Uses the Office of Personnel Management's Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework, which advocates strategic alignment, workforce planning and development, and leadership and knowledge management, to assess the U.S. civilian personnel and staffing requirements for stability and reconstruction operations.
Recent U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that engaging in Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)1 operations is a di cult and potentially lengthy process that requires appropriate resources. Most of all, in order to have a chance of being successful, a SSTR operation requires a realistic understanding of the capabilities needed for such an operation. This monograph examines one capability required for successful SSTR operations: the provision of competent civilian staffs that can manage and conduct the tasks needed for success.
U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that improving U.S. capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations is critical to national security. The authors recommend building civilian rather than military capacity, realigning and reforming existing agencies, and funding promising programs. They also suggest improvements to deployable police capacity, crisis-management processes, and guidance and funding.
U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that improving U.S. capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations is critical to national security. To help craft a way ahead, the authors provide an overview of the requirements posed by stabilization and reconstruction operations and recommend ways to improve U.S. capacity to meet these needs.
Product Description: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIR's lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraq's essential services, build Iraq's security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government--all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was - or was not - done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the Surge in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations.
A combination of poor planning, weak oversight and greed cheated U.S. taxpayers and undermined American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. taxpayers have paid nearly $51 billion for projects in Iraq, including training the Iraqi army and police and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electric, justice, health and transportation sectors. Many of the projects did not succeed, partly because of violence in Iraq and friction between U.S. officials in Washington and Iraqi officials in Baghdad. The U.S. gov¿t. "was neither prepared for nor able to respond quickly to the ever-changing demands" of stabilizing Iraq and then rebuilding it. This report reviews the problems in the war effort, which the Bush admin. claimed would cost $2.4 billion. Charts and tables.
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness), referred to throughout this report as P&R, is responsible for the total force management of all Department of Defense (DoD) components including the recruitment, readiness, and retention of personnel. Its work and policies are supported by a number of organizations both within DoD, including the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), and externally, including the federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) that work for DoD. P&R must be able to answer questions for the Secretary of Defense such as how to recruit people with an aptitude for and interest in various specialties and along particular career tracks and how to assess on an ongoing basis service members' career satisfaction and their ability to meet new challenges. P&R must also address larger-scale questions, such as how the current realignment of forces to the Asia-Pacific area and other regions will affect recruitment, readiness, and retention. While DoD makes use of large-scale data and mathematical analysis in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and elsewhereâ€"exploiting techniques such as complex network analysis, machine learning, streaming social media analysis, and anomaly detectionâ€"these skills and capabilities have not been applied as well to the personnel and readiness enterprise. Strengthening Data Science Methods for Department of Defense Personnel and Readiness Missions offers and roadmap and implementation plan for the integration of data analysis in support of decisions within the purview of P&R.
The recent conclusion to the war in Afghanistan — America’s longest and one of its most frustrating — serves as a vivid reminder of the unpredictability and tragedy of war. In this timely book, esteemed military expert Michael O’Hanlon examines America’s major conflicts since the mid-1800s: the Civil War, the two World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Now updated with a new preface that addresses the Revolutionary War and brief observations on three other conflicts in U. S. History, O’Hanlon’s unique book — combining brevity and clarity with a broad conceptual approach —serves as an important treatment of America’s military history at the strategic and theater of operations levels. It should appeal to students of security studies and military history at universities and war colleges as well as generalists. He addresses profound questions. How successful has the United States been when it waged these wars? Were the wars avoidable? Did America’s leaders know what they were getting into when they committed to war? And what lessons does history offer for future leaders contemplating war? O’Hanlon looks for overarching trends and themes, along with the lessons for the military strategists and political leaders of today and tomorrow, including the observation that war is usually far more difficult than expected, and that its outcomes are rarely predictable.
How can the Army help make key civilian agencies more capable partners in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations? The authors identify the civilian agencies that should be involved in such operations, then locate the necessary skill sets. They then assess the capacity of the civilian agencies to participate in SSTR operations and analyze the recurring structural problems that have plagued their attempts to do so.
Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria - a quarter-century of stumbles in America’s pursuit of a more peaceful and just world. American military interventions have cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars, yet we rarely manage to enact positive and sustainable change. In Peace Works: America's Unifying Role in a Turbulent World, ambassador and global conflict leader Rick Barton uses a mix of stories, history, and analysis for a transformative approach to foreign affairs and offers concrete and attainable solutions for the future. Drawing on his lifetime of experience as a diplomat, foreign policy expert, and State Department advisor, Rick Barton grapples with the fact that the U.S. is strategically positioned and morally obligated to defuse international conflicts, but often inadvertently escalates conflicts instead. Guided by the need to find solutions that will yield tangible results, Barton does a deep analysis of our last several interventions and discusses why they failed and how they could have succeeded. He outlines a few key directives in his foreign policy strategy: remain transparent with the American public, act as a catalyzing (not colonizing!) force, and engage local partners. But above all else, he insists that the U.S. must maintain a focus on people. Since a country’s greatest resource is often the ingenuity of its local citizens, it is counterproductive to ignore them while planning an intervention. By anchoring each chapter to a story from a specific conflict zone, Barton is able to discuss opportunities pursued and missed, areas for improvement, and policy recommendations. This balance between storytelling and concrete policy suggestions both humanizes distant stories of foreign crises, and provides going-forward solutions for desperate situations. The book begins and ends in Syria – the ultimate failure of our current approach to foreign policy, and with devastating consequences.