On August 24-25, 2010, the National Defense University held a conference titled “Economic Security: Neglected Dimension of National Security?” to explore the economic element of national power. This special collection of selected papers from the conference represents the view of several keynote speakers and participants in six panel discussions. It explores the complexity surrounding this subject and examines the major elements that, interacting as a system, define the economic component of national security.
With continuing instability in Iraq, the threat of a nuclear Iran, and the ever-present reality of further terrorist attacks within its own borders, Saudi Arabia has been forced to make some hard decisions. The current structure of the Saudi security apparatus is only one pathway to improved security. Economic and demographic threats may well be the hardest hurdles to overcome. What has been accomplished since 2001 and what are the real prospects and implications of further reform? To what extent should the kingdom continue to rely on the US to protect its interests? Cordesman and Obaid argue that it is time to put an end to client and tutorial relations. Saudi Arabia must emerge as a true partner. This will require the creation of effective Saudi forces for both defense and counterterrorism. Saudi Arabia has embarked on a process of political, economic, and social reforms that reflects a growing understanding by the governing members of the royal family, Saudi technocrats, and Saudi businessmen that Saudi Arabia must reform and diversify its economy and must create vast numbers of new jobs for its young and growing population. There is a similar understanding that economic reform must be combined with some level of political and social reform if Saudi Arabia is to remain stable in the face of change. With Gulf security, the war on terrorism, and the security of some sixty percent of the world's oil reserves at stake, the real question is how quickly Saudi Arabia can change and adapt its overall approach to security, and how successful it will be in the process.
Contents: (1) Recent Developments; (2) Background: Saudi Arabia (SA)-U.S. Relations, 1931-2001; 9/11 and its Aftermath; Recent Assessments; Terrorist Financing; (3) Congress. Interest in SA: U.S. Foreign Assist. to SA and Prohibitions; Counter-terrorism Assist.; BAE Corruption Inquiry; (4) Current Issues in U.S.-SA Relations; Mil. Cooperation: Counterterrorism; Al Qaeda; Combating Extremism; Arab-Israeli Conflict; SA-Palestinian Relations; SA Policy Priorities in Iraq; U.S.-SA Trade; U.S. Oil Imports and SA Policy; SA Boycott of Israel and WTO Membership; Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and Political Reform; Leadership and Succession; Social Reform Debates and Recent Leadership Changes; Human Rights; Religious Freedom.
With the continuing importance of Saudi Arabia in regional and world politics, the current and future effectiveness of the Saudi military carries increased significance. Despite recent strains in relations with the U.S., particularly in light of the role Saudis played in the events of September 11, 2001, the Kingdom remains America's key Arab ally. Cordesman studies the challenges faced by the Saudis from both their allies and their potential enemies to assess Saudi Arabia's ability to forge a better approach to collective security in the Gulf and to create more stable long-term security arrangements with the U.S. and other Western Powers. This assessment of Saudi Arabia's strategic position includes a full-scale analysis of Saudi military forces, defense expenditures, arms imports, military modernization, readiness and war fighting capability. It examines both the cooperation and tension with other Southern Gulf States. It explores the implications of the conventional military build-up and creeping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Gulf and the resulting changes in Saudi Arabia's security position. All of these factors have critical implications for stability within the Kingdom, within the Gulf, as well as in the broader global context.
The United States'' relationship with Saudi Arabia has been one of the cornerstones of U.S. policy in the Middle East for decades. Despite their substantial differences in history, culture, and governance, the two countries have generally agreed on important political and economic issues and have often relied on each other to secure mutual aims. The 1990-91 Gulf War is perhaps the most obvious example, but their ongoing cooperation on maintaining regional stability, moderating the global oil market, and pursuing terrorists should not be downplayed. Yet for all the relationship''s importance, it is increasingly imperiled by mistrust and misunderstanding. One major question is Saudi Arabia''s stability. In this Council Special Report, sponsored by the Center for Preventive Action, F. Gregory Gause III first explores the foundations of Riyadh''s present stability and potential sources of future unrest. It is difficult not to notice that Saudi Arabia avoided significant upheaval during the political uprisings that swept the Middle East in 2011, despite sharing many of the social and economic problems of Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. But unlike their counterparts in Cairo, Sanaa, and Tripoli, Riyadh''s leadership was able to maintain order in large part by increasing public spending on housing and salaries, relying on loyal and well-equipped security forces, and utilizing its extensive patronage networks. The divisions within the political opposition also helped the government''s cause. This is not to say that Gause believes that the stability of the House of Saud is assured. He points out that the top heirs to the throne are elderly and the potential for disorderly squabbling may increase as a new generation enters the line of succession. Moreover, the population is growing quickly, and there is little reason to believe that oil will forever be able to buy social tranquility. Perhaps most important, Gause argues, the leadership''s response to the 2011 uprisings did little to forestall future crises; an opportunity for manageable political reform was mostly lost. Turning to the regional situation, Gause finds it no less complex. Saudi Arabia has wielded considerable influence with its neighbors through its vast oil reserves, its quiet financial and political support for allies, and the ideological influence of salafism, the austere interpretation of Islam that is perhaps Riyadh''s most controversial export. For all its wealth and religious influence, however, Saudi Arabia''s recent record has been less than successful. It was unable to counter Iranian influence in post-Saddam Iraq, it could not prevent Hezbollah taking power in Lebanon, and its ongoing efforts to reconcile Hamas and the Palestinian Authority have come to naught. The U.S.-Saudi relationship has, unsurprisingly, been affected by these and other challenges, including Saudi unhappiness with Washington''s decision to distance itself from Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, the lack of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and Iran. For its part, the United States is unhappy with the Saudi intervention in Bahrain and Saudi support for radical Islamists around the region and the world. The two traditional anchors of the U.S.-Saudi relationship-the Cold War and U.S. operation of Riyadh''s oil fields-are, Gause notes, no longer factors. It is no wonder, he contends, that the relationship is strained when problems are myriad and the old foundations of the informal alliance are gone. It would be far better, Gause argues, to acknowledge that the two countries can no longer expect to act in close concert under such conditions. He recommends that the United States reimagine the relationship as simply transactional, based on cooperation when interests-rather than habit-dictate. Prioritizing those interests will therefore be critical. Rather than pressuring Riyadh for domestic political reform, or asking it to reduce global oil prices, Gause recommends that the United States spend its political capital where it really matters: on maintaining regional security, dismantling terrorist networks, and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There have been few relationships more important to the United States than that with Saudi Arabia, and it is vital that, as it enters a new phase, the expectations and priorities of both countries are clear. In Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East, Gause effectively assesses the challenges and opportunities facing Saudi Arabia and makes a compelling argument for a more modest, businesslike relationship between Washington and Riyadh that better reflects modern realities. As the United States begins reassessing its commitments in the Greater Middle East, this report offers a clear vision for a more limited-but perhaps more appropriate and sustainable-future partnership.
This book discusses the threats and challenges facing the Persian Gulf and the future security in the region, providing an overview of the major regional and extra-regional actors in Gulf security. It argues that except for Iran, no regional or extra-regional actors, including the United States, China, India and Russia, have developed a strategy for Persian Gulf security, and only Turkey has expressed a willingness to provide security for the region. Importantly, the major threats to Persian Gulf security are nonconventional, rather than external, threats to Iranian hegemony or the balance of power. In conclusion, it predicts that the power struggle in the Persian Gulf in the coming decades will be between Iran and Turkey, and not between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This book is of interest to diplomats, journalists, international affairs specialists, strategists and scholars of Gulf politics and security and defence studies.
The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa takes a deep dive into the complexities of power projection, political rivalry and conflict across the Red Sea and beyond. Focusing on the nature of interregional connections between the Gulf and the Horn, it explores the multifaceted nature of relations between states and the two increasingly important subregions. Bringing together scholars working on and in both regions, the book considers strategic competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and between the UAE and both Qatar and Turkey, along with other international engagement such as joint anti-piracy operations, counterterrorism cooperation, security assistance, base agreements and economic development. Drawing on a range of subject expertise and field research across case study countries, the volume adds to the sparse literature on the regional and international politics of the Horn of Africa and Red Sea, gleaning specific insights from contemporary reflections across the book. This is essential reading for students and researchers interested in the Horn of Africa and the evolving regional geopolitics of the Gulf.
From the opening of a U.S. consulate in Dhahran in 1944 through the conclusion of his ambassadorship to Saudi Arabia in 1965, Parker T. Hart played a critical part in building the U.S.-Saudi security relationship, a key aspect of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East to this day. Drawing on his personal involvement in events as well as the documentary record, Hart provides fresh insights into early Saudi-U.S. diplomatic relations - from, Franklin D. Roosevelt through Lyndon B. Johnson - and details the construction of the Dhahran airfield, King Faisal's consolidation of the Saudi nation, and U.S./U.N. intervention to halt Saudi-Egyptian hostilities sparked by the revolutionary war, in Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the United States also offers perspectives on politically sensitive current issues, such as U.S. military bases in the Middle East and the security of the vast Saudi oil reserves.
