Structural Econometrics of Auctions
Structural Econometrics of Auctions

Author: Matthew L. Gentry

Publisher: Foundations and Trends (R) in Econometrics

Published: 2018-04-26

Total Pages: 244

ISBN-13: 9781680834468

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Structural Econometrics of Auctions summarizes the structural econometric analysis of observational data from auctions.

Structural Econometric Modeling in Industrial Organization and Quantitative Marketing
Structural Econometric Modeling in Industrial Organization and Quantitative Marketing

Author: Ali Hortaçsu

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2023-10-24

Total Pages: 281

ISBN-13: 0691251002

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A concise and rigorous introduction to widely used approaches in structural econometric modeling Structural econometric modeling specifies the structure of an economic model and estimates the model’s parameters from real-world data. Structural econometric modeling enables better economic theory–based predictions and policy counterfactuals. This book offers a primer on recent developments in these modeling techniques, which are used widely in empirical industrial organization, quantitative marketing, and related fields. It covers such topics as discrete choice modeling, demand modes, estimation of the firm entry models with strategic interactions, consumer search, and theory/empirics of auctions. The book makes highly technical material accessible to graduate students, describing key insights succinctly but without sacrificing rigor. • Concise overview of the most widely used structural econometric models • Rigorous and systematic treatment of the topics, emphasizing key insights • Coverage of demand estimation, estimation of static and dynamic game theoretic models, consumer search, and auctions • Focus on econometric models while providing concise reviews of relevant theoretical models

An Introduction to Auction Theory
An Introduction to Auction Theory

Author: Flavio M. Menezes

Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA

Published: 2005

Total Pages: 200

ISBN-13: 0199275998

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This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of auction theory and aims to provide an introductory treatment to allow students to work through all the basic results. The techniques and insights gained provide a useful starting point for those wanting to venture into information economics, mechanism design and regulatory economics.

Putting Auction Theory to Work
Putting Auction Theory to Work

Author: Paul Milgrom

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2004-01-12

Total Pages: 378

ISBN-13: 1139449168

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This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable?
Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable?

Author: Patrick Bajari

Publisher:

Published: 2003

Total Pages: 36

ISBN-13:

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Recently, economists have developed methods for structural estimation of auction models. Many researchers object to these methods because they find the rationality assumptions used in these models to be implausible. In this paper, we explore whether structural auction models can generate reasonable estimates of bidders' private information. Using bid data from auction experiments, we estimate four alternative structural models of bidding in first-price sealed-bid auctions: 1) risk neutral Bayes-Nash, 2) risk averse Bayes-Nash, 3) a model of learning and 4) a quantal response model of bidding. For each model, we compare the estimated valuations and the valuations assigned to bidders in the experiments. We find that a slight modification of Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong's (2000) procedure for estimating the risk neutral Bayes-Nash model to allow for bidder asymmetries generates quite reasonable estimates of the structural parameters.