Competitive Strategy
Competitive Strategy

Author: Benoit Chevalier-Roignant

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2011-12-22

Total Pages: 517

ISBN-13: 0262297833

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A new paradigm for balancing flexibility and commitment in management strategy through the amalgamation of real options and game theory. Corporate managers who face both strategic uncertainty and market uncertainty confront a classic trade-off between commitment and flexibility. They can stake a claim by making a large capital investment today, influencing their rivals' behavior, or they can take a “wait and see” approach to avoid adverse market consequences tomorrow. In Competitive Strategy, Benoît Chevalier-Roignant and Lenos Trigeorgis describe an emerging paradigm that can quantify and balance commitment and flexibility, “option games,” by which the decision-making approaches of real options and game theory can be combined. The authors first discuss prerequisite concepts and tools from basic game theory, industrial organization, and real options analysis, and then present the new approach in discrete time and later in continuous time. Their presentation of continuous-time option games is the first systematic coverage of the topic and fills a significant gap in the existing literature. Competitive Strategy provides a rigorous yet pragmatic and intuitive approach to strategy formulation. It synthesizes research in the areas of strategy, economics, and finance in a way that is accessible to readers not necessarily expert in the various fields involved.

Multiunit Organization and Multimarket Strategy
Multiunit Organization and Multimarket Strategy

Author: Joel Baum

Publisher: Elsevier

Published: 2001-06-15

Total Pages: 420

ISBN-13: 0762307218

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A conspicuous feature of the modern economy is the multitude of multiunit systems that operate in several markets - an organizational form that arguably rivals the "M-form" as the 20th century's most successful. Research traditions studying multiunit systems include the multimarket perspective, which has used commitment and mutual forbearance theory, and the multiunit perspective, which has used learning and knowledge transfer theory. These perspectives are interdisciplinary, but to date there has been little direct interaction among them. This text aims to bring these areas together, discussing such things as: examining how variation in firm capabilities affects the co-ordination of branches and thus their forbearance or transfer of routines; bridging theories of market conduct and internal behaviour to explore how knowledge about markets and competitor behaviour is transferred among organizational units; making a theory of contingent multiunit or single-unit competitive advantage that can account for the coexistence of these organizational forms in many markets; and examining the effects of firm contacts in alliances or technological fields on their competitive behaviours.

Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I
Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I

Author: Luis C. Corchón

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

Published: 2018-02-23

Total Pages: 567

ISBN-13: 178536328X

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The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.

A Theory of Strategic Mergers
A Theory of Strategic Mergers

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 2013

Total Pages: 54

ISBN-13:

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We examine firms' strategic incentives to engage in horizontal mergers. In a real options framework, we show that strategic considerations may explain abnormally high takeover activity during periods of positive and negative demand shocks. Importantly, this pattern emerges solely as a result of firms' strategic interaction in output markets and holds in the absence of technological and financial reasons for merging. Varying the intensity of product market competition and the industry structure, and allowing for the existence of operating synergies, operating leverage, and merger-related costs generates additional empirical implications. We test the main predictions of the model using parametric and semi-parametric regression analysis. Consistent with the theory, there is a U-shaped relation between the state of demand and the propensity of firms to merge horizontally, controlling for firms' non-strategic incentives to merge. Furthermore, as predicted by the model, this relation is driven by horizontal mergers within relatively concentrated industries, whereas no such relation exists in industries in which strategic considerations are likely to be less important.

Handbook of Industrial Organization
Handbook of Industrial Organization

Author: Richard Schmalensee

Publisher: North Holland

Published: 1989-09-11

Total Pages: 1002

ISBN-13:

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Determinants of firm and market organization; Analysis of market behavior; Empirical methods and results; International issues and comparision; government intervention in the Marketplace.

The Bank Merger Wave: The Economic Causes and Social Consequences of Financial Consolidation
The Bank Merger Wave: The Economic Causes and Social Consequences of Financial Consolidation

Author: Gary Dymski

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2016-09-16

Total Pages: 356

ISBN-13: 1315292432

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This far-reaching study shows that operating efficiencies are not what are driving today's unrelenting bank merger mania. It suggests that bank mergers and consolidation may have effects that are contrary to consumer and non-financial business interests, such as lower rates of interest, increasing fees, and tighter credit constraints. Dymski recommends several new policies to apply to the evaluation of prospective mergers.