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Author: John Eatwell
Publisher: Springer
Published: 1989-09-21
Total Pages: 321
ISBN-13: 1349202150
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Author: Patrick Bolton
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 2004-12-10
Total Pages: 746
ISBN-13: 9780262025768
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
Author: Rick Antle
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2007-02-15
Total Pages: 334
ISBN-13: 0387303995
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe integration of accounting and the economics of information developed by Joel S. Demski and those he inspired has revolutionized accounting thought. This volume collects papers on accounting theory in honor of Professor Demski. The book also contains an extensive review of Professor Demski’s own contributions to the theory of accounting over the past four decades.
Author: Amy Finkelstein
Publisher: Columbia University Press
Published: 2014-12-02
Total Pages: 161
ISBN-13: 0231538685
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAddressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2009-12-27
Total Pages: 436
ISBN-13: 1400829453
DOWNLOAD EBOOKEconomics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
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Publisher: SIAM
Published: 2003-01-01
Total Pages: 896
ISBN-13: 9780898715385
DOWNLOAD EBOOKFrom the January 2003 symposium come just over 100 papers addressing a range of topics related to discrete algorithms. Examples of topics covered include packing Steiner trees, counting inversions in lists, directed scale-free graphs, quantum property testing, and improved results for directed multicut. The papers were not formally refereed, but attempts were made to verify major results. Annotation (c)2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
Author: Georges Dionne
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2012-12-06
Total Pages: 980
ISBN-13: 9401006423
DOWNLOAD EBOOKIn the 1970's, the research agenda in insurance was dominated by optimal insurance coverage, security design, and equilibrium under conditions of imperfect information. The 1980's saw a growth of theoretical developments including non-expected utility, price volatility, retention capacity, the pricing and design of insurance contracts in the presence of multiple risks, and the liability insurance crisis. The empirical study of information problems, financial derivatives, and large losses due to catastrophic events dominated the research agenda in the 1990's. The Handbook of Insurance provides a single reference source on insurance for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants, and practitioners, that reviews the research developments in insurance and its related fields that have occurred over the last thirty years. The book starts with the history and foundations of insurance theory and moves on to review asymmetric information, risk management and insurance pricing, and the industrial organization of insurance markets. The book ends with life insurance, pensions, and economic security. Each chapter has been written by a leading authority in insurance, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
Author: Yanru Zhang
Publisher: Springer
Published: 2017-02-15
Total Pages: 131
ISBN-13: 331953288X
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis book presents theoretical research between wireless communications, networking, and economics using the framework of contract theory. This work fills a void in the literature by closely combining contract theoretical approaches with wireless networks design problems. Topics covered include classification in contract theory, reward design, adverse selection, and moral hazard. The authors also explore incentive mechanisms for device-to-device communication in cellular networks, insurance plans for service assurance in cloud computing markets with incomplete information, multi-dimensional incentive mechanisms and tournament based incentive mechanisms in mobile crowdsourcing. Financial applications include financing contracts with adverse selection for spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks and complementary investment of infrastructure and service providers in wireless network visualization. This book offers a useful reference for engineers and researchers in the wireless communication community who seek to integrate the notions from contract theory and wireless engineering, while emphasizing on how contract theory can be applied in wireless networks. It is also suitable for advanced-level students studying information systems or communications engineering.
Author: Gerald A. Feltham
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2012-12-06
Total Pages: 412
ISBN-13: 9400926677
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe three coeditors knew John Butterworth for many years and had worked closely with him on a number of research projects. We respected him as a valuable colleague and friend. We were greatly saddened by his untimely death. This book is an attempt to remember him. We dedicate the volume to John with thanks for the contributions he made to our research, to the Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration at the University of British Columbia, and to the accounting profession. This volume contains twelve invited papers on the general topic of the economic theory of information and contracts. We asked leading scholars who had known John to contribute papers. The response was very gratifying. The authors provided us with new strong research papers that should make a lasting contribution to the accounting and information economics research literature, and make us all proud to have put this volume together. The research papers in the volume are in three sections: information evaluation in multi person conte)l:ts; contracting in agencies under moral hazard; and contracting in agencies with private information. We begin part I with Jerry Feltham's review of John Butterworth's pioneering contributions to the accounting and information economics literature. This is followed by an introduction to the papers in the volume and the papers themselves.
Author: Richard E. Just
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2013-11-11
Total Pages: 580
ISBN-13: 1475735839
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAfter all the research on agricultural risk to date, the treatment of risk in agricultural research is far from harmonious. Many competing risk models have been proposed. Some new methodologies are largely untested. Some of the leading empirical methodologies in agricultural economic research are poorly suited for problems with aggregate data where risk averse behavior is less likely to be important. This book is intended to (i) define the current state of the literature on agricultural risk research, (ii) provide a critical evaluation of economic risk research on agriculture to date and (iii) set a research agenda that will meet future needs and prospects. This type of research promises to become of increasing importance because agricultural policy in the United States and elsewhere has decidedly shifted from explicit income support objectives to risk-related motivations of helping farmers deal with risk. Beginning with the 1996 Farm Bill, the primary set of policy instruments from U.S. agriculture has shifted from target prices and set aside acreage to agricultural crop insurance. Because this book is intended to have specific implications for U.S. agricultural policy, it has a decidedly domestic scope, but clearly many of the issues have application abroad. For each of the papers and topics included in this volume, individuals have been selected to give the strongest and broadest possible treatment of each facet of the problem. The result is this comprehensive reference book on the economics of agricultural risk.
