In October 1962 school children huddled under their desks and diplomats feverishly negotiated as the world sat on the brink of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dangerous moment in modern history and resulted in a changed worldview for the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. In tracing the developments of the missile crisis and beyond, Sad and Luminous Days presents and interprets a heretofore unavailable (and largely unknown) secret speech that Castro delivered to the Cuban leadership in 1968. In it, Castro reflects on the crisis and reveals the distrust and bitterness that characterized Cuban-Soviet relations in 1968. Blight and Brenner frame the annotated speech with an examination of the missile crisis itself, and an analysis of Cuban-Soviet relations between 1962–1968, ending with an epilogue that highlights the lessons the missile crisis offers us in the current search for security and a stable world order. Sad and Luminous Days sheds new light on Cuban-Soviet relations and should be required reading not only for Cold-War scholars and historians, but also for anyone intrigued by the drama of the thirteen momentous days in October 1962.
Robert S. McNamara is one of modern America's most controversial figures. His opinions, policies, and actions have led to a firestorm of debate, ignited most recently by Errol Morris's Academy Award-winning film, The Fog of War. In the companion book, editors James G. Blight and janet M. Lang use lessons from McNamara's life to examine issues of war and peace in the 20th century. McNamara's career spans some of America's defining events—from the end of World War I, through the course of World War II, and the unfolding of the Cold War in Cuba, Vietnam, and around the world. The Fog of War brings together film transcripts, documents, dialogues, and essays to explore what the horrors and triumphs of the 20th century can teach us about the future.
This book addresses the relationship between Moscow and Havana in the period between the Russian and Cuban Revolutions, i.e. from November 1917 to January 1959. It analyzes the reasons why in this era before the Cuban Revolution, which is traditionally thought to have ignited Moscow’s interest in the Caribbean island, a relationship existed between the two countries at a variety of different levels. In order to do this, both the attention that the Third International, or Comintern, gave to Cuba, as well as Moscow’s formal state-to-state relations with Havana, are examined. In addition, United States policy towards both socialism and the Soviet Union are analyzed, due to the role that Washington played in Cuba prior to the Cuban Revolution. Following this, an examination of the events, process and dynamics that characterized the nature of the relationship between Moscow and Havana from 1917 to 1959 will be conducted. A number of conclusions will be given, but the primary one is that prior to January 1959, the Kremlin took considerable interest in Cuba and did not suffer from “geographical fatalism,” as has traditionally been thought. This is significant in itself, but also in light of the relationship that rapidly developed between Moscow and Havana in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, as a number of factors that were important in the pre-1959 relationship would also be significant after 1959. Furthermore, this analysis is also important for the contemporary bilateral relationship between Russia and Cuba, as both governments have made increasing reference to the multifaceted relationship that existed prior to 1959.
In October, 1962, the Cuban missile crisis brought human civilization to the brink of destruction. On the 50th anniversary of the most dangerous confrontation of the nuclear era, two of the leading experts on the crisis recreate the drama of those tumultuous days as experienced by the leaders of the three countries directly involved: U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and Cuban President Fidel Castro. Organized around the letters exchanged among the leaders as the crisis developed and augmented with many personal details of the circumstances under which they were written, considered, and received, Blight and Lang poignantly document the rapidly shifting physical and psychological realities faced in Washington, Moscow, and Havana. The result is a revolving stage that allows the reader to experience the Cuban missile crisis as never before—through the eyes of each leader as they move through the crisis. The Armageddon Letters: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro in the Cuban Missile Crisis transports the reader back to October 1962, telling a story as gripping as any fictional apocalyptic novel.
The Handbook of Latin America in the World explains how the Latin American countries have both reacted and contributed to changing international dynamics over the last 30 years. It provides a comprehensive picture of Latin America’s global engagement by looking at specific processes and issues that link governments and other actors, social and economic, within the region and beyond. Leading scholars offer an up-to-date state of the field, theoretically and empirically, thus avoiding a narrow descriptive approach. The Handbook includes a section on theoretical approaches that analyze Latin America’s place in the international political and economic system and its foreign policy making. Other sections focus on the main countries, actors, and issues in Latin America’s international relations. In so doing, the book sheds light on the complexity of the international relations of selected countries, and on their efforts to act multilaterally. The Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World is a must-have reference for academics, researchers, and students in the fields of Latin American politics, international relations, and area specialists of all regions of the world.
This volume brings together a collection of leading international experts to revisit and review our understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis, via a critical reappraisal of some of the key texts. In October 1962, humankind came close to the end of its history. The risk of catastrophe is now recognised by many to have been greater than realised by protagonists at the time or scholars subsequently. The Cuban missile crisis remains one of the mostly intensely studied moments of world history. Understanding is framed and informed by Cold War historiography, political science and personal experience, written by scholars, journalists, and surviving officials. The emergence of Soviet (later Russian) and other national narratives has broadened the scope of enquiry, while scrutiny of the operational, especially military, dimensions has challenged assumptions about the risk of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal brings together world leading scholars from America, Britain, France, Canada, and Russia to present critical scrutiny of authoritative accounts and to recast assumptions and interpretations. The book aims to provide an essential guide for students of the missile crisis, the diplomacy of the Cold War, and the dynamics of historical interpretation and reinterpretation. Offering original ideas and agendas, the contributors seek to provide a new understanding of the secrets and mysteries of the moment when the world went to the brink of Armageddon. This book will be of great interest to students of the Cuban missile crisis, Cold War Studies, nuclear proliferation, international history and International Relations in general.
In October 1962, when the Soviet Union deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba, the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War ensued, bringing the world close to the brink of nuclear war. Over two tense weeks, U.S. president John F. Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev managed to negotiate a peaceful resolution to what was nearly a global catastrophe. Drawing on the best recent scholarship and previously unexamined documents from the archives of the former Soviet Union, this introductory volume examines the motivations and calculations of the major participants in the conflict, sets the crisis in the context of the broader history of the global Cold War, and traces the effects of the crisis on subsequent international and regional geopolitical relations. Selections from twenty primary sources provide firsthand accounts of the frantic deliberations and realpolitik diplomacy between the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and Fidel Castro's Cuban regime; thirteen illustrations are also included. CONTENTS: Introduction: The Making of a global Crisis The Origins of the Cold WarA New Front in the Cold WarThe Cold War in Latin AmericaThe Cuban Revolution and the Soviet UnionU.S. and Regional Responses to the Cuban RevolutionOperation Zapata: The Bay of PigsOperation Anadyr: Soviet Missiles in CubaCrisis Dénouement: The Missiles of NovemberEvaluating the Leadership on All Sides of the CrisisNuclear Fallout: Consequences of the Missile CrisisThe Future of Cuban-Soviet RelationsLatin American Responses to the Missile CrisisConclusion: Lessons of the Cuban Missile CrisisHistoriography of the Cuban Missile Crisis DocumentsMemorandum for McGeorge Bundy from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., April 10, 1961State Department White Paper, April 1961From the Cable on the Conversation between Gromyko and Kennedy, October 18, 1962Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the CC CPSU, October 20, 1962President John F. Kennedy’s speech to the Nation, October 22, 1962Resolution Adopted by the Council of the Organization of American States Acting Provisionally as the Organ of Consultation, October 23, 1962Message from Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos to Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós, October 23, 1962Letter from Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy, October 24, 1962Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, October 24, 1962Memorandum for President Kennedy from Douglas Dillon, October 26, 1962Telegram from Fidel Castro to N.S. Khrushchev, October 26, 1962Letter from Khrushchev to Fidel Castro, October 28, 1962Cable from USSR Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 28, 1962Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the U.N. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry (1), October 30, 1962Premier Khrushchev’s Letter to Prime Minister Castro, October 30, 1962Prime Minister Castro’s Letter to Premier Khrushchev, October 31, 1962Meeting of the Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba with Mikoyan in the Presidential Palace, November 4, 1962Brazilian Foreign Ministry Memorandum, “Question of Cuba,” November 20, 1968Letter from Khrushchev to Fidel Castro, January 31, 1963“I Know Something About the Caribbean Crisis,” Notes from a Conversation with Fidel Castro, November 5, 1987Select Bibliography
