This book examines the historical, diplomatic, economic, and strategic aspects of the European Recovery Program (ERP) - popularly known as the Marshall Plan.
Historian and geographer Sorensen (1952-95) wrote her analysis of Danish political policy towards the Marshall Plan during the middle 1980s, but Rudiger says it continues to be essential reading for historians interested in the immediate postwar period. The new edition drops her chapter on COCOM, because more recent studies have made in superfluous. The rest of the study remains intact. It is not indexed. Distributed in the US by ISBS. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
A re-interpretation of the Marshall Plan, as an extension of strategic American policy, views the plan as the "brainchild" of the New Deal coalition of progressive private and political interests.
Traces the history of the Marshall Plan and the efforts to reconstruct western Europe as a bulwark against communist authoritarianism during a two-year period that saw the collapse of postwar U.S.-Soviet relations and the beginning of the Cold War.
Edited and with an Introduction by Michael Wala, Assistant Professor at Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg This recently discovered study by Allen Dulles, written in the winter of 1947/48 when the acceptance of the Marshall Plan was still in doubt, not only offers fascinating insights into the early postwar period but may also serve as an inspiration to policy makers at a time when there is much discussion of recovery programmes for Eastern Europe and the Marshall Plan is often evoked as a possible model.
Sir Alan Walters ex-chief economic advisor to PM Margaret Thatcher Whether it succeeds or fails, Europe is everyone's concern. The idea of a united Europe has been entertained, even partially at least, achieved, inter alia, CharlemagI!e, Napoleon, Hitler, and in our da)' by Spaak, Monet and Chancellor Kohl: the first three by military conquest, the last three by "negotiation" and the creation of integrating institutional arrangements. The motives varied from the twisted paranoia of the Nazis to the idealism of SpaaklMonet/Kohl in avoiding conflicts and wars. Under the protection of NATO the European Coal and Steel Community soon was transformed into the EEC by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The massive reduction of trade barriers, particularly between France and Germany, was rewarded by vigorous growth over the next 15 years. Even as late as 1972, when Britain acceeded to the Treaty of Rome, the EEC was thought to be lar~ely a customs union: in de Gaulle eyes the EEC was simply a collection of sovereISJ:l states who cooperated primarily on trade. Each state however enjoyed a veto; deCIsions had to be unanimous.
Western Europe's recovery from World War II was nothing short of miraculous. From the chaos of the war and the crisis of 1947, Europe moved directly to the most rapid quarter-century of economic growth in her history. The contributors to this volume seek to identify the sources of this singularly successful recovery. That all European countries shared in the miracle suggests that its roots may lie at the international level. The chapters therefore focus on the role played by international institutions - the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Payments Union, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - and weigh the relative importance of domestic and international factors in Europe's postwar recovery. This book will be of interest to students of modern European history and to economists interested in economic growth, European economic integration, and reform of the Bretton Woods institutions.