Not long ago, secrecy was the byword in central banking circles, but now the unmistakable trend is towards greater openness and transparency. This, the third Geneva Report on the World Economy, describes and evaluates some of the changes in how central banks talk to the markets, to the press, and to the public. The report first assesses the case for transparency ? defined as providing sufficient information for the public to understand the policy regime ? and concludes that it is very strong, based on both policy effectiveness and democratic accountability. It then examines what should be the content of communication and argues that central banks ought to spell out their long-run objectives and methods. It then investigates the link between the decision-making process and central bank communication, drawing a distinction between individualistic and collegial committees. The report concludes with a review of the communications strategies of some of the main central banks.
This book explores current issues regarding the regulation of various economic sectors, theoretically and empirically, discussing both neoclassical and behavioural economics approaches to regulation. Regulation has become one of the main determinants of modern economies, and virtually every sector is subject to general laws and regulations as well as specific rules and standards. A traditional argument to justify regulatory interventions is the promotion of public interests. Fixing markets that lack competition, balancing information asymmetries, internalising externalities, mitigating systemic risks, and protecting consumers from irrational behaviour are frequently invoked to complement the invisible hand of the market with the visible hand of the state.However, regulations can lead to unintended consequences, and serve the interests of powerful private interest groups rather than the public interest and social welfare. In addition, new insights from behavioural economics question the traditional regulatory approaches, most prominently in attitudes towards consumers. Furthermore, digitalisation and technological innovation in general present new challenges in terms of both the type of regulation and the regulatory process.Part I of this book discusses various theoretical approaches to the economic analysis of regulations, while Part II looks at specific applications of the law and economics of regulation.
Over the last decade, the developed world has been hit by the deepest recession since the Great Depression and a rollercoaster in commodity prices. And yet, core inflation has been both low and fairly stable. A rule of thumb that inflation is always near 2%, though more often than not just a bit below, has been quite reliable. The young, or those with short memories, could be forgiven for looking condescendingly at their older friends who speak of inflation as a major economic problem. But, like Galileo Galilei told his contemporaries who thought the Earth was immovable, "Eppur si muove" ("and yet it moves"). Since most societies regard stable inflation as a goal, it is tempting to describe this solid anchoring of inflation as a great achievement of monetary policy. But what if it was just luck? Will the great anchoring soon lead a great bout of inflation, just as the Great Moderation was followed by the Great Recession? Do we need to change the way in which policy is set to better handle changed circumstances since the financial crash? The 19th Geneva Report on the World Economy starts by analysing outcomes across countries for the last ten years. Inflation is compared with its behaviour in the period before the financial crash to assess the extent to which it really has been stable, what the proximate causes are, and whether it will stay low in future. The report then assesses theories of inflation in light of these facts, and tries to make sense of them. Next, the report turns to the question we posed at the start: was it good policy or good luck that prevented severe deflation and kept inflation relatively steady? A description of what policies were adopted and how they interacted with economic shocks informs the conclusions on appropriate policies--both monetary and fiscal--for the future. The report pays particular attention tothe role of central banks and the extent of their activities.
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, economists around the world have advanced theories to explain the persistence of high unemployment and low growth rates. Written in clear, accessible language by prominent macroeconomic theorist Roger E. A. Farmer, Prosperity for All proposes a paradigm shift and policy changes that could successfully raise employment rates, keep inflation at bay, and stimulate growth.
This broad-ranging collection assesses the links between targets and central bank independence, accountability and the transparency of monetary policy. Renowned experts contribute to this original and comprehensive text which will be of great value to professional economists and students of economics and banking alike. Monetary Policy Frameworks in a Global Context was named Book of the Year, 2000 by Central Banking journal
Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. By uncovering the constitutional incentives that influence citizens, politicians, administrators, and judges, Cooter exposes fault lines in alternative forms of democracy: unitary versus federal states, deep administration versus many elections, parliamentary versus presidential systems, unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, common versus civil law, and liberty versus equality rights. Cooter applies an efficiency test to these alternatives, asking how far they satisfy the preferences of citizens for laws and public goods. To answer Cooter contrasts two types of democracy, which he defines as competitive government. The center of the political spectrum defeats the extremes in "median democracy," whereas representatives of all the citizens bargain over laws and public goods in "bargain democracy." Bargaining can realize all the gains from political trades, or bargaining can collapse into an unstable contest of redistribution. States plagued by instability and contests over redistribution should move towards median democracy by increasing transaction costs and reducing the power of the extremes. Specifically, promoting median versus bargain democracy involves promoting winner-take-all elections versus proportional representation, two parties versus multiple parties, referenda versus representative democracy, and special governments versus comprehensive governments. This innovative theory will have ramifications felt across national and disciplinary borders, and will be debated by a large audience, including the growing pool of economists interested in how law and politics shape economic policy, political scientists using game theory or specializing in constitutional law, and academic lawyers. The approach will also garner attention from students of political science, law, and economics, as well as policy makers working in and with new democracies where constitutions are being written and refined.
"The process by which securities are traded is very different from the idealized picture of a frictionless and self-equilibrating market offered by the typical finance textbook. This book offers a more accurate and authoritative take on this process. The book starts from the assumption that not everyone is present at all times simultaneously on the market, and that participants have quite diverse information about the security's fundamentals. As a result, the order flow is a complex mix of information and noise, and a consensus price only emerges gradually over time as the trading process evolves and the participants interpret the actions of other traders. Thus, a security's actual transaction price may deviate from its fundamental value, as it would be assessed by a fully informed set of investors. The book takes these deviations seriously, and explains why and how they emerge in the trading process and are eventually eliminated. The authors draw on a vast body of theoretical insights and empirical findings on security price formation that have come to form a well-defined field within financial economics known as "market microstructure." Focusing on liquidity and price discovery, the book analyzes the tension between the two, pointing out that when price-relevant information reaches the market through trading pressure rather than through a public announcement, liquidity may suffer. It also confronts many striking phenomena in securities markets and uses the analytical tools and empirical methods of market microstructure to understand them. These include issues such as why liquidity changes over time and differs across securities, why large trades move prices up or down, and why these price changes are subsequently reversed, and why we observe temporary deviations from asset fair values"--
Again and again, Latin America has seen the populist scenario played to an unfortunate end. Upon gaining power, populist governments attempt to revive the economy through massive spending. After an initial recovery, inflation reemerges and the government responds with wage an price controls. Shortages, overvaluation, burgeoning deficits, and capital flight soon precipitate economic crisis, with a subsequent collapse of the populist regime. The lessons of this experience are especially valuable for countries in Eastern Europe, as they face major political and economic decisions. Economists and political scientists from the United States and Latin America detail in this volume how and why such programs go wrong and what leads policymakers to repeatedly adopt these policies despite a history of failure. Authors examine this pattern in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru—and show how Colombia managed to avoid it. Despite differences in how each country implemented its policies, the macroeconomic consequences were remarkably similar. Scholars of Latin America will find this work a valuable resource, offering a distinctive macroeconomic perspective on the continuing controversy over the dynamics of populism.
The 1990s witnessed several acute currency crises among developing nations that invariably spread to other nearby at-risk countries. These episodes—in Mexico, Thailand, South Korea, Russia, and Brazil—were all exacerbated by speculative foreign investments and high-volume movements of capital in and out of those countries. Insufficient domestic controls and a sluggish international response further undermined these economies, as well as the credibility of external oversight agencies like the International Monetary Fund. This timely volume examines the correlation between volatile capital mobility, currency instability, and the threat of regional contagion, focusing particular attention on the emergent economies of Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe. Together these studies offer a new understanding of the empirical relationship between capital flows, international trade, and economic performance, and also afford key insights into realms of major policy concern.
