“About 2 p.m., July 31, 1990, an explosives accident occurred in the last open crosscut between the Nos. 1 and 2 Right entries of Granny Rose Coal Company’s No. 3 Mine. Six miners were present on the working section at the time of the explosion. Three of the miners died instantly as a result of the explosion. Two other miners were admitted to the hospital for observation because of smoke inhalation and other trauma. The remining miner was not injured.......The accident and resultant fatalities occurred because mine management failed to take proper measures to ensure entries and crosscuts were mined in the proper direction and alignment.”
In To Punish or Persuade, John Braithwaite declares that coal mine disasters are usually the result of corporate crime. He surveys 39 coal mine disasters from around the world, including 19 in the United States since 1960, and concludes that mine fatalities are usually not caused by human error or the unstoppable forces of nature. He shows that a combination of punitive and educative measures taken against offenders can have substantial effects in reducing injuries to miners. Braithwaite not only develops a model for determining the optimal mix of punishment and persuasion to maximize mine safety, but provides regulatory agencies in general with a model for mixing the two strategies to ensure compliance with the law. To Punish or Persuade looks at coal mine safety in the United States, Great Britain, Australia, France, Belgium, and Japan. It examines closely the five American coal mining companies with the best safety performance in the industry: U.S. Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Consolidation Coal Company, Island Creek Coal Company, and Old Ben Coal Company. It also takes a look at the safety record of unionized versus non-unionized mines and how safety regulation enforcement impacts productivity.
In the 1950s Centralia was a small town, like many others in the anthracite region of Pennsylvania. But since the 1960s, it has been consumed, outwardly and inwardly by a fire that has inexorably spread in the abandoned mines beneath it. The earth smokes, subsides, and breathes poisonous gases. No less destructive has been the spread of dissension and enmity among the townspeople. The Real Disaster Above Ground tells the story of the fire and the tragic failure of all efforts to counter it. This study of the Centralia fire represents the most thorough canvass of the documentary materials and the community that has appeared. The authors report on the futile efforts of residents to reach a common understanding of an underground threat that was not readily visible and invited multiple interpretations. They trace the hazard management strategies of government agencies that, ironically, all too often created additional threats to the welfare of Centralians. They report on the birth and demise of community organizations, each with its own solution to the problem and its diehard partisans. The final solution, now being put into effect, is to abandon the town and relocate its people. Centralia's environmental disaster, the authors argue, is not a local or isolated phenomenon. It warns of the danger lurking in our own technology when safeguards fail and disaster management policy is not in place to respond to failure, as the examples of Chernobyl and Bhopal have clearly demonstrated. The lessons in this study of the fate of a small town in Pennsylvania are indeed sobering. They should be pondered by a variety of social scientists and planners, by all those dealing with the behavior of people under stress and those responsible for the welfare of the public.
