In this award-winning study on Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle, Lt.-Col. R. Kent Lauchbaum argues that current joint doctrine does not provide sufficient and acceptable guidance for synchronizing Air Force and Army deep operations. To improve such synchronization, Colonel Lauchbaum proposes five modifications to current joint doctrine.
Deep battle was formally introduced to US warfighters through the Armys AirLand Battle doctrine during the early 1980s. The initial purpose for the deep battle, as envisioned by Air Force and Army leaders, was to delay and weaken Soviet second and follow-on echelons during a European conventional war. Within the AirLand Battle construct, the Air Force had the responsibility for synchronizing deep operations, and planned to employ air interdiction against Soviet maneuver forces to set the conditions for victory in the decisive close battle. The fire support coordination line, normally positioned at field artillery maximum range from the FLOT, separated the Air Forces deep operations from the Army s close battle. During the late 1980s, the Army fielded a potent deep battle capability. Concurrently, Army doctrine assigned the ground forces commander the responsibility for synchronizing deep operations with the close battle germinating the seeds of conflict with the Air Force over deep battle management. To better influence deep operations, the Army defined the FSCL as a permissive fire support coordination measure and also extended the range of fire support coordination line from the FLOT. The Persian Gulf War tested US deep battle doctrine. The JFACC, synchronized deep operations using several ad hoc procedures approved by the JFC. By most Air Force accounts the deep battle was well managed and executed, except for the Army s use of the FSCL during the last days of the war. Conversely, the Army was thoroughly disappointed with the prosecution of the deep battle during Desert Storm. Army frustration stems from the fact that the deep battle was synchronized by the JFACC and not by the ground forces commander in violation of Joint and Army doctrine. Joint doctrine produced since the Gulf War attempts to create a framework to synchronize airpowerand acceptable guidance to synchronize Air Force and Army deep operations. Re-defi.
The concept of "deep battle" was formally introduced to US war fighters during the early 1980s through the US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. As envisioned by Air Force and Army leaders, the initial purpose for the deep battle was to delay and weaken Soviet second and follow-on echelons during a European conventional war. Within the AirLand Battle construct, the Air Force had responsibility for synchronizing deep operations and for employing air interdiction against Soviet maneuver forces to set the conditions for victory in the decisive "close battle." The fire support coordination line (FSCL), normally positioned at field artillery maximum range from the forward line of troops (FLOT), separated the Air Force's deep operations from the Army's close battle. During the late 1980s the Army began fielding a potent deep-battle capability of its own. Concurrently, Army doctrine assigned to the ground force commander responsibility for synchronizing deep operations with the close battle. Thus were planted the seeds of conflict with the Air Force over management of the deep battle. To better influence deep operations, the Army defined the FSCL as a permissive fire support coordination measure and also extended the range of the FSCL from the FLOT. The Persian Gulf War "field tested" US deep-battle doctrine. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) synchronized deep operations using several ad hoc procedures approved by the joint force commander (JFC). By most Air Force accounts, the deep battle was well managed and executed, except for the Army's use of the FSCL during the last days of the war. Conversely, the Army was thoroughly disappointed with prosecution of the deep battle during Operation Desert Storm. Army frustration arose from the fact that the deep battle was synchronized by the JFACC and not by the ground force commander-a direct violation of joint and Army doctrine. Joint doctrine produced since the Gulf War has attempted to create a framework for synchronizing airpower and land-based firepower in the deep battle. In spite of that effort, many contentious issues between airmen and soldiers remain unresolved, chief among them the matter of command relationships on and above the deep battlefield. In this award-winning study on Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle, Lt Col R. Kent Laughbaum argues that current joint doctrine does not provide sufficient and acceptable guidance for synchronizing Air Force and Army deep operations. To improve such synchronization, Colonel Laughbaum proposes five modifications to current joint doctrine: assign the joint force commander responsibility for establishing and positioning the fire support coordination line; redefine the fire support coordination line as a restrictive fire support coordination measure; include all planned airpower, firepower, and maneuver operations beyond the fire support coordination line in the air tasking order; position the fire support coordination line relatively close to the forward line of own troops, typically no farther than the maximum range of tube artillery; and restrict planned air interdiction missions from targets short of the fire support coordination line.
Presents a regional, national, and global overview of air power; Written by a cadre of military specialists who offer global perspectives; Assesses its cultural as well as military influences
Is there a reason for the busy citizen-leader to read about air and space history, theory, and doctrine? Yes, asserts David Mets, because without some vision of what the future is likely to bring, we enter new conflicts unarmed with any ideas and highly vulnerable to confusion and paralysis. He wrote this book to help the aspirant American leader build a theory of war and air and space power, including an understanding of what doctrine is, and what its utility and limitations are. Since its earliest days, airpower has been one of the dominant forces used by the American military. American airmen, both Navy and Air Force, have been continually striving to achieve precision strikes in high altitude, at long range, or in darkness. The search for precision attack from standoff distances or altitudes has been imperative to national objectives with expenditure of American lives, treasure, and time. This work covers the whole history of American aviation with special attention to the development of smart weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles and the influence they have had on the effectiveness of airpower. In a chronological treatment, emphasizing theory and doctrine, technology, tactics, and strategy. Mets also details both combat experience and intellectual processes, lethal and non-lethal, involved in the preparation of airpower. In addition to the narrative discussion, the work offers sidebars and feature sections that facilitate the understanding of key weapons systems and operational challenges. It also offers A Dozen-Book Sampler for Your Reading on Air and Space Theory and Doctrine. The work concludes with a brief look at information warfare and with some speculations about the future. Through this thorough consideration of the evolution of American airpower and technology, Mets provides, not only a map of the past, but a guide to future generations of airpower and its potential for keeping the United States strong and safe.
This book suggests a general framework for the analysis of formative factors in military thought and offers an account of the Israel Defense Force’s state of intellectualism and modernity. This account is followed by an attempt to trace the factors that have shaped Israeli military thought. The explanations are a mixture of realist and non-realist factors, which can be found at both the systemic and the state level of analysis. At the systemic level, realist evaluations focus on factors such as the dominance of the technological dimension and the pervasiveness of asymmetrical, low-intensity conflict; whereas at the state level one can find realist explanations, cultural factors, and societal influences. Moral and legal constraints also factor into both the systemic and state levels.
US Air Force Forward Air Controllers (FACs) bridge the gap between air and land power. They operate in the grey area of the battlefield, serving as an aircrew who flies above the battlefield, spots the enemy, and relays targeting information to control close air support attacks by other faster aircraft. When done well, Air Force FACs are the fulcrum for successful employment of air power in support of ground forces. Unfortunately, FACs in recent times have been shunned by both ground and air forces, their mission complicated by inherent difficulty and danger, as well as by the vicissitudes of defense budgets, technology, leadership, bureaucracy, and doctrine. Eagles Overhead is the first complete historical survey of the US Air Force FAC program from its origins in World War I to the modern battlefield. Matt Dietz examines their role, status, and performance in every US Air Force air campaign from the Marne in 1918, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and finally Mosul in 2017. With the remaking of the post-Vietnam US military, and the impact of those changes on FAC, the Air Force began a steady neglect of the FAC mission from Operation Desert Storm, through the force reductions after the Soviet Union’s collapse, and into the post 9-11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Eagles Overhead asks why FACs have not been heavily used on US battlefields since 2001, despite their warfighting importance. Dietz examines the Air Force FAC’s theoretical, doctrinal, institutional, and historical frameworks to assess if the nature of air warfare has changed so significantly that the concept and utility of the FAC has been left behind. From these examinations, Eagles Overhead draws conclusions about the potential future of Air Force FACs.
