As the US prepares for changes in the national security strategic vision that comes with any transition of presidential administrations, it must examine what the military's role in nation building should be and how to execute this task. The tasks associated with nation building are part of the Army's core competencies under the auspices of "Stability Operations", and are now cited in doctrine in the recently published Field Manual 3-07. The US has been executing nation building tasks in Iraq for the past four years as part of Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations. With resources shifting to Afghanistan, the US has a nation building model from Iraq that could be applicable using the same lines of operation of governance, rule of law, economics and security. It's critical that policy makers understand the military capabilities and limitations when assigning it as the lead for nation building.
Although the United States (US) has been involved in nation-building efforts for the past 100 years it does not have a doctrinal definition to articulate what nation building is. Another challenge for the US is the lack of a designated agency within the US Government (USG) to lead the effort. First, an interagency, agreed upon, doctrinal definition of nation building must be established. Following this, each department and agency within the USG must be examined to identify the role each plays within a nation-building operation. This examination will allow the identification of the relationships between departments of the USG and the resources available to conduct nation building. This thesis examines the role of Army Special Operation Forces (ARSOF) in nation building. In order to do so, a definition of nation building is established, key tasks of nation building are derived, and military tasks that support a nation building operation are developed. These military tasks are analyzed against the doctrinal missions and capabilities of ARSOF in order to identify how ARSOF can contribute to nation building. This thesis concludes with recommendations on the employment of ARSOF in nation-building operations.
The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for postconflict nation-building that have not since been matched. Only in recent years has the United States has felt the need to participate in similar transformations, but it is now facing one of the most challenging prospects since the 1940s: Iraq. The authors review seven case studies--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--and seek lessons about what worked well and what did not. Then, they examine the Iraq situation in light of these lessons. Success in Iraq will require an extensive commitment of financial, military, and political resources for a long time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed.
Does the withdrawal of armies from direct rule in most countries herald an end to their role as actors in domestic politics? Has political intervention by the military been superseded? This comparative examination of the politicized armed forces looks at * the consequences of military rule for nation building and economic development * the effects of the passing of the Cold War and the rise of globalization on the political role of the military * the role of political armies in the consolidation of civil politics and democratic governance * the lessons for policy makers in global governance and post-conflict reconstruction The contributors build on successive theories about the role of the military in politics and look to the future. The most threatening scenario may be a proliferation of armed actors and the rise of privatized forces of law and order.
In the last decades, the United States Army has often been involved in missions other than conventional warfare. These include low-intensity conflicts, counterinsurgency operations, and nation-building efforts. Although non-conventional warfare represents the majority of missions executed in the past sixty years, the Army still primarily plans, organizes, and trains to fight conventional ground wars. Consequently, in the last ten years, there has been considerable criticism regarding the military’s inability to accomplish tasks other than conventional war. Failed states and the threat they represent cannot be ignored or solved with conventional military might. In order to adapt to this new reality, the U.S. Army must innovate. This text examines the conditions that have allowed or prevented the U.S. Army to innovate for nation-building effectively. By doing so, it shows how military leadership and civil-military relations have changed. Nation-building refers to a type of military occupation where the goal is regime change or survival, a large number of ground troops are deployed, and both military and civilian personnel are used in the political administration of an occupied country, with the goals of establishing a productive economy and a stable government. Such tasks have always been a challenge for the U.S. military, which is not normally equipped or trained to undertake them. Using military effectiveness as the measurement of innovative success, the book analyzes several U.S. nation-building cases, including post World War II Germany, South Korea from 1945-1950, the Vietnam War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. By doing so, it reveals the conditions that enabled military innovation in one unique case (Germany) while explaining what prevented it in the others. This variation of effectiveness leads to examine prevailing military innovation theories, threat-based accounts, quality of military organizations, and civil-military relations. This text comes at a critical time as the U.S. military faces dwindling resources and tough choices about its force structure and mission orientation. It will add to the growing debate about the role of civilians, military reformers, and institutional factors in military innovation and effectiveness.
This book explores the origins of the Indian army from its early exploitative role, to its performance in World War II when it confronted extreme political and military challenges. Cohen examines the doctrine of civilian control in India and the evolution of the theory of so-called martial races. The book serves as an interpretation of the history of the Indian Army in the light of contemporary approaches to nation-building and development theory.
The United States Army and the Making of America: From Confederation to Empire, 1775–1903 is the story of how the American military—and more particularly the regular army—has played a vital role in the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century United States that extended beyond the battlefield. Repeatedly, Americans used the army not only to secure their expanding empire and fight their enemies, but to shape their nation and their vision of who they were, often in ways not directly associated with shooting wars or combat. That the regular army served as nation-builders is ironic, given the officer corps’ obsession with a warrior ethic and the deep-seated disdain for a standing army that includes Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, the writings of Henry David Thoreau, and debates regarding congressional appropriations. Whether the issue concerned Indian policy, the appropriate division of power between state and federal authorities, technology, transportation, communications, or business innovations, the public demanded that the military remain small even as it expected those forces to promote civilian development. Robert Wooster’s exhaustive research in manuscript collections, government documents, and newspapers builds upon previous scholarship to provide a coherent and comprehensive history of the U.S. Army from its inception during the American Revolution to the Philippine-American War. Wooster integrates its institutional history with larger trends in American history during that period, with a special focus on state-building and civil-military relations. The United States Army and the Making of America will be the definitive book on the army’s relationship with the nation from its founding to the dawn of the twentieth century and will be a valuable resource for a generation of undergraduates, graduate students, and virtually any scholar with an interest in the U.S. Army, American frontiers and borderlands, the American West, or eighteenth- and nineteenth-century nation-building.
