Security cooperation between states remains elusive. Using a fascinating case study with wide implications for European security and stability, the division of former Soviet security assets between Russia and Ukraine, Deborah Sanders considers which factors promote and which hamper security cooperation. She examines the dynamics of security cooperation in three areas: the dismantling of Ukraine's tactical nuclear weapons, the removal of Ukraine's strategic nuclear weapons and the division of the Black Sea fleet. While the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up numerous possibilities for cooperation between the two countries, it also unleashed long suppressed national feelings and reawakened historical controversies. Sanders argues that the dynamics of cooperation can only be understood if these domestic political factors are taken into account.
D'Anieri explores the dynamics within Ukraine, between Ukraine and Russia, and between Russia and the West, that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and eventually led to war in 2014. Proceeding chronologically, this book shows how Ukraine's separation from Russia in 1991, at the time called a 'civilized divorce', led to what many are now calling 'a new Cold War'. He argues that the conflict has worsened because of three underlying factors - the security dilemma, the impact of democratization on geopolitics, and the incompatible goals of a post-Cold War Europe. Rather than a peaceful situation that was squandered, D'Anieri argues that these were deep-seated pre-existing disagreements that could not be bridged, with concerning implications for the resolution of the Ukraine conflict. The book also shows how this war fits into broader patterns of contemporary international conflict and should therefore appeal to researchers working on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia's relations with the West, and conflict and geopolitics more generally.
Instead of resurrecting old images and nourishing new narratives about a ‘New Cold War’, Post-Soviet Conflict Potentials features politically and legally oriented critical investigations into conflict potentials and dynamics in the post-Soviet region and beyond. Contributions coming from the disciplinary perspectives of international relations, international law, and comparative political science are linked to investigations dealing with international, transnational, regional and local levels of the dynamics between conflict and cooperation in the region. Despite the diversity of perspectives, the authors of this volume take a shared critical view on an alleged ‘New Cold War’ as their point of departure, observing that contemporary post-Soviet conflict potentials are produced through various discursive practices ranging from intentional choices of belligerent language to unintentional misinterpretations. The chapters in this volume seek to shed light on conflict potentials from different angles as well as on processes that increase or decrease the probability of political and violent conflicts in the post-Soviet region. Together, the authors offer individual and shared outside-the-box approaches to the study of conflict dynamics and potentials in the post-Soviet space. The book draws connections to conflict potentials on the cross-regional and global levels, providing varied perspectives on what can be learned in and from the post-Soviet region. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Europe-Asia Studies.
Among the contentious issues that come into play in relations between Russia and the other post-Soviet states, security concerns are arguably at the top of the list. This text explores the links between post-Soviet security politics and the development of state sovereignty in the region.
Is America in a new Cold War with Russia? How does a new Cold War affect the safety and security of the United States? Does Vladimir Putin really want to destabilize the West? What should Donald Trump and America’s allies do? America is in a new Cold War with Russia even more dangerous than the one the world barely survived in the twentieth century. The Soviet Union is gone, but the two nuclear superpowers are again locked in political and military confrontations, now from Ukraine to Syria. All of this is exacerbated by Washington’s war-like demonizing of the Kremlin leadership and by Russiagate’s unprecedented allegations. US mainstream media accounts are highly selective and seriously misleading. American “disinformation,” not only Russian, is a growing peril. In War With Russia?, Stephen F. Cohen—the widely acclaimed historian of Soviet and post-Soviet Russia—gives readers a very different, dissenting narrative of this more dangerous new Cold War from its origins in the 1990s, the actual role of Vladimir Putin, and the 2014 Ukrainian crisis to Donald Trump’s election and today’s unprecedented Russiagate allegations. Topics include: Distorting Russia US Follies and Media Malpractices 2016 The Obama Administration Escalates Military Confrontation With Russia Was Putin’s Syria Withdrawal Really A “Surprise”? Trump vs. Triumphalism Has Washington Gone Rogue? Blaming Brexit on Putin and Voters Washington Warmongers, Moscow Prepares Trump Could End the New Cold War The Real Enemies of US Security Kremlin-Baiting President Trump Neo-McCarthyism Is Now Politically Correct Terrorism and Russiagate Cold-War News Not “Fit to Print” Has NATO Expansion Made Anyone Safer? Why Russians Think America Is Attacking Them How Washington Provoked—and Perhaps Lost—a New Nuclear-Arms Race Russia Endorses Putin, The US and UK Condemn Him (Again) Russophobia Sanction Mania Cohen’s views have made him, it is said, “America’s most controversial Russia expert.” Some say this to denounce him, others to laud him as a bold, highly informed critic of US policies and the dangers they have helped to create. War With Russia? gives readers a chance to decide for themselves who is right: are we living, as Cohen argues, in a time of unprecedented perils at home and abroad?
Essay from the year 2006 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 62 (UK system), University of Kent, language: English, abstract: During his speech at the Security Conference in Munich in February this year, the Russian Defence Minister Ivanov emphasised that there is ‘plenty of work to be done’ concerning the relations between Russia and the European Union (EU) in the fields of security and defence policy. Further, he urged for the deepening of the dialogue between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A successful Europe, according to Ivanov, cannot be built without a close partnership between Russia and the European security institution. Ivanov’s speech constitutes an adequate example for efforts of the Russian Federation aimed at getting more involved into European security issues. By examining the completed NATO and EU enlargements in 1999 and 2004, the ambition of Russia to have an influential say in European security questions becomes obvious. Being confronted with enlargement processes that incorporated a former Soviet sphere of influence, the Russian Federation regards itself as being excluded. Both sides, EU/NATO and Russia currently do not consider full Russian accession to these organisations as a possible and desirable policy option in the short- and medium-term. Therefore, European security institutions are facing the problem of finding a way to cooperate with those states that do not wish or are not allowed to join these institutions. How to fit in the Russian Federation, can thus be regarded as one of the most urgent issues in European security policies. This essay will argue that the underpinnings of the security cooperation are actually very fragile and are lacking substance. In particular, the lack of a shared set of common aims, interests, and values make it difficult to develop a sustainable security partnership between Europe’s security institutions and Russia.
From the earliest times of its post-Soviet independence, Ukraine has been open to security cooperation with the United States. In the beginning, there were significant differences in political, security and even bureaucratic cultures between the two countries, which formed some obstacles to building bridges quickly. Many of these obstacles remain, especially in the political dimension of relations between the two countries. But in the absence of their former ideological differences and united by common interests in preserving international peace and fighting terrorism, Ukraine and the United States have established constructive and mutually beneficial military cooperation. The United States has been interested in engaging post-Soviet Ukraine in security cooperation and clearly articulated what it wanted to achieve from this cooperation. It was in U.S. interests to have a strong, independent, stable, and democratic Ukraine as a partner in Eastern Europe. Guided by such a vision, the United States consistently has demonstrated initiative in supporting Ukraine in building its national military by engaging it in peacetime military-to- military contacts. The Ukrainian government unhesitatingly accepted U.S. leadership in bilateral military cooperation, which has provided it with an opportunity to learn useful approaches to defense reform, raised Ukraine's international prestige, and strengthened the country's position vis-à-vis the pressure for regional influence exerted by its neighbor (and regional dominant power), Russia. Bilateral programs of military contacts with the United States have become the largest among Ukraine's many international military cooperation programs. Since 1992 bilateral military cooperation has improved in terms of quality and substance, and set the stage for preparation, execution, and support of actual U.S. Ukraine combined operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Iraq. These combined deployments have demonstrated that the years of cooperation were not in vain; Ukrainians have proven their ability to be a reliable and capable peacekeeping combat force. However, as this monograph suggests, despite steady improvement in bilateral cooperation, developing full interoperability between the Ukrainian and U.S. militaries beyond joint peacekeeping is not yet a realistic possibility. At a time when full combat interoperability is beyond reach for even the closest U.S. allies, the experience of previous U.S.-Ukraine partnership shows that the most logical and realistic option is to promote and further improve tactical interoperability for low intensity conflict: peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance. More ambitious goals are far beyond Ukraine's current financial capabilities, and are restrained by the country's inability to qualify politically and economically for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership soon. This monograph consists of four parts. Part I presents a strategic context for U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation and provides general data on the history and current state of security relations between Ukraine and the United States. Part II focuses on the development and improvement of cooperative mechanisms for bilateral military contacts. Part III provides data and analysis of peacetime military engagement and discusses important lessons learned. Part IV examines Ukraine's practical cooperation with the U.S. military in operations in Kosovo and Iraq, operations where cooperation continues today. In sum, U.S. Ukrainian military cooperation has created a reasonable foundation for limited joint and combined action, with the United States helping Ukraine to build a noticeable cooperative capability. This capability currently is being adjusted in Iraq and other places. The potential remains for even greater cooperation, if necessary improvements are made.
This book explores post-Soviet Eurasian regional security governance, as embedded in the military alliance of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). CSTO was established in 2002 and consists of six post-Soviet countries: Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Moving studies of regional security governance beyond the so-called Eurocentrism trend expressed, inter alia, via the focus on Western military alliance, such as NATO, this book examines CSTO as a new, post-Soviet form of regional security cooperation by looking at the reasons and drivers behind the establishment of the post-Soviet Eurasian security governance; the organization's institutional design; the military capabilities of its member states; the degree of the members' integration within the alliance; the cooperation pattern adopted by CSTO members; as well as the effect and effectiveness of this military alliance.
Disorder erupted in Ukraine in 2014, involving the overthrow of a sitting government, the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula, and a violent insurrection, supported by Moscow, in the east of the country. This Adelphi book argues that the crisis has yielded a ruinous outcome, in which all the parties are worse off and international security has deteriorated. This negative-sum scenario resulted from years of zero-sum behaviour on the part of Russia and the West in post-Soviet Eurasia, which the authors rigorously analyse. The rivalry was manageable in the early period after the Cold War, only to become entrenched and bitter a decade later. The upshot has been systematic losses for Russia, the West and the countries caught in between. All the governments involved must recognise that long-standing policies aimed at achieving one-sided advantage have reached a dead end, Charap and Colton argue, and commit to finding mutually acceptable alternatives through patient negotiation.
