This book examines the links between Britain's withdrawal from its east of Suez role and the establishment of South-East Asian regional security arrangements. The link between these two events is not direct, but a relationship existed, which is important to a wider understanding of the development of regional security arrangements.
This collection of essays examines the British and American experience in the Middle East from 1950 to 1980. The book compares British and American foreign policy in the Far East and the Persian Gulf, explaining that the Anglo-American relationship was far from harmonious. Both powers tried to manipulate the other to its own advantage. While Washington was clearly the stronger power, London was never reduced to subservience. The book looks at the often neglected role of Egypt's King Farouk, arguing that Egypt was forced to contend with Britain's imperial power, which could, at a few hours notice, overwhelm or undermine Egypt's supposed sovereign institutions. At the same time, however, London was unwilling or unable to prevent Gamal Abdul Nasser and his revolutionary officers from seizing power in 1952. While London perhaps mishandled the transfer of power in Egypt, the book points out how the British managed the transition from being the dominant power in Jordan to preserving a substantial influence, by inviting American participation in securing regime legitimacy. In the end, American dollars supported the Hashemite regime while British influence remained, just as British officials had wished. Challenging Retrenchment argues that, by the mid-1970s, there was an Anglo-American understanding that the Northern Gulf was America's responsibility and that the southern Gulf was Britain's. The book also looks at how intelligence and clandestine operations were used and abused by the British in pursuit of their strategic interests, first somewhat unsuccessfully in Yemen in the 1960s, but with more tangible success in Oman in the 1970s. (Series: ROSTRA Books Trondheim Studies in History - No. 4)
Part of The Labour Governments 1964-70 series, this text concentrates on Britain's international policy during Harold Wilson's Labour governments in the 1960s. The coverage ranges from defence policy and the government machine to European integration, NATO and the Vietnam War. Harold Wilson and his ministers have often been accused of betraying the sense of promise that greeted their victory in 1964. Using recently released archival evidence, Young argues that a more balanced view of the goverment should recognize the real difficulties that surrounded decision-making, not only on Vietnam, but also on Aden, the Nigerian Civil War and Rhodesia. tensions and the need to placate allies all placed limits on what a once-great but clearly declining power could achieve. Fruthermore, the government proved of pivotal importance in the history of Britain's international role, in that it presided over a major shift of focus from positions east of Suez to European concerns, a focus that has remained until the present day. international relations during this exciting period. Together with the other books in the series, on domestic and economic policy, it provides a complete picture of the development of Britain under the premiership of Harold Wilson.
The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial rule and the context in which this took place. This publication is the first of three volumes which examine the years 1964 to 1971, during which period ten territories became independent and all but one (Aden) became new members of the Commonwealth. Issues considered include: the symbolic significance of the recall of British troops from East of Suez, and the circumstances of Britain's withdrawl from Aden; a reappraisal of British interests in South-East Asia in the context of Singapore's secession from Malaysia; the ending of confrontation with Indonesia; British views on the Vietnam conflict; the end of Britain's treaties of protection in the Persian Gulf and the creation of the UAE.
Throughout the War in Southeast Asia, Communist forces form North Vietnam infiltrated the isolated, neutral state of Laos. Men and supplies crossed the mountain passes and travelled along an intricate web of roads and jungle paths known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam. American involvement in Laos began which a photo-reconnaissance missions and, as the war in Vietnam intensified, expanded to a series of air-ground operations from bases in Vietnam and Thailand against fixed targets and infiltration routes in southern Laos. This volume examines this complex operational environment. United States Air Force. Center for Air Force History.
P.L. Pham examines the reasons for the Wilson Government's decision to withdraw from 'East of Suez'. Drawing upon previously classified records in the United Kingdom, USA, and Australia, Pham provides a detailed and comprehensive examination of the British policy process leading up to the final decision to withdraw.
Is the United Kingdom capable of grand strategy? Common wisdom suggests otherwise. Some think it implausible amid the maelstrom of domestic politics, while others believe the UK lacks the necessary autonomy, as a cog in the US-led order. British Grand Strategy in the Age of American Hegemony challenges these claims. William D. James contends that grand strategy is an unavoidable part of governing. Grand strategy is the highest level of national security decision-making, encompassing judgements over a state's overarching objectives and interests, as well as its security environment and resource base. Getting these decisions 'right' is vital in moments of geopolitical flux. Employing several historical case studies between 1940-2003 and marshalling a host of primary sources, James argues that British politicians and officials have thought in grand strategic terms under American hegemony - even if they do not realise or admit to this. He also demonstrates that the role of allies in shaping British grand strategy has been overstated. Finally, James highlights the conditions under which domestic political actors can influence grand strategic decision-making. Written for practitioners as well as scholars, the book concludes with several policy recommendations at this inflection point in British history.
Embedded in the evolving comparative regionalism literature, this book offers a systematic analysis of the factors positively and negatively influencing regional institution-building. The ruptures caused by the Eurozone crises, the coronavirus pandemic and by Brexit have renewed the interest in the impact of crises and critical junctures on regionalism here defined as regional institution-building. Drawing from critical juncture research and historical comparative analysis, this volume uses the cases of European and East Asian regional institution-building to systematically analyse institutional transformations during specific historical turning points and critical juncture moments. Wunderlich’s research offers an in-depth analysis of the interrelated drivers, spoilers and dissolvers of regional institution-building processes in Europe and East Asia, and addresses key questions including: Under what conditions does regionalism take hold? What is influencing the initial institutional design choices? What is the impact of historical experiences and well-entrenched norms and ideas? What are the roles of regional leaders? How do external factors influence regional institution-building? What turns a crisis into a critical juncture and are such junctures threats or opportunities? What accounts for variations in institutional responses to crisis events across different regional settings? This book will be a valuable resource for scholars of regionalism, region-building, regional governance and international relations of Europe and East Asia.
Unexceptional: America's Empire in the Persian Gulf, 1941-2007 examines U.S. policy vis-^-vis the Persian Gulf since the Second World War. It asserts that the American experience in this strategic yet volatile region known for its plentiful oil and gas can be best understood as an unexceptional imperial endeavor similar in kind to that of the British, Ottoman, and other empires in previous centuries. Since 1941, the U.S. empire in the Gulf has achieved successes such as Operation Desert Storm and the invasion of Iraq. Setbacks have included the Iranian Revolution and the ongoing occupation of Iraq. Given these and many other events, which this book spotlights, America's Gulf empire has undergone repeated expansion and contraction_a typical imperial pattern. The result has been a cycle of waxing and waning U.S. influence in a critical region of the world. Until its occupation of Iraq, the United States practiced informal empire in the Gulf rather than colonialism. Currently, however, the formal empire established by the United States in Iraq jeopardizes the overall American position in the Gulf, which seemed unassailable in early 2003.
