Proceedings of the Air Force¿s commemorative symposium on the Korean War, held on 7 June 2000. Sponsored by the Air Force History and Museums Program, Air Force Legislative Liaison, and Air Force Association, the goal of this symposium was ¿to set the record straight¿ on Korea as an ¿absolutely vital victory:¿ in the 40-year-long history of the Cold War, checking communism¿s spread. Dr. Richard Hallion, who edited the volume, notes that the most important lesson of Korea is the resolve that allows Airmen to continue providing unparalleled global vigilance, reach, and power.
To some people, the Korean War was just a "police action," preferring that euphemism to what it really was -- a brutal and bloody war involving hundreds of thousands of air, ground, and naval forces from many nations. It also was termed a "limited war," in that it took place in a small region of the world versus the worldwide conflict that had ended less than five years earlier. But this "police action," this "limited war," cost an estimated 2.4 million military casualties on both sides, while at least another 2 million civilians also were casualties. The United States military alone suffered 33,742 killed and another 103,234 wounded. The war in the air was as bloody and violent as that on the ground. The United Nations air forces lost 1,986 aircraft, with the U.S. Air Force sustaining 1,466 of these. Air Force personnel casualties totaled 1,841, including 1,180 dead. These losses were far greater than can be accounted for in the glib terms "police action" and "limited war." As the years passed following the end of the war, Korea receded in memory. Another war -- in Southeast Asia -- became lodged in the public's mind, and the Korean War became "forgotten." But to those veterans and historians alike participating in the proceedings recorded in this volume, their reminiscences and perspectives provide the reader with compelling arguments why the Korean War deserves to be remembered.
To some people, the Korean War was just a "police action," preferring that euphemism to what it really was - a brutal and bloody war involving hundreds of thousands of air, ground, and naval forces from many nations. It was also termed a "limited war," in that it took place in a small region of the world versus the worldwide conflict that had ended less than five years earlier. But this "police action," this "limited war," cost an estimated 2.4 million military casualties on both sides, while at least another 2 million civilians were also casualties. The United States military alone suffered 33,742 killed and another 103,234 wounded. The war in the air was as bloody and violent as that on the ground. The United Nations air forces lost 1,986 aircraft, with the USAF sustaining 1,466 of these. Air Force personnel casualties totaled 1,841, including 1,180 dead. These losses were far greater than can be accounted for in the glib terms "police action" and "limited war." As the years passed following the end of the war, Korea receded in memory. Another war - in Southeast Asia - became lodged in the public's mind, and the Korean War became "forgotten." But to those veterans and historians alike participating in the proceedings recorded in this volume, their reminiscences and perspectives provide the reader with compelling arguments why the Korean War deserves to be remembered
"The fielding of automated flight controls and weapons systems in fighter aircraft from 1950 to 1980 challenged the significance ascribed to several of the pilots' historical skillsets, such as superb hand-eye coordination--required for aggressive stick-and-rudder maneuvering--and perfect eyesight and crack marksmanship--required for long-range visual detection and destruction of the enemy. Highly automated systems would, proponents argued, simplify the pilot's tasks while increasing his lethality in the air, thereby opening fighter aviation to broader segments of the population. However, these new systems often required new, unique skills, which the pilots struggled to identify and develop. Moreover, the challenges that accompanied these technologies were not restricted to individual fighter cockpits, but rather extended across the pilots' tactical formations, altering the social norms that had governed the fighter pilot profession since its establishment. In the end, the skills that made a fighter pilot great in 1980 bore little resemblance to those of even thirty years prior, despite the precepts embedded within the "myth of the fighter pilot." As such, this history illuminates the rich interaction between human and machine that often accompanies automation in the workplace. It is broadly applicable to other enterprises confronting increased automation, from remotely piloted aviation to Google cars. It should appeal to those interested in the history of technology and automation, as well as the general population of military aviation enthusiasts."--Provided by publisher.
Airpower Applied reviews the evolution of airpower and its impact on the history of warfare. Through a critical examination of twenty-nine case studies in which various U.S. coalitions and Israel played significant roles, this book offers perspectives on the political purpose, strategic meaning, and military importance of airpower. By comparing and contrasting more than seventy-five years of airpower experience in very different circumstances, readers can gain insight into present-day thinking on the use of airpower and on warfare. The authors, all experts in their fields, demystify some of airpower‘s strategic history by extracting the most useful teachings to help military professionals and political leaders understand what airpower has to offer as a “continuation of politics by other means.” The case studies emphasize the importance of connecting policy and airpower: operational effectiveness cannot substitute for poor statecraft. As the United States, its allies, and Israel have seen in their most recent applications of airpower, even the most robust and capable air weapon can never be more effective than the strategy and policy it is intended to support.
The Korean War is the most comprehensive and detailed bibliography compiled to date on the American involvement in "The Forgotten War." In this revised and expanded second edition, Keith D. McFarland’s clearly written annotations provide concise descriptions of more than 2,600 of the most important books, articles, and documents written in English on the conflict in Korea. Key topics include origins of the war; the political and military roles of North and South Korea, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Turkey, and other United Nations members; campaigns and battles; weapons and uniforms; and the military and diplomatic aspects of the war. Specific subjects are easy to find using the index organized by topic and author, making The Korean War a necessity for every academic or research library.
As Clausewitz observed, “In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect.” The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit’s skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice. Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately.
Understand the growth and evolution of American air power with this overview of the history of the world's most successful aviation force. The United States Air Force: A Chronology captures the sweep of U.S. Air Force history from the service's inception to present times. Concise entries, arranged by date, touch upon military events such as victories and defeats; significant political, administrative, and technological changes affecting the service; and significant events in the careers of noted leaders. Daily occurrences are described within the context of greater historical events such as wars. The chronology covers all aspects of the U.S. Air Force and its historical antecedents (U.S. Air Service, Army Air Corps, and Army Air Force), commencing with the Balloon Corps in the American Civil War and extending through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. Events of note, major and minor, are listed in the order of occurrence. The book includes all major air campaigns in all major conflicts, as well as such noteworthy events as record-breaking flights and the introduction of new aircraft.
