

Total Pages: 202

ISBN-13:

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"The following dissertation advances methodological aspects of American bureaucratic and judicial politics. Each of the following three papers focus on developing methodological approaches to those subject areas specifically with respect to Natural Language Processing (NLP) and text-as-data. The main contributions of each paper are methodological in nature. First, I create a new text-based preference scaling algorithm for estimating United States Supreme Court preferences using text and network analysis. Despite widespread acceptance of text-based methods for scaling the ideological preferences of political actors, only two text-based models find widespread use: Wordfish and Wordscores. Using network-derived features to identify multiple Supreme Court issue areas and the text of Supreme Court opinions, I develop a new model for estimating the latent ideological preferences, of Supreme Court justices improving and extending Wordfish. This new model integrates new advances in network analysis and community detection algorithms to introduce multi-dimensional preferences into one comprehensive model for Supreme Court decisions. For Freedom of Speech, Search and Seizure, and Commerce Clause cases, I compare the predictive efficacy of estimates derived by the commonly used Wordfish algorithm and my own for Supreme Court cases between 1969-2003. This methods presents a way to estimate preferences from opinions even from cases on which votes are unanimous. Second, I identify key structural and ideological motivations on the U.S. National Labor Relations Board. Bureaucrat and agency preferences, and the policy choices that bureaus make, are crucial for myriad theoretical models and empirical analyses. While measuring such preferences has proven problematic, recently a number of scholars have provided alternatives for estimating these features. However, efforts have generally not included advances in text-based analysis, despite the potential for employing written records to develop rich, dynamic, estimates. To remedy this omission, we utilize and build upon text-based scaling methods to estimate the ideological and partisan preferences of key decision-makers and case decisions for a canonical agency long-studied by policy scholars: the National Labor Relations Board. Specifically, we create a comprehensive, text-based, database of Board decisions from 1947-2015. Using text analysis, we find that member preferences must be separated by case type, i.e., assuming that there we can combine such decisions in generating preference scores is not warranted. We also show that our preferences measures do well compared to alternatives, such as those solely using Item Response Theory, when we estimate models with preferences and forces internal and external to the agency to explain outputs. Finally, we find structural effects on the agency's decision content over time using change-point analysis. Finally, I leverage tools from Natural Language Processing to create an ideological common space between the U.S. Congress, Supreme Court, and Appeals Courts. Comparable ideological preferences across United States Federal institutions are fundamental to understanding the interplay of political preferences and power across those institutions. Two decades of work has encouraged the creation of ideological scores in the bureaucracy, Congress, and the Supreme Court. These scores have largely either been focused narrowly on easily observable and quantifiable institutional behavior such as roll-call votes or focusing on observable behavior that relates to the private political preferences of judges, Supreme Court justices, and members of Congress. To facilitate the creation of a legal common space, I employ textbased information retrieval and sentimental analysis techniques to create a new set of bridge observations between members of Congress, the Supreme Court, and Federal Court of Appeals and District Court judges. Utilizing this new set of bridge observations, I develop a new legal common space using sentiment of legal and judicial citations as votes to estimate the political ideal points of the entire U.S. Federal Judiciary and members of Congress from 1980 to 2012. These scores are then validated by examining the spatial arrangement of these scores relative to political party and comparing to more recent attempts at creating common space scores."--Pages viii-x.


Bureaucracy in America

Bureaucracy in America

Author: Joseph Postell

Publisher: University of Missouri Press

Published: 2017-07-30

Total Pages: 416

ISBN-13: 0826273785

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The rise of the administrative state is the most significant political development in American politics over the past century. While our Constitution separates powers into three branches, and requires that the laws are made by elected representatives in the Congress, today most policies are made by unelected officials in agencies where legislative, executive, and judicial powers are combined. This threatens constitutionalism and the rule of law. This book examines the history of administrative power in America and argues that modern administrative law has failed to protect the principles of American constitutionalism as effectively as earlier approaches to regulation and administration.


Administrative Law

Administrative Law

Author: Daniel E. Hall

Publisher: Pearson

Published: 2019-01-22

Total Pages: 496

ISBN-13: 9780135186329

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Introduction -- Bureaucracy and democracy -- Agency discretion -- The requirement of fairness -- Delegation -- Agency rulemaking -- Agency investigationsand information collection -- Formal adjudications -- Accountability through reviewability -- Accountability through accessibility -- Accountability through liability


Law and Leviathan

Law and Leviathan

Author: Cass R. Sunstein

Publisher: Harvard University Press

Published: 2020-09-15

Total Pages: 209

ISBN-13: 0674247531

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From two legal luminaries, a highly original framework for restoring confidence in a government bureaucracy increasingly derided as “the deep state.” Is the modern administrative state illegitimate? Unconstitutional? Unaccountable? Dangerous? Intolerable? American public law has long been riven by a persistent, serious conflict, a kind of low-grade cold war, over these questions. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that the administrative state can be redeemed, as long as public officials are constrained by what they call the morality of administrative law. Law and Leviathan elaborates a number of principles that underlie this moral regime. Officials who respect that morality never fail to make rules in the first place. They ensure transparency, so that people are made aware of the rules with which they must comply. They never abuse retroactivity, so that people can rely on current rules, which are not under constant threat of change. They make rules that are understandable and avoid issuing rules that contradict each other. These principles may seem simple, but they have a great deal of power. Already, without explicit enunciation, they limit the activities of administrative agencies every day. But we can aspire for better. In more robust form, these principles could address many of the concerns that have critics of the administrative state mourning what they see as the demise of the rule of law. The bureaucratic Leviathan may be an inescapable reality of complex modern democracies, but Sunstein and Vermeule show how we can at last make peace between those who accept its necessity and those who yearn for its downfall.