Monograph speculating on effects of future change in USSR political leadership regarding soviet planned economy and foreign policy towards the USA - profiles Elite members in the communist political party, (including past generations), in public administration, in military service and in the foreign policy establishment, and asserts that future soviet leadership might try to improve the present conflictual relationships with the USA. Graphs, map and references.
This volume analyzes various aspects of the political leadership during the collapse of the Soviet Union and formation of a new Russia. Comparing the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin, the book reflects upon their goals, governing style, and sources of influence—as well as factors that influenced their activities and complicated them too. Contents Introduction Archie Brown Transformational Leaders Compared: Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin Archie Brown Evaluating Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders George W. Breslauer From Yeltsin to Putin: The Evolution of Presidential Power Lilia Shevtsova Political Leadership and the Center-Periphery Struggle: Putin's Administrative Reforms Eugene Huskey Conclusion Lilia Shevtsova
Because of the recent transition in the Soviet Union's leadership, scholars worldwide have found it necessary to reevaluate Soviet domestic and foreign policy. In this volume, prominent Japanese, U.S., and European experts examine changes within the USSR as well as Soviet reactions to changes in the rest of the world. They assess the immediate implications of change for such areas as technology, energy policy, and economic reform and deliver commentaries on current policy directions and historical backgrounds of Soviet policies. To commemorate its silver jubilee and to add the valuable perspective of Japanese Soviet-studies scholars to Western analyses, the Japan Institute of International Affairs held the symposium on which this volume is based.
The late twentieth century witnessed remarkable changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Eastern Europe sprang free of the country that held it in its grip for over forty years. The Soviet leadership has accepted the reunification of Germany and supported the US-sponsored resolution in the UN permitting the use of force in the Gulf against one of its former allies.
This book addresses the Soviet needs for external help to allow the Soviet leadership to carry out its program—in any version—of stabilization. It focuses on the scenarios outlined in the Shatalin plan, as elaborated in the 224-page draft made public.
Raymond L. Garthoff examines the fateful final decade of U.S.- Soviet relations, from the start of the Reagan administration in 1981 through the end of the Soviet era-- the collapse of the communist bloc, the end of Gorbachev's failed perestroika, and the demise of the Soviet Union itself at the end of 1991. While standing on its own, the book is a sequel to the author's earlier acclaimed, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, which covers the period 1969-1980. This volume features a detailed examination of the perspectives and actions of both the United States and the Soviet Union and their interaction, including the interrelationships of domestic factors with foreign and security policies in both countries and the involvement of both powers with other countries around the world, which infringed on their direct relationship. Besides analyzing the turn from confrontation to détente over the years of the Reagan and Bush administrations and Brezhnev through the Gorbachev administration, it reflects on the significance of the great transition from the cold war to a new era. It thus illuminates the very relevant recent history that underlines and informs American-Russian relations and the new situation of a post-Soviet, post-cold war world. Garthoff has obtained access to many formerly secret Soviet documents on this period in the Russian archives, as well as to a number of official American documents that have only recently been declassified. In addition, he has been able to interview and discuss the issues with many active or former Soviet and American officials. The author concludes that the key development was the advent of a Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who recognized the need to cast off a failed world view and to end the cold war-- and who successfully moved with the United States, under the Reagan and Bush administrations, and others, to achieve that goal; notwithstanding his failure in the parallel attempt to revitalize and transform the Soviet Union. Selected by Choice as an Outstanding Book of 1994
