Silverman’s Game

Silverman’s Game

Author: Gerald A. Heuer

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 295

ISBN-13: 3642468195

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The structure of a Silverman game can be explained very quickly: Each of two players independently selects a number out of a prede termined set, not necessarily the same one for both of them. The higher number wins unless it is at least k times as high as the other one; if this is the case the lower number wins. The game ends in a draw if both numbers are equal. k is a constant greater than 1. The simplicity of the rules stimulates the curiosity of the the orist. Admittedly, Silverman games do not seem to have a direct applied significance, but nevertheless much can be learnt from their study. This book succeeds to give an almost complete overview over the structure of optimal strategies and it reveals a surprising wealth of interesting detail. A field like game theory does not only need research on broad questions and fundamental issues, but also specialized work on re stricted topics. Even if not many readers are interested in the subject matter, those who are will appreciate this monograph.


Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets

Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets

Author: Gerald A. Heuer

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 149

ISBN-13: 3642956637

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A Silverman game is a two-person zero-sum game defined in terms of two sets S I and S II of positive numbers, and two parameters, the threshold T > 1 and the penalty v > 0. Players I and II independently choose numbers from S I and S II, respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses v. Equal numbers tie. Such a game might be used to model various bidding or spending situations in which within some bounds the higher bidder or bigger spender wins, but loses if it is overdone. Such situations may include spending on armaments, advertising spending or sealed bids in an auction. Previous work has dealt mainly with special cases. In this work recent progress for arbitrary discrete sets S I and S II is presented. Under quite general conditions, these games reduce to finite matrix games. A large class of games are completely determined by the diagonal of the matrix, and it is shown how the great majority of these appear to have unique optimal strategies. The work is accessible to all who are familiar with basic noncooperative game theory.


Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications

Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications

Author: Anne Hakansson

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2009-05-25

Total Pages: 884

ISBN-13: 3642016642

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This book constitutes the proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications, held in Uppsala, Sweden, during June 3-5, 2009. The 86 papers contained in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. There are 13 main tracks covering the methodology and applications of agent and multi-agent systems and 8 special sessions on specific topics within the field. The papers are divided in topical sections on social and organizational structures of agents; negotiation protocols; mobile agents and robots; agent design and implementation; e-commerce; simulation systems and game systems; agent systems and ontologies; agents for network systems; communication and agent learning systems; Web services and semantic Web; self-organization in multi-agent systems; management and e-business; mobile and intelligent agents for networks and services; engineering interaction protocols; agent-based simulation, decision making and systems optimization; digital economy; agent-based optimization (ABO2009); distributed systems and artificial intelligence applications.


More Games of No Chance

More Games of No Chance

Author: Richard Nowakowski

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2002-11-25

Total Pages: 552

ISBN-13: 9780521808323

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This 2003 book provides an analysis of combinatorial games - games not involving chance or hidden information. It contains a fascinating collection of articles by some well-known names in the field, such as Elwyn Berlekamp and John Conway, plus other researchers in mathematics and computer science, together with some top game players. The articles run the gamut from theoretical approaches (infinite games, generalizations of game values, 2-player cellular automata, Alpha-Beta pruning under partial orders) to other games (Amazons, Chomp, Dot-and-Boxes, Go, Chess, Hex). Many of these advances reflect the interplay of the computer science and the mathematics. The book ends with a bibliography by A. Fraenkel and a list of combinatorial game theory problems by R. K. Guy. Like its predecessor, Games of No Chance, this should be on the shelf of all serious combinatorial games enthusiasts.


Games of No Chance 3

Games of No Chance 3

Author: Michael H. Albert

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2009-05-29

Total Pages: 577

ISBN-13: 0521861349

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This fascinating look at combinatorial games, that is, games not involving chance or hidden information, offers updates on standard games such as Go and Hex, on impartial games such as Chomp and Wythoff's Nim, and on aspects of games with infinitesimal values, plus analyses of the complexity of some games and puzzles and surveys on algorithmic game theory, on playing to lose, and on coping with cycles. The volume is rounded out with an up-to-date bibliography by Fraenkel and, for readers eager to get their hands dirty, a list of unsolved problems by Guy and Nowakowski. Highlights include some of Siegel's groundbreaking work on loopy games, the unveiling by Friedman and Landsberg of the use of renormalization to give very intriguing results about Chomp, and Nakamura's "Counting Liberties in Capturing Races of Go." Like its predecessors, this book should be on the shelf of all serious games enthusiasts.


Game Shows FAQ

Game Shows FAQ

Author: Adam Nedeff

Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield

Published: 2000-01-01

Total Pages: 382

ISBN-13: 1540033171

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TV game shows are an American pastime, broadcast ratings champ, and cultural institution. Lavishly illustrated and filled with entertaining titbits, Game Shows FAQ presents an unprecedented look at how the game show genre has evolved in the past hundred years. From its earliest days as a promotional tool for newspapers, to the high-browed panel games on radio, to the scandalous years of the quiz shows, to the glitzy and raucous games of the 1970s, to the prime-time extravaganzas of the modern era – this book examines the most relevant game shows of every decade, exploring how the genre changed and the reasons behind its evolution. Packed with photos and mementos to give a feel of how game shows evolved over the years, the book includes interviews and insights from the shows' beloved hosts, including Wink Martindale and Marc Summers, executives Bob Boden and Jamie Klein, and producers Aaron Solomon and Mark Maxwell-Smith, among others. Game Shows FAQ offers a richly detailed lineage of this American television institution.


A Course In Game Theory

A Course In Game Theory

Author: Thomas S Ferguson

Publisher: World Scientific

Published: 2020-07-20

Total Pages: 409

ISBN-13: 9813227370

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Game theory is a fascinating subject. We all know many entertaining games, such as chess, poker, tic-tac-toe, bridge, baseball, computer games — the list is quite varied and almost endless. In addition, there is a vast area of economic games, discussed in Myerson (1991) and Kreps (1990), and the related political games [Ordeshook (1986), Shubik (1982), and Taylor (1995)]. The competition between firms, the conflict between management and labor, the fight to get bills through congress, the power of the judiciary, war and peace negotiations between countries, and so on, all provide examples of games in action. There are also psychological games played on a personal level, where the weapons are words, and the payoffs are good or bad feelings [Berne (1964)]. There are biological games, the competition between species, where natural selection can be modeled as a game played between genes [Smith (1982)]. There is a connection between game theory and the mathematical areas of logic and computer science. One may view theoretical statistics as a two-person game in which nature takes the role of one of the players, as in Blackwell and Girshick (1954) and Ferguson (1968).Games are characterized by a number of players or decision makers who interact, possibly threaten each other and form coalitions, take actions under uncertain conditions, and finally receive some benefit or reward or possibly some punishment or monetary loss. In this text, we present various mathematical models of games and study the phenomena that arise. In some cases, we will be able to suggest what courses of action should be taken by the players. In others, we hope simply to be able to understand what is happening in order to make better predictions about the future.


Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information

Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information

Author: Wolfgang Ryll

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 177

ISBN-13: 3642614671

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We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P'ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P'ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P'ng's model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously.