(E-book available via MyiLibrary) In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. The Handbook of Organizational Economics surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field. It displays the breadth of topics in organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.
A graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.
It is our great pleasure to have you at the 2022 4th International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering (ICEMME 2022), which was held in Nanjing, China from November 18th to 20th (virtual event). It is an international forum for academic communications between experts and scholars in the fields of economic management and model engineering. The main objective of ICEMME 2022 is to provide a platform to deliberate latest developments and future directions in the fields of economic management and model engineering. The conference provided opportunities for the delegates to exchange research ideas and scientific information, and established business or research relations for all participants to find global partners for future collaboration.
Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
To commemorate Research in Labor Economics s 35th anniversary, this retrospective edition contains 20 of the most influential Research in Labor Economics articles along with new introductory prefatory updates written by the original authors.
This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design. This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.
Health economics has made major contributions to the development of health policy in many countries. This book describes those successes and looks forward to the major contributions that health economics can bring to bear on emerging policy issues in health and health care. With contributions from internationally recognized researchers, this book addresses generic policy issues confronting health systems across the developed world. The coverage progresses from micro, patient level issues to macro, whole system issues including: ·Determining cost-effective treatments ·Fair distribution of health care ·Regulatory issues such as performance measurement and incentives ·Revenue distribution ·Decentralization and internationalization of health systems Health Policy and Economics identifies the major contributions that health economics makes to important policy issues in health and health care. It is key reading for policy makers and health managers as well as students and academics with an interest in health policy and health services research. Contributors: Ron L. Akehurst, Karen E. Bloor, Martin Buxton, Karl P. Claxton, Richard Cookson, Diane A. Dawson, Paul Dolan, Mike Drummond, Brian Ferguson, Hugh Gravelle, Maria Goddard, Katharina Hauck, John Hutton, Andrew M. Jones, Rowena Jacobs, Paul Kind, Rosella Levaggi, Guillem López Casanovas, Alan K. Maynard, Nigel Rice, Anthony Scott, Rebecca Shaw, Trevor Sheldon, Andrew D. Street, Mark Sculpher, Matthew Sutton, Peter C. Smith, Adrian Towse, Aki Tsuchiya, Alan H. Williams.
This book demonstrates what kind of problems, originating in a management accounting setting, may be solved with game theoretic models. Game theory has experienced growing interest and numerous applications in the field of management accounting. The main focus traditionally has been on the field of non-cooperative behaviour, but the area of cooperative game theory has developed rapidly and has received increasing attention. Intensive research, in combination with the changing culture of publishing, has produced a nearly unmanageable number of publications in the areas concerned. Therefore, one main purpose of this volume is providing an intensive analysis of the intersection of these areas. In addition, the book strengthens the relationship between the theory and the practical applications and it illustrates the two-sided relationship between game theory and management accounting: new game theoretic models offer new fields of applications and these applications raise new questions for the theory.
The history, mystique, and remarkable success of Goldman Sachs, the world's premier investment bank, are examined in unprecedented depth in this fascinating and authoritative study. Former Goldman Sachs Vice President Lisa Endlich draws on an insider's knowledge and access to all levels of management to bring to life this unique company that has long mystified financial players and pundits. The firm's spectacular ascent is traced in the context of its tenacious grip on its core values. Endlich shows how close client contact, teamwork, focus on long-term profitability rather than short-term opportunism, and the ability to recruit consistently some of the most talented people on Wall Street helped the firm generate a phenomenal $3 billion in pretax profits in 1997. And she describes in detail the monumental events of 1998 that shook Goldman Sachs and the financial world. Her book documents some of the most stunning accomplishments in modern American finance, as told through the careers of the gifted and insightful men who have led Goldman Sachs. It begins with Marcus Goldman, a German immigrant who in 1869 founded the firm in a lower Manhattan basement. After the turn of the century, we see his son Henry and his son-in-law Sam Sachs develop a full-service bank. Sidney Weinberg, a kid from the streets, was initially hired as an assistant porter and became senior partner in 1930. We watch him as he steers the firm through the aftermath of the Crash and raises the Goldman Sachs name to national prominence. When he leaves in 1969 the firm has a solid-gold reputation and a first-class list of clients. We see his successor, Gus Levy, a trading wizard and in his day the best-known man on Wall Street, urging greater risk, inventing block trading (which revolutionized the exchanges), and psychologically preparing Goldman Sachs for the complex and perilous financial world that was the 1980s. Endlich shows us how co-CEOs John Whitehead and John Weinberg turned the family firm into a highly professional international organization with a culture that was the envy of Wall Street. She shows as well how Steve Friedman and Robert Rubin brought the firm to the pinnacle of investment banking, increased annual profits from $900 million to $2.7 billion, and achieved dominance in most of the businesses in which the firm competes internationally. We see how Goldman Sachs weathered both an insider trading scandal and the fallout from its relationship with Robert Maxwell. We are taken to the present day, as Jon Corzine and Hank Paulson lead the firm out of turmoil to face the most important decision ever placed before the partnership--the question of a public sale. For many years the leadership wrestled with the issue behind closed doors. Now, against the backdrop of unforeseen events, we witness the passionate debate that engulfed the entire partnership. A rare and revealing look inside a great institution--the last private partnership on Wall Street--and inside the financial world at its highest levels.
