This report demonstrates that a significant proportion of prospective homeowners remains underserved by the mortgage finance industry. The report reviews and evaluates the framework of housing goals that has been established by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It finds that the housing goals represent a promising approach to focusing their resources on the mortgage credit needs of homebuyers. Such a programmatic emphasis by these enterprises represents an appropriate exchange for the benefits that they receive through their ties with the Federal government.
Why America's public-private mortgage giants threaten the world economy—and what to do about it The financial collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008 led to one of the most sweeping government interventions in private financial markets in history. The bailout has already cost American taxpayers close to $150 billion, and substantially more will be needed. The U.S. economy--and by extension, the global financial system--has a lot riding on Fannie and Freddie. They cannot fail, yet that is precisely what these mortgage giants are guaranteed to do. How can we limit the damage to our economy, and avoid making the same mistakes in the future? Guaranteed to Fail explains how poorly designed government guarantees for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac led to the debacle of mortgage finance in the United States, weighs different reform proposals, and provides sensible, practical recommendations. Despite repeated calls for tougher action, Washington has expanded the scope of its guarantees to Fannie and Freddie, fueling more and more housing and mortgages all across the economy--and putting all of us at risk. This book unravels the dizzyingly immense, highly interconnected businesses of Fannie and Freddie. It proposes a unique model of reform that emphasizes public-private partnership, one that can serve as a blueprint for better organizing and managing government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In doing so, Guaranteed to Fail strikes a cautionary note about excessive government intervention in markets.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Conventional wisdom held that housing prices couldn’t fall. But the spectacular boom and bust of the housing market during the first decade of the twenty-first century and millions of foreclosed homeowners have made it clear that housing is no different from any other asset in its ability to climb and crash. Housing and the Financial Crisis looks at what happened to prices and construction both during and after the housing boom in different parts of the American housing market, accounting for why certain areas experienced less volatility than others. It then examines the causes of the boom and bust, including the availability of credit, the perceived risk reduction due to the securitization of mortgages, and the increase in lending from foreign sources. Finally, it examines a range of policies that might address some of the sources of recent instability.
I. Understanding the housing GSEs: What, why, how? -- II. Federal costs of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- III. Public benefits of the housing GSEs -- IV. Congress and the GSEs: Weak control and incompatible interests -- V. Options for improving the GSE cost-benefit balance for taxpayers.
Discusses options for restructuring Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On Sept. 6, 2008, both enterprises were placed in conservatorship out of concern that their deteriorating financial condition and potential default on $5.4 trillion in financial obligations threatened the stability of financial markets. This testimony: (1) summarizes the enterprises' performance in achieving key housing mission objectives; (2) identifies various options for revising the enterprises' long-term structures; (3) analyzes these options in terms of their potential capacity to achieve key housing mission and safety objectives; and (4) discusses how the fed. gov¿ts. mgmt. of the conservatorships and response to the housing crisis could affect any transition. Illus.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
In his new book, "Bad History, Worse Policy: How a False Narrative about the Financial Crisis Led to the Dodd-Frank Act," (AEI Press) Wallison argues that the Dodd-Frank Act -- the Obama administration's sweeping financial regulation law -- will suppress economic growth for years to come. Based on his essays on financial services issues published between 2004 and 2012, Wallison shows that the act was based on a false and ideologically motivated narrative about the financial crisis." -- Provided by publisher.
