Russia's place in the world as a powerful regional actor can no longer be denied; the question that remains concerns what this means in terms of foreign policy and domestic stability for the actors involved in the situation, as Russia comes to grips with its newfound sources of might.
"As Robert Art makes clear in a groundbreaking conclusion, those results have been mixed at best. Art dissects the uneven performance of coercive diplomacy and explains why it has sometimes worked and why it has more often failed."--BOOK JACKET.
Russia's place in the world as a powerful regional actor can no longer be denied; the question that remains concerns what this means in terms of foreign policy and domestic stability for the actors involved in the situation, as Russia comes to grips with its newfound sources of might.
This volume explores sanctions as instruments of coercive diplomacy, delving into theoretical arguments and combining perspectives from international law and international relations scholars and practitioners. Primary questions include the compatibility and legitimacy of sanctions regimes, enforcement measures, including the role of sanctions committees, the practice of circumventing sanctions, and the relation with the ICC proceedings. Legal and institutional aspects of the practice of the European Union are addressed. The extraterritorial effects of national legislation implementing sanctions imposed by individual States are investigated. A focus is on the impact of sanctions on non-State actors. The connections with the protection of human rights and the adverse impact on individual rights are considered. The implementation of sanctions is addressed in view of their legal limitation and the concept of proportionality, their consequences upon existing treaties and contracts, their effectiveness, and their strategic implications.
Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction adapts Clausewitz's framework to highlight the dynamic relationship between the main elements of strategy: purpose, method, and means. Drawing on historical examples, Antulio J. Echevarria discusses the major types of military strategy and how emerging technologies are affecting them. This second edition has been updated to include an expanded chapter on manipulation through cyberwarfare and new further reading.
Peacekeeping operations have become a central issue in international relations since the end of the Cold War. This work underlines the mixture of defensive and offensive stimuli driving Russian 'peacekeeping' strategies, and highlights the dangers that the new Russian Federation faces in undertaking these operations.
Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, there has been much talk of a new Cold War between the West and Russia. Under Putin’s authoritarian leadership, Moscow is widely seen as volatile, belligerent and bent on using military force to get its way. In this incisive analysis, top Russian foreign and security policy analyst Dmitri Trenin explains why the Cold War analogy is misleading. Relations between the West and Russia are certainly bad and dangerous but - he argues - they are bad and dangerous in new ways; crucial differences which make the current rivalry between Russia, the EU and the US all the more fluid and unpredictable. Unpacking the dynamics of this increasingly strained relationship, Trenin makes a compelling case for handling Russia with pragmatism and care rather than simply giving into fear.
Why do states often refuse to yield to military threats from a more powerful actor, such as the United States? Why do they frequently prefer war to compliance? International Relations scholars generally employ the rational choice logic of consequences or the constructivist logic of appropriateness to explain this puzzling behavior. Max Weber, however, suggested a third logic of choice in his magnum opus Economy and Society: human decision making can also be motivated by emotions. Drawing on Weber and more recent scholarship in sociology and psychology, Robin Markwica introduces the logic of affect, or emotional choice theory, into the field of International Relations. The logic of affect posits that actors' behavior is shaped by the dynamic interplay among their norms, identities, and five key emotions: fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation. Markwica puts forward a series of propositions that specify the affective conditions under which leaders are likely to accept or reject a coercer's demands. To infer emotions and to examine their influence on decision making, he develops a methodological strategy combining sentiment analysis and an interpretive form of process tracing. He then applies the logic of affect to Nikita Khrushchev's behavior during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and Saddam Hussein's decision making in the Gulf conflict in 1990-1 offering a novel explanation for why U.S. coercive diplomacy succeeded in one case but not in the other.