Conflict and intervention in the Middle East are not uncommon occurrences. Yet when civil strife erupted in Lebanon in 1975, the events that followed were unusual indeed. Unlike most patterns of intervention, Syria displayed remarkable tactical flexibility by first intervening on behalf of the rebels, its traditional allies, then shifting its allegiance mid-war to the Lebanese incumbents. Also, whereas most intervention scenarios end with a process of decommitment, Syria eventually occupied parts of Lebanon to become an enduring military entity there. Delving into primary Syrian and Lebanese sources, Weinberger unravels the history, competing factions, religion, politics, and culture of the region and presents an intriguing and complex portrait of intervention by a regional power.
Despite the bitter conflict that divided Jerusalem and Damascus, a fascinating process of indirect – through the United States – and tacit understandings emerged with regard to Lebanon in the 1970s. This derived largely from the Israeli deterrence posture which held in check Syrian military involvement in Lebanon. This book, first published in 1987, traces the development of the Israeli and Syrian involvement in Lebanon between 1975 and 1985, and of the deterrence dialogue which evolved between them. It also places this dialogue within the larger context of the overall Israeli-Syrian deterrence equation. War and Intervention in Lebanon is a fascinating and relevant work, of great value to those with an interest in International Relations and Middle Eastern history, politics and diplomacy.
Lebanon experienced serious instability and ethno-national conflict following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, compounded by the Arab Spring, which led to regional instability and civil war in Iraq and Syria. Why did consociational democracy fail? Was failure inevitable? What impact could external powers play in creating an environment where consociationalism might be successfully implemented? This book addresses these key questions and provides a comprehensive analysis of how internal and external elite relations influence the chances of a successful regulation of ethno-national conflict through power-sharing. Exploring the roles played by Syria, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States and France, it argues that external actors in the Lebanese conflict largely determined whether power-sharing was successfully established and shows that the consociational democratic model cannot provide long-term conflict regulation in their absence. The author argues that relationships between internal and external actors determine the prospects for successful conflict regulation and pinpoints the crucial role of the external forces in the creation of power-sharing agreements in Lebanon concluding that future success is dependent on the maintenance of positive, exogenous pressures. This book will be of key interest to students and scholars studying politics, international relations, and Middle East studies.
Conflict and intervention in the Middle East are not uncommon occurrences. Yet when civil strife erupted in Lebanon in 1975, the events that followed were unusual indeed. Unlike most patterns of intervention, Syria displayed remarkable tactical flexibility by first intervening on behalf of the rebels, its traditional allies, then shifting its allegiance mid-war to the Lebanese incumbents. Also, whereas most intervention scenarios end with a process of decommitment, Syria eventually occupied parts of Lebanon to become an enduring military entity there. Delving into primary Syrian and Lebanese s.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Syrian intervention in the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1976 extended the conflict and caused then President Hafiz al-Assad to fail in achieving his long-term strategic objectives. In 1975, Civil War in Lebanon broke out. The following year, 35,000 Syrian troops entered the country and remain there today. Syrian President Hafiz al- Assad had five strategic goals in Lebanon: (1) Prevention of a radical regime from gaining power; (2) Securing the Syrian western flank from Israeli invasion; (3) Controlling the Palestinian Liberation Organization; (4) Gaining legitimacy as leader of pan-Arabism following the death of Egypt's Gamal Nasser, and; (5) Enhancing the prospect of gaining Lebanon as part of a "Greater Syria." While initially successful, Assad failed to achieve his long-term goals largely due to a failure of strategy in Lebanon. During the conflict, the Syrians fought against the PLO. This action against the leaders of the Palestinian resistance movement were widely unpopular and protested within the Arab states, including Syria. Assad was never able to gain control of the PLO, and the outrage among the Arab nations denied him the chance to ever gain legitimacy as the leader of pan-Arabism. Moreover, the long occupation by Syrian troops led to Israeli intervention and continued violence in Lebanon, preventing Assad from achieving two other strategic goals. At the strategic level, Syria's intervention failed. Other factors contributed to the failure and are instructive to United States warfighters and warplanners. When placed against the Powell Doctrine, it is evident that Syrian military actions were at odds with the precepts of the use of military force expressed by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. Assad failed to exploit all diplomatic means available to him. He failed to adequately weigh risks against gains. He discounted the political costs of military intervention. And he failed to apply decisive force once he decided to use military force to achieve his goals.
Lebanon experienced serious instability and ethno-national conflict following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, compounded by the Arab Spring, which led to regional instability and civil war in Iraq and Syria. Why did consociational democracy fail? Was failure inevitable? What impact could external powers play in creating an environment where consociationalism might be successfully implemented? This book addresses these key questions and provides a comprehensive analysis of how internal and external elite relations influence the chances of a successful regulation of ethno-national conflict through power-sharing. Exploring the roles played by Syria, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States and France, it argues that external actors in the Lebanese conflict largely determined whether power-sharing was successfully established and shows that the consociational democratic model cannot provide long-term conflict regulation in their absence. The author argues that relationships between internal and external actors determine the prospects for successful conflict regulation and pinpoints the crucial role of the external forces in the creation of power-sharing agreements in Lebanon concluding that future success is dependent on the maintenance of positive, exogenous pressures. This book will be of key interest to students and scholars studying politics, international relations, and Middle East studies.
In this timely and significant book, an eminent scholar recounts the history of modern and contemporary Lebanon-a history marked by continuing strife and tragedy. A judicious account of Lebanon's sustained domestic conflict, this book analyzes the exacerbating effects that foreign intervention and occupation have had on the Lebanese political order. Itamar Rabinovich opens with a chapter explaining the paradoxical nature of the Lebanese state. He follows the events of a particularly important twelve-year period through four distinct stages: the collapse of the Lebanese political system between 1970 and 1975; the civil war of 1975-1976; the lingering crisis of the years 1976-1982; and the war of 1982. Bringing the story up to date, he devotes a chapter and a postscript to events since September 1982. Grounding his interpretation and narrative firmly in a historical perspective, Rabinovich provides an unbiased treatment of the perceptions and intentions of the participants—a rarity in books on this subject. He sorts out the rich mix of domestic, regional, and international political figures and uses a variety of Arab and Israeli sources to clarify military moves, political ties, and diplomatic initiatives. The author offers a thorough review of the internecine rivalries between different religious groups, political factions, economic interests, and the international allies and opponents with longstanding stakes in Lebanon. His explanation of the delicate balancing and counterbalancing required of any Lebanese regime trying to establish order between these antagonistic elements helps to clarify the basic causes of the current crisis. Writing from a solid background in modern Middle Eastern studies, Rabinovich successfully delineates the interplay between Lebanon's domestic unrest and the major problems that continue to plague the Middle East.
This book is a comprehensive examination of the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese crisis. It focuses on the Syrian interests in Lebanon, the motivation of the Assad regime for intervening in the Lebanese crisis, and the pattern of Syrian actions in Lebanon.
