Governments have been negotiating about disarmament, or more limited forms of arms control, for forty years. Despite these negotiations, weapons of increasing deadliness and sophistication continue to be developed. Through the use of case studies of particular negotiations (Partial and Comprehensive Test Ban, SALT I and II, INF and START, and MBFR/CFE), the book explores both the reasons for success and the obstacles leading to failure, and assesses the importance of different types of explanation. Dr Carter not only analyses the reasons why negotiations fail, she also examines the conditions under which they are likely to succeed. The result is a balanced comprehensive treatment of the problems and prospects for arms control.
Rose Gottemoeller, the US chief negotiator of the New START treaty-and the first woman to lead a major nuclear arms negotiation-delivers in this book an invaluable insider's account of the negotiations between the US and Russian delegations in Geneva in 2009 and 2010. It also examines the crucially important discussions about the treaty between President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev, and it describes the tough negotiations Gottemoeller and her team went through to gain the support of the Senate for the treaty. And importantly, at a time when the US Congress stands deeply divided, it tells the story of how, in a previous time of partisan division, Republicans and Democrats came together to ratify a treaty to safeguard the future of all Americans. Rose Gottemoeller is uniquely qualified to write this book, bringing to the task not only many years of high-level experience in creating and enacting US policy on arms control and compliance but also a profound understanding of the broader politico-military context from her time as NATO Deputy Secretary General. Thanks to her years working with Russians, including as Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, she provides rare insights into the actions of the Russian delegation-and the dynamics between Medvedev and then-Prime Minister Vladmir Putin. Her encyclopedic recall of the events and astute ability to analyze objectively, while laying out her own thoughts and feelings at the time, make this both an invaluable document of record-and a fascinating story. In conveying the sense of excitement and satisfaction in delivering an innovative arms control instrument for the American people and by laying out the lessons Gottemoeller and her colleagues learned, this book will serve as an inspiration for the next generation of negotiators, as a road map for them as they learn and practice their trade, and as a blueprint to inform the shaping and ratification of future treaties. This book is in the Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS) Series (General Editor: Dr. Geoffrey R.H. Burn) and has received much praise, including: “As advances in technology usher in a new age of weaponry, future negotiators would benefit from reading Rose Gottemoeller’s memoir of the process leading to the most significant arms control agreement of recent decades.” —Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State “Rose Gottemoeller’s book on the New START negotiations is the definitive book on this treaty or indeed, any of the nuclear treaties with the Soviet Union or Russia. These treaties played a key role in keeping the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union from breaking out into a civilization-ending war. But her story of the New START negotiation is no dry academic treatise. She tells with wit and charm the human story of the negotiators, as well as the critical issues involved. Rose’s book is an important and well-told story about the last nuclear treaty negotiated between the US and Russia.” —William J. Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense “This book is important, but not just because it tells you about a very significant past, but also because it helps you understand the future.” — George Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of State
`A unique and indispensible work that serves both as a basic introduction to the disarmament scene and a reference book for experts′ - Disarmament Times `This compendium of the history and achievements of arms control and disarmament efforts is unique in its kind and is likely to remain so. This for three reasons: first, because of its unparalleled comprehensiveness; second, because of the outstanding quality of its presentation, and, third, because of its author, Jozef Goldblat, one of the world′s leading experts in the field. This triad makes the updated Second Edition of Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements a must for all concerned with international security in general and arms control in particular′ - Curt Gasteyger, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva `The thesaurus of arms regulation and disarmament...a precious tool for negotiators and treaty makers′ - Ambassador V Petrovsky, Former Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament `Being the most comprehensive and authoritative compilation and analysis of arms control agreements available, this is an indispensable reference volume for students and practitioners of arms control and international security. The author has spent a lifetime in the study and practice of international security affairs: where international law and arms control agreements are concerned, there is no one better qualified than him′ - Sverre Lodgaard, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo The revised and updated edition of Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements contains the most authoritative and comprehensive survey ever published of the documents related to arms control. All major agreements reached since the second half of the nineteenth century through to mid-2002 are critically analysed and assessed. The assessment is made in the light of the international security environment, the developments in the field of weapon technology, the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation, and the efforts to strengthen the humanitarian law of armed conflict. The accompanying CD-ROM reproduces full text and carefully selected excerpts of treaties, conventions, common understandings, statutes, charters, binding decisions of international bodies, final acts of international conferences, exchanges of letters and diplomatic notes. Multilateral agreements are followed by a list of parties. Enriched with new maps, tables and figures, as well as an expanded glossary and bibliography, the book will remain the definitive resource for students of international relations, journalists, diplomats and military strategists. Jozef Goldblat, the author, is Vice-President of the Geneva International Peace Research Institute (GIPRI), Resident Senior Fellow of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and Associate Editor of Security Dialogue, published by SAGE for the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). He has studied the problems of arms control since the 1950s and has been involved in arms control negotiations. From 1969 to 1989 he directed the arms control and disarmament programme of studies at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). He has lectured at various universities and has written reports, articles and books on the arms race and disarmament. His latest publications include The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Assessment and Prospects, The Hague Academy of International Law, 1997, and Nuclear Disarmament: Obstacles to Banishing the Bomb, I. B. Tauris, 2000.
Political scientist Fen Osler Hampson, with the assistance of trade specialist Michael Hart, studies the component parts of the multilateral negotiation process to identify those factors making for success or failure. The authors argue that multilateral negotiation is, in essence, a coalition-building enterprise involving states, nonstate actors, and international organizations. Among the questions they raise are: How do issues get to the table in multilateral negotiations? Who sits at the table and who composes the tiers of relevant stakeholders? What are the procedures for managing complexity? What are the obstacles - strategic and psychological - to reaching agreement? Ranging from the 1963 Test Ban Treaty to the Climate Change Convention (1992) and the completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT (1993), individual case studies include discussions on security, environmental, and economic issues. Of particular interest is the attention given to nongovernmental actors - such as scientists and environmental groups like Greenpeace International - in prenegotiation and negotiation phases.
This book is essentially a series of case histories of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, as seen from the American side. It describes the processes of governmental decisionmaking for arms control in Washington, D.C., and the techniques for joint U.S.-Soviet decisionmaking at the negotiating table. As general counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and member of U.S. delegations to disarmament conferences for eight years, the author was in a unique position to assess the difficulties of fashioning an arms control treaty that could pass muster within the executive branch of the U.S. government, be approved by U.S. allies, be successfully negotiated with the Soviets, and then win the approval of the U.S. Senate. This process will be even more complex now that the United States will face at least four nuclear powers from the former U.S.S.R. The book has three purposes. The first is to add to the recorded history of the following negotiations: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the ABM Treaty of 1972 and its companion SALT Interim Agreements, and the 1987 INF Treaty. The author asks in each case, What did the president and his assistants do (or fail to do) to negotiate a successful agreement? The second purpose is to use the case book approach, common in law schools and business schools, as a teaching device for those who wish to learn how the American government made decisions about arms control negotiations, how U.S.-Soviet negotiators reached decisions, and what the results of the decisions have been. The book's third purpose is to generalize about what works and what does not work in the complex world of arms control negotiations, including information on the impact of negotiating committees and comparisons of the process for negotiating arms control treaties with that for achieving arms limits through action and reaction, without written agreement. The concluding chapter looks to the future: What changes will occur in the arms control process given the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union?
This is a book of contrasts. Its contributors include both arms control negotiators and their critics. Its content spans questions about the need for nuclear weapons and the urgency of arms limitation. The authors are Republicans and Democrats. One group emphasizes successes in the unending task of limiting weaponry, while another points to the continuing use of nuclear weapons in establishing strategic stability and nuclear deterrence. The virtue of a multi-authored volume such as this one is that it helps readers understand, apart from the misconceptions that partisan politics and thirty-second sound bites foster, the realities of the arms control process and negotiations leading to such agreements. The analysis of differing approaches to negotiationsóSoviet and Americanóis one of the unique aspects of this collection of essays. It is surprising that not more has been written on the actual process and differing styles of arms negotiations. The intent of the contributors is to help fill the void in these aspects of the arms limitation literature.
The United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating nuclear arms control agreements for over twenty years, yet radical differences remain in the two sides' concept of, and approaches to, strategic stability and arms control. This book compares and contrasts those approaches, using START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) as a case study. Throughout two decades of negotiation, U.S. policy has been directed toward dialogue that would encourage convergence of American and Soviet thought on nuclear deterrence. In Kartchner's view, that hope is belied not only by continuing asymmetries in the development and deployment of their strategic nuclear arsenals, but by differing U.S. and Soviet negotiating positions. The Reagan administration viewed START as a means of repudiating SALT II, restoring a measure of balance in the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition, and as a way of closing the so-called window of vulnerability. In contrast, Kartchner analyzes the Soviets' differing views of nuclear balance, emphasizing their satisfaction with SALT II and a strategic equilibrium shaped by a decade of bilateral arms control. Kartchner offers a detailed exposition of the major negotiating issues in START, contrasting concerns of U.S. and Soviet negotiators. Not surprisingly, each side's agenda was dominated by weapon systems that figure prominently in the other's development program. The author concludes by summarizing and comparing American and Soviet quests for stability and drawing up an assessment of U.S. efforts in both SALT and START to use arms control negotiations as a kind of classroom for instructing Soviet officials in American notions of "stabilizing" versus "destabilizing" weapon technology and America's own ethnocentric view of stability. START will profoundly affect the acquisition, operation, maintenance, and cost of U.S. strategic nuclear forces well into the next century. The history and analysis presented here will provide an essential source to policymakers and students of military-political relations for much-needed further study of this treaty's implications.
The definitive guide to the history of nuclear arms control by a wise eavesdropper and masterful storyteller, Michael Krepon. The greatest unacknowledged diplomatic achievement of the Cold War was the absence of mushroom clouds. Deterrence alone was too dangerous to succeed; it needed arms control to prevent nuclear warfare. So, U.S. and Soviet leaders ventured into the unknown to devise guardrails for nuclear arms control and to treat the Bomb differently than other weapons. Against the odds, they succeeded. Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare for three quarters of a century. This book is the first in-depth history of how the nuclear peace was won by complementing deterrence with reassurance, and then jeopardized by discarding arms control after the Cold War ended. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace tells a remarkable story of high-wire acts of diplomacy, close calls, dogged persistence, and extraordinary success. Michael Krepon brings to life the pitched battles between arms controllers and advocates of nuclear deterrence, the ironic twists and unexpected outcomes from Truman to Trump. What began with a ban on atmospheric testing and a nonproliferation treaty reached its apogee with treaties that mandated deep cuts and corralled "loose nukes" after the Soviet Union imploded. After the Cold War ended, much of this diplomatic accomplishment was cast aside in favor of freedom of action. The nuclear peace is now imperiled by no less than four nuclear-armed rivalries. Arms control needs to be revived and reimagined for Russia and China to prevent nuclear warfare. New guardrails have to be erected. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace is an engaging account of how the practice of arms control was built from scratch, how it was torn down, and how it can be rebuilt.
Robert Jervis argues here that the possibility of nuclear war has created a revolution in military strategy and international relations. He examines how the potential for nuclear Armageddon has changed the meaning of war, the psychology of statesmanship, and the formulation of military policy by the superpowers.
