This book provides a short introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology by Husserl himself. Husserl highly regarded his work "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" as basic for his theory of the phenomenological reduction. He considered this work as equally fundamental for the theory of empathy and intersubjectivity and for his theory of the life-world. Further, with the appendices, it reveals Husserl in a critical dialogue with himself.
§ 1. Remarks on the Current Status of the Problematic. The literature treating the relationship between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger has not been kind to Husserl. Heidegger's "devastating" phenomenologically ontological critique of traditional epistemology and ontology, advanced under the rubric of "fundamental ontology" in Being and Time, has almost been universallyl received, despite the paucity of its references to Husserl, as sounding the death knell for Husserl's original formulation of phenomenology. The recent publication of Heidegger's lectures from the period surrounding his composition of Being and Time, lectures that contain detailed references and critical analyses of Husserl's phenomenology, and which, in the words of one respected commentator, Rudolf Bernet, "offer at long last, insight into the principal sources of fundamental ontology,"2 will, if 3 the conclusions reached by the same commentator are any indication, serve only to reinforce the perception of Heidegger's phenomenological /I superiority" over Husserl. This is not to suggest that the tendency toward Heidegger partisan ship in the literature treating the relationship of his phenomenology to Husserl's has its basis in extra-philosophical or extra-phenome nological concerns and considerations. Rather, it is to draw attention to the undeniable 'fact' that Heidegger's reformulation of Husserl's phenomenology has cast a "spell" over all subsequent discussions of the basic problems and issues involved in what has become known as their "controversy.
"Understanding Phenomenology" provides a guide to one of the most important schools of thought in modern philosophy. The book traces phenomenology's historical development, beginning with its founder, Edmund Husserl and his "pure" or "transcendental" phenomenology, and continuing with the later, "existential" phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The book also assesses later, critical responses to phenomenology - from Derrida to Dennett - as well as the continued significance of phenomenology for philosophy today. Written for anyone coming to phenomenology for the first time, the book guides the reader through the often bewildering array of technical concepts and jargon associated with phenomenology and provides clear explanations and helpful examples to encourage and enhance engagement with the primary texts.
A new 2024 translation of Martin Heidegger's early work "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" (original German "Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie"), originally published in 1926. This edition contains a new afterword by the Translator, a timeline of Heidegger's life and works, a philosophic index of core Heideggerian concepts and a guide for terminology across 19th and 20th century Existentialists. This translation is designed for readability and accessibility to Heidegger's enigmatic and dense philosophy. Complex and specific philosophic terms are translated as literally as possible and academic footnotes have been removed to ensure easy reading. In this lecture, which focuses on the central theme of the third section of Part I of "Being and Time," Martin Heidegger explores the fundamental ontological question of the meaning of being. He emphasizes the role of "time" as the horizon that shapes our understanding of being. This exploration of the "temporality of being" is presented in a historically oriented approach, indicating that Heidegger's inquiry into the question of being is rooted in the broader tradition of metaphysical-ontological questioning rather than existential-philosophical or consciousness-phenomenological motives. While the lecture covers only the first part and the first chapter of the second part of the original plan, it provides insights into the unelaborated aspects of Heidegger's thought. The most significant chapter for discussing "Time and Being" is undoubtedly the first chapter of the second part, where the concept of the "ontological difference" is introduced for the first time, marking a pivotal moment in Heidegger's philosophical development. Integral to this philosophical exploration is the concept of ontology, which is presented as the backbone of phenomenological study. The paper rigorously analyzes the ontological dimensions and positions them as central to the understanding of phenomenology. This ontological focus is not limited to a narrow interpretation, but encompasses various facets, including the relationship between being and existence, the distinction between different modes of being, and the critical examination of traditional ontological theses. The complexity of the paper's discourse is evident in its treatment of phenomenology not as a mere philosophical subset, but as a methodological approach that encompasses the entire spectrum of scientific philosophy. This comprehensive approach extends to the evaluation of phenomenology's methodological aspects, where the paper examines phenomenology's triple methodological character, comprising reduction, construction, and destruction. This tripartite methodology underscores the depth and breadth of phenomenological inquiry and reaffirms its position as a fundamental tool in philosophical research.
The central task of phenomenology is to investigate the nature of consciousness and its relations to objects of various types. The present book introduces students and other readers to several foundational topics of phenomenological inquiry, and illustrates phenomenology’s contemporary relevance. The main topics include consciousness, intentionality, perception, meaning, and knowledge. The book also contains critical assessments of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method. It argues that knowledge is the most fundamental mode of consciousness, and that the central theses constitutive of Husserl’s "transcendental idealism" are compatible with metaphysical realism regarding the objects of thought, perception, and knowledge. Helpful tools include introductions that help the reader segue from the previous chapter to the new one, chapter conclusions, and suggested reading lists of primary and some key secondary sources. Key Features: Elucidates and engages with contemporary work in analytic epistemology and philosophy of mind Provides clear prose explanations of the necessary distinctions and arguments required for understanding the subject Places knowledge at the center of phenomenological inquiry
Phenomenology, together with Marxism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy, dominated philosophy in the 20th century and Edmund Husserl is usually thought to have been the first to develop the concept. The author argues for a return to phenomenology's origins in epistemology and does so by locating its roots in the work of Immanuel Kant.