First Published in 1986. The papers in this volume were originally delivered at a series of seminars held at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, between January and May 1984. The inspiration for the scheme was the Soviet succession struggle of 1982 but further reflection indicated that the problem of elderly leaderships, and the apparent absence of legitimate succession mechanisms, applied to nearly all communist systems.
Soviet Succession Struggles (1988) is a key study of the history, nature and development of Soviet politics and politicians from the earliest days of Soviet Russia up to the rise of Gorbachev. It examines the power struggles between opposing factions within the Soviet leadership, and identifies two main political standpoints that were always vying for ultimate control of the Communist State.
Soviet Succession Struggles (1988) is a key study of the history, nature and development of Soviet politics and politicians from the earliest days of Soviet Russia up to the rise of Gorbachev. It examines the power struggles between opposing factions within the Soviet leadership, and identifies two main political standpoints that were always vying for ultimate control of the Communist State.
From Kurdistan to Somaliland, Xinjiang to South Yemen, all secessionist movements hope to secure newly independent states of their own. Most will not prevail. The existing scholarly wisdom provides one explanation for success, based on authority and control within the nascent states. With the aid of an expansive new dataset and detailed case studies, this book provides an alternative account. It argues that the strongest members of the international community have a decisive influence over whether today's secessionists become countries tomorrow and that, most often, their support is conditioned on parochial political considerations.
This book provides a comprehensive overview of the ways in which the structure and process of Soviet politics have been transformed since Stalin's death, and particularly during the years of the Brezhnev regime. In explaining the Soviet Union's political stability, the author analyzes the Soviet combination of harsh authoritarian rule with political flexibility in the treatment of its citizens, and he describes the social processes that contribute to this stability. He also analyzes the Soviet perception of the current international situation and discusses trends in Soviet foreign policy, including the imbalance between military power on the one hand and political, economic, ideological, and cultural resources on the other. Professor Bialer explains the Soviet concept of détente and explores the difference between Soviet and American perceptions of this process. A major part of the work is devoted to an examination of the imminent succession of the Soviet leadership. The book gives a profile of the new generation of potential leaders and identifies the characteristics that make them different form those whom they will replace. The Soviet leadership, while embroiled in its succession struggle, will have to make difficult decisions concerning the allocation of national resources and overall changes in management, planning, and incentives. Professor Bialer concludes by analyzing the kinds of economic reform that could make the problems manageable and the conditions under which the new Soviet leadership will need to institute reforms.
An assessment of the question of Soviet succession in Khrushchev's 68th year, the fourth year of his rule. The study indicates that a succession crisis is inevitable when Khrushchev ceases to exercise dictatorial powers. The depth of the crisis, however, will depend on certain circumstances at the time. Only if the Soviet regime is seriously weakened by such a crisis is it likely that Soviet foreign policy will be redirected from its primary aim of subverting the West and achieving a communist world order. Moreover, while economic and social progress poses a serious problem for the regime and is certain to have important political consequences, it cannot, in the author's view, change the regime's totalitarian character in the years ahead unless it is seriously weakened by a succession crisis. (Author).
