The natural gas sector in Argentina is undergoing profound change as a result of regulatory and structural reforms launched at the end of the 1980s. Critical to achieving national economic restructuring, these reform measures were aimed at improving economic efficiency and increasing investment through greater reliance on market forces and new opportunities for private capital. This report, the first IEA study to focus on Argentina, critically reviews the impact of gas-sector reforms. It identifies challenges that policy makers, regulatory and competition authorities still confront, in particular the promotion of competition in gas supply.
The natural gas sector in Argentina is undergoing profound change as a result of regulatory and structural reforms launched at the end of the 1980s. Critical to achieving national economic restructuring, these reform measures were aimed at improving economic efficiency and increasing investment through greater reliance on market forces and new opportunities for private capital. This report, the first IEA study to focus on Argentina, critically reviews the impact of gas-sector reforms. It identifies challenges that policy makers, regulatory and competition authorities still confront, in particular the promotion of competition in gas supply.
Liberalization of the natural gas industry is complex because the sector combines activities with natural monopoly characteristics with activities that are potentially competitive. The challenges are compounded when the state opts to retain vertically integrated monopolies in otherwise contestable segments of the industry. Regulatory issues associated with partial liberalization of natural gas markets are analyzed through a case study of Mexico.
Argentina's natural gas industry was privatized at the end of 1992. Prior to divestiture, the state-owned monopoly Gas del Estado was divided into two transport and eight distribution companies, all of which were sold through international bidding. An independent government body, Ente Naal Regulador de Gas (Enargas), was established to regulate the transport and distribution segments of the industry. As part of its mandate, Enargas is in charge of price reviews. These reviews, which occur every five years, determine the allowed tariffs for each transport and distribution company. The first such review took place in 1996-97, and the new tariffs went into effect in January 1998. This Note examines the methodology and outcome of this experience. The Enargas price review is of interest for several reasons. First, it is the first of its kind in Argentina, and one of the first in a developing country. The outcome of the process provides a test of the regulatory framework adopted by the Argentine government, and may influence regulatory reform in other parts of the world. Second, as the first such event, the 1996-97 review set a precedent for methodologies and approaches to be used in future utility price reviews in Argentina. Finally, the approach used to calculate the cost of capital-as well as the other parameters used to set prices-provide an interesting illustration of how theoretical and practical methods from regulatory practice in industrial countries can be adapted to developing countries, where data availability and other restrictions prevent a direct transfer of techniques.
This paper develops a theoretical model based on stylized facts regarding regulation and performance of the oil and gas sectors in Argentina after the fall of Convertibility. Regarding performance, facts include an important drop in domestic production and investment, as well as a reversal in the energy trade balance (from surplus to deficit). Regulations include a direct government intervention in upstream and downstream prices (below international ones), together with strong restrictions to export. The model uses a self-enforcing equilibrium concept derived from Yared (2010) to endogeneize such policy variables such as upstream domestic prices and downstream energy prices. The model can explain some of the regulation policies observed in the facts, including very low energy prices and strictly positive subsidies.
