This book provides a comprehensive understanding of how, and under which conditions, regulators in the social sectors are able to influence political agendas and issue definitions. In these political processes, agencies may become the policy entrepreneurs which are able to prioritize issues, placing them in the political agenda and influencing policy formulations. These activities generate additional questions about the political role of regulatory agencies and post-delegation settings. Based on original source data and a mixed methods approach, the book shows that the diffusion of regulatory agencies is not only limited to regulatory responsibilities and to their increasing role in policy-making, but their influence has stretched over the agenda-setting phase but only under certain conditions. Moreover, the evolution of their strategies, the production and use of knowledge and the context in which they operate enable them to exert leverage on agendas. This book will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners of the politics of regulation, bureaucracy, agenda-setting, public policy, social problems and more broadly to European and comparative politics, and democracy.
Featuring a comprehensive analytical collection of interdisciplinary research on regulatory authorities, this innovative Handbook combines contributions from leading scholars and regulatory practitioners to present the fundamental theoretical concepts, empirical achievements and challenges in the contemporary study of regulatory authorities.
Setting the agenda on agenda setting, this Handbook explores how and why private matters become public issues and occasionally government priorities. It provides a comprehensive overview and analysis of the perspectives, individuals, and institutions involved in setting the government’s agenda at subnational, national, and international levels. Drawing on contributions from leading academics across the world, this Handbook is split into five distinct parts. Part one sets public policy agenda setting in its historical context, devoting chapters to more in-depth studies of the main individual scholars and their works. Part two offers an extensive examination of the theoretical development, whilst part three provides a comprehensive look at the various institutional dimensions. Part four reviews the literature on sub-national, national and international governance levels. Finally, part five offers innovative coverage on agenda setting during crises.
Legislatures are arguably the most important political institution in modern democracies. The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies, written by some of the most distinguished legislative scholars in political science, provides a comprehensive and up-to-date description and critical assessment of the state of the art in this key area.
Why are the economic interests and priorities of lower- and middle-class Americans so often ignored by the U.S. Congress, while the economic interests of the wealthiest are prioritized, often resulting in policies favorable to their interests? In Hijacking the Agenda, political scientists Christopher Witko, Jana Morgan, Nathan J. Kelly, and Peter K. Enns examine why Congress privileges the concerns of businesses and the wealthy over those of average Americans. They go beyond demonstrating that such economic bias exists to illuminate precisely how and why economic policy is so often skewed in favor of the rich. The authors analyze over 20 years of floor speeches by several hundred members of Congress to examine the influence of campaign contributions on how the national economic agenda is set in Congress. They find that legislators who received more money from business and professional associations were more likely to discuss the deficit and other upper-class priorities, while those who received more money from unions were more likely to discuss issues important to lower- and middle-class constituents, such as economic inequality and wages. This attention imbalance matters because issues discussed in Congress receive more direct legislative action, such as bill introductions and committee hearings. While unions use campaign contributions to push back against wealthy interests, spending by the wealthy dwarfs that of unions. The authors use case studies analyzing financial regulation and the minimum wage to demonstrate how the financial influence of the wealthy enables them to advance their economic agenda. In each case, the authors examine the balance of structural power, or the power that comes from a person or company’s position in the economy, and kinetic power, the power that comes from the ability to mobilize organizational and financial resources in the policy process. The authors show how big business uses its structural power and resources to effect policy change in Congress, as when the financial industry sought deregulation in the late 1990s, resulting in the passage of a bill eviscerating New Deal financial regulations. Likewise, when business interests want to preserve the policy status quo, it uses its power to keep issues off of the agenda, as when inflation eats into the minimum wage and its declining purchasing power leaves low-wage workers in poverty. Although groups representing lower- and middle-class interests, particularly unions, can use their resources to shape policy responses if conditions are right, they lack structural power and suffer significant resource disadvantages. As a result, wealthy interests have the upper hand in shaping the policy process, simply due to their pivotal position in the economy and the resulting perception that policies beneficial to business are beneficial for everyone. Hijacking the Agenda is an illuminating account of the way economic power operates through the congressional agenda and policy process to privilege the interests of the wealthy and marks a major step forward in our understanding of the politics of inequality.
Why does the EU deal with some issues but not others? This is the central question of this book dedicated to agenda-setting processes in the EU. Through a comparison of EU and US policy agendas and the analysis of four case studies in environmental and health policy, this book offers a new understanding of how policy issues come onto the EU agenda.
Over the past forty years, numerous theoretical advances have been made. From Ayres’ and Braithwaite’s ground breaking work on ‘responsive regulation’, we have seen models of ‘smart regulation’, ‘regulatory governance’ and ‘regulatory capitalism’ emerge to capture the growing prevalence and importance of regulation in modern liberal Western capitalist societies. Important advances also have been made in the practice of regulation, with regulators evolving from traditional enforcement focussed ‘command and control’ models to being ‘modern regulators’ with a suite of diverse and innovative regulatory tools at their disposal. The book presents and critically examines these theoretical and practical developments from the perspective of governments who design regulations, and the regulators that deploy them. In doing so, the book examines the various forces and interests that influence and shape the regulatory endeavour, and the practical challenges facing governments and regulators when deciding whether and how to regulate. This volume is a study of regulation in context: in the context of the public policy it is designed to deliver; the law that enables, shapes and holds it to account; and the evolving societal and institutional frameworks within which it takes place. Aimed to provide innovative cross-disciplinary conceptual frameworks that regulators, regulatees, those whom regulation is intended to benefit, and academics, might employ to better understand and undertake the regulatory endeavour. This will be of great interest to researchers, educators, advanced students and practitioners working in the fields of political science, public management and administration, and public policy. .
Whether striving to protect citizens from financial risks, climate change, inadequate health care, or the uncertainties of the emerging “sharing” economy, regulators must routinely make difficult judgment calls in an effort to meet the conflicting demands that society places on them. Operating within a political climate of competing demands, regulators need a lodestar to help them define and evaluate success. Achieving Regulatory Excellence provides that direction by offering new insights from law, public administration, political science, sociology, and policy sciences on what regulators need to do to improve their performance. Achieving Regulatory Excellence offers guidance from leading international experts about how regulators can set appropriate priorities and make sound, evidence-based decisions through processes that are transparent and participatory. With increasing demands for smarter but leaner government, the need for sound regulatory capacity—for regulatory excellence—has never been stronger.
This book explains how international financial law 'works' and presents an alternative theory for understanding its purpose, operation, and limitations. Drawing on a close institutional analysis of the post-crisis financial architecture, it argues that international financial law is often bolstered by a range of reputational, market, and institutional mechanisms that make it more coercive than classical theories of international law predict. As such, it is a powerful, though at times imperfect, tool of financial diplomacy. Expanded and revised, the second edition of Soft Law and the Global Financial System contains updated material as well as an extensive new chapter analyzing how international standards and best practices have been operationalized in the US and EU in the wake of the financial crisis. It remains an essential tool for understanding global soft law for political scientists, lawyers, economists, and students of financial statecraft.
This title was first published in 2000. A timely look at the politics of agenda setting in relation to the car, under both the Conservative and Labour governments since the late 1980s.
