Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, maritime security efforts have focused primarily on large commercial vessels, cargoes, and crew. Efforts to address the small vessel environment have largely been limited to traditional safety and basic law enforcement concerns. Small vessels are, however, readily vulnerable to potential exploitation by terrorists, smugglers of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, and other contraband, and other criminals. Small vessels have also been successfully employed overseas by terrorists to deliver Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs).
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, maritime security efforts have focused primarily on large commercial vessels, cargoes, and crew. Efforts to address the small vessel environment have largely been limited to traditional safety and basic law enforcement concerns. Small vessels are, however, readily vulnerable to potential exploitation by terrorists, smugglers of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, and other contraband, and other criminals. Small vessels have also been successfully employed overseas by terrorists to deliver Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs). Law enforcement agencies face the challenge of distinguishing between the vast number of legitimate vessel operators and the relatively few individuals engaged in illicit activities. The challenge is immense, as it involves nearly 13 million registered U.S. recreational vessels, 82,000 fishing vessels, and 100,000 other commercial small vessels. On any given day, a considerable number of these boats share waterways with commercial and military traffic, operating at hundreds of U.S. ports and in the immediate vicinity of critical maritime infrastructure, including bridges and waterfront facilities such as petrochemical plants. More information concerning small vessels is needed to improve the proper assessment of the risk posed by these vessels. The challenge is to balance the collection of requisite information necessary for proper assessment of risk posed by these vessels, with the freedom of the seas expected by the small boating community.
Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, maritime security efforts have focused primarily on large commercial vessels, cargoes, and crew. Efforts to address the small vessel environment have largely been limited to traditional safety and basic law enforcement concerns. Small vessels are, however, readily vulnerable to potential exploitation by terrorists, smugglers of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, and other contraband, and other criminals. Small vessels have also been successfully employed overseas by terrorists to deliver Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components -- such as the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) -- have started or completed initiatives to address small vessel security risks, but DHS is not tracking the progress being made to address action items in the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) Implementation Plan. This book examines what actions, if any, DHS and its components have taken to address small vessel security concerns, and the extent to which they have implemented action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan.
The Coast Guard estimates that there were more than 22 million small vessels operating in the U.S. in 2012. Terrorists, smugglers, and other criminals can use small vessels as platforms for their activities because small vessels are generally unregulated and largely anonymous. Law enforcement agencies face the challenge of distinguishing between legitimate small vessel operators and the relatively few individuals estimated to be engaged in illicit activities. The Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) issued its Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) in April 2008 and its follow-on SVSS Implementation Plan in Jan. 2011 to help guide actions to mitigate the security risks arising from small vessels. This report examines what actions, if any, DHS and its components have taken to address small vessel security concerns, and the extent to which they have implemented action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. Tables and figures. This is a print on demand report.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, maritime security efforts have focused primarily on large commercial vessels, cargoes, and crew. Efforts to address the small vessel environment have largely been limited to traditional safety and basic law enforcement concerns. Small vessels are, however, readily vulnerable to potential exploitation by terrorists, smugglers of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, and other contraband, and other criminals. Small vessels have also been successfully employed overseas by terrorists to deliver Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components--such as the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--have started or completed initiatives to address small vessel security risks, but DHS is not tracking the progress being made to address action items in the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) Implementation Plan. This book examines what actions, if any, DHS and its components have taken to address small vessel security concerns, and the extent to which they have implemented action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan.
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. An attack on ports, waterways, and vessels could have a widespread impact on global trade and the economy. Within the Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS), component agencies have responsibility for securing the maritime environment. The Coast Guard is responsible for protecting U.S. economic and security interests in any maritime region. Customs and Border Protection is responsible for keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the U.S., securing and facilitating trade, and cargo container security. This testimony discusses DHS and its component agencies' challenges, re: (1) strengthening risk mgmt.; (2) reducing the risk of small-vessel threats; (3) implementing foreign port assessments; and (4) enhancing supply chain security. Illus.
Over 9 million passengers departed from U.S. ports on cruise ships in 2008, and according to agency officials, cruise ships are attractive terrorist targets. This report addresses the extent to which: (1) the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency on maritime security, assessed risk in accordance with the Dept. of Homeland Security's guidance and identified risks; and (2) federal agencies, cruise ship and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken actions to protect cruise ships and their facilities. The report reviewed relevant requirements and agency documents on maritime security, analyzed 2006 through 2008 security operations data, and made observations at seven ports. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.
National secuirty strategy is a vast subject involving a daunting array of interrelated subelements woven in intricate, sometimes vague, and ever-changing patterns. Its processes are often irregular and confusing and are always based on difficult decisions laden with serious risks. In short, it is a subject understood by few and confusing to most. It is, at the same time, a subject of overwhelming importance to the fate of the United States and civilization itself. Col. Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow have done a considerable service by drawing together many of the diverse threads of national security strategy into a coherent whole. They consider political and military strategy elements as part of a larger decisionmaking process influenced by economic, technological, cultural, and historical factors. I know of no other recent volume that addresses the entire national security milieu in such a logical manner and yet also manages to address current concerns so thoroughly. It is equally remarkable that they have addressed so many contentious problems in such an evenhanded manner. Although the title suggests that this is an introductory volume - and it is - I am convinced that experienced practitioners in the field of national security strategy would benefit greatly from a close examination of this excellent book. Sidney J. Wise Colonel, United States Air Force Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education
Sea and freshwater ports are a key component of critical infrastructure and essential for maintaining global and domestic economies. In order to effectively secure a dynamic port facility operation, one must understand the business of maritime commerce. Following in the tradition of its bestselling predecessor, Port Security Management, Second Edition continues to supply readers with this understanding. This fully updated edition covers the latest in continuously changing legislation regarding federal mandates, securing vessels, cargo security, and granting employee credentials. Focusing on best practices, it details real-world solutions that law enforcement authorities and security management professionals can put to use immediately. Assuming little prior knowledge of the industry, the book examines port security in the context of global transportation systems. It supplies practitioners and educators with a framework for managing port security and details risk assessment and physical security best practices for securing ships and ports. The book explains how the various stakeholders, including port management, security, government, and private industry, can collaborate to develop safe and secure best practices while maintaining efficient operations. Addressing the legislative measures, regulatory issues, and logistical aspects of port security, the book includes coverage of cruise ships, cargo security, CT-PAT, and emergency operations. Complete with a new chapter on intelligence, this book is ideal for anyone with a vested interest in secure and prosperous port facilities who wants to truly understand how to best tackle the management of port security.
