"General Matthew Bunker Ridgway (March 3, 1895–July 26, 1993) was the 19th Chief of Staff of the United States Army. He served with distinction during World War II, where he was the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division, leading it in action in Sicily, Italy and Normandy, before taking command of the newly formed XV,III Airborne Corps in August 1944, holding this post until the end of the war, commanding it in the Battle of the Bulge, Operation Varsity, and the Western Allied invasion of Germany. Ridgway held several major commands after the war and was most famous for resurrecting the United Nations (UN) war effort during the Korean War. His long military career was recognized by the award of the Presidential Medal of Freedom on May 12, 1986."--Wikipedia, January 11, 2018.
Matthew B. Ridgway was a significant figure in United States history. He commanded the 82nd Airborne Division in the invasion in Europe; he succeeded MacArthur in Korea; he was the U.S. delegate to the United Nations; he served as Supreme Commander of the Far East and Supreme Commander in Europe. He was counselor to four presidents, helped found a university research center on national security, and was a powerful influence in national affairs for 40 years. Using Ridgway's personal papers, George Mitchell offers a unique and compelling view of this authentic American hero.
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Now in retirement, General Ridgway describes how he raised the morale of the troops and pushed the Reds back behind the 38th parallel. He is critical of General MacArthur and makes suggestions for other "bushfire wars."
In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution.
Distinguished historian D. Clayton James offers a brilliant reinterpretation of the Korean War conflict. Focusing on the critical issue of command, he shows how the Korean War is a key to understanding American decision-making in all military encounters since World War II. Korea, the first of America’s limited wars to stem the tide of world communism, was fought on unfamiliar terrain and against peasant soldiers and would become a template for subsequent American military engagements, especially Vietnam. And yet, the strategic and tactical doctrines employed in Korea, as well as the weapons and equipment, were largely left over from World War II. James, the master biographer of MacArthur, uses studies of military crises to examine the American high command in the Korean War. He explores the roles, leadership, personalities, and prejudices of five key commanders—President Harry S. Truman; Generals Douglas MacArthur, Matthew B. Ridgway, and Mark W. Clark; and Admiral C. Turner Joy—and then looks at six crucial issues confronting them in that conflict. From the decision made by Truman, without congsessional approval, to commit United States forces to combat in Korea, to MacArthur’s persistent fight for approval of his dangerous plan to assault Inchon, to the judgment to finally open truce negotiations, these turning points illuminate the American way of command in wartime. James analyzes the ground-level results and long-term implications of each choice, and sensitively explores the course that might had followed if other options had been taken. Probing the nature and consequences of these military resolutions, James shows how the conduct of the Korean War, like every new war, bears the imprint of the preceding one.
In December 1950 General Matthew B. Ridgway replaced General Walton Walker as commander of the Eighth Army, and in April 1951 he succeeded Douglas MacArthur as supreme commander of the United Nations forces in Korea and supreme commander of the United States Far East Command. In this spirited book, General Ridgway describes how he took a dispirited army and rebuilt it in a few short months, leading it into battle against the Chinese and North Korean forces, forcing them back over the 38th parallel and ”victory.” It is a book that takes a close look at MacArthur, his failings and brilliance, and a hard look at the idea of limited war. Infused with a humane leader's appreciation for the ordinary fighting soldier, Ridgway's history also teaches important lessons about Vietnam and any future conflict. Above all, he emphasizes: We should not involve ourselves in escalating warfare without a specific and attainable goal.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
This is the candid and revealing wartime memoir of the soldier who, at the age of just 32, became South Korea's first four-star general. The book brings an unprecedented perspective to the Korean War.
